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Abstract 
This thesis examines the process of nation-building in South Asia, 
with particular reference to the Baluch in Pakistan and the Sikhs in 
India. The two movements stand in stark contrast to one another. The 
Baluch, a closed tribal community with low levels of socio-economic 
development represent a small ethnic group in Pakistan; while the 
Sikhs, a small religious minority, are a robust people with high levels 
of socio-economic development in India. But both desired a separate 
homeland for themselves. 
The thesis pursues two objectives. First, it analyses the factors 
responsible for the growth of separatist sentiments among the Baluch 
and the Sikhs, as well as the causes contributing to the decline of the 
respective movements. It explains these dynamics with the help of 
three variables: the nature of the movements, the policies of the 
Pakistani and Indian state, and the role of external powers. The period 
selected for the two case studies coincides with the rise, operation, and 
decay of the two movements. For the Baluch it ranges from 1971, the 
beginning of the civil war to 1981. In the case of Khalistan, it 
concentrates on the period from 1978 to 1992. Second, it examines the 
phenomenon of separatism in the larger context of state-building in 
South Asia, but more specifically India and Pakistan. It looks at the 
policies of both the Indian and Pakistani states in dealing with their 
ethnic minorities. 
The study does not subscribe to any one theory to explain the rise of 
the Baluch and Khalistan movements. Instead it adopts a trans-
v 
disciplinary approach using various schools of social anthropology 
and political science to understand separatism ii\ the subcontinent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts have dominated much of the discourse 
in contemporary politics in recent years. The salience of ethnic conflict 
can be measured from the fact that there is hardly any part of the 
world that has not witnessed it in some form and magnitude. The 
importance of ethnicity as a force shaping human affairs is 
unquestionable. A ubiquitous and pervasive phenomenon, it has, as 
remarked by Donald Horowitz, fought and bled and burned its way 
into public and scholarly consciousness.I 
Though not unique to South Asia, the assertion of separate identities 
remains the biggest challenge to the stability and integrity of states in 
the subcontinent. In fact it has been a critical variable in the formation 
and re-demarcation of boundaries in the region. Almost all the 
countries in the region face cleavages and conflicts along cultural and 
religious lines. They have also inherited asymmetrically developed 
social structures and political and economic institutions. 
Efforts at nation-building have tended to create further imbalances 
within the polity, with federal governments in most states grappling 
with problems of integrating different groups. The clash between the 
ever-increasing clamour for nationhood and sovereignty on the one 
hand, and the notions of indivisible statehood on the other, have 
created a fundamental contradiction in contemporary times. There are 
1 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985) p. xi. 
two major views on the contested concept of sovereignty. The first is a 
conceptualisation which emanates from a centralised state apparatus 
while the second view is that sovereignty resides in the social base of a 
nation, the essence of which is a psychological bond that joins people 
and differentitates them, in the subconscious conviction of their 
members, from all non-members in a most vital way.2 The failure of 
the state to articulate a viable national identity and the simultaneous 
politicisation of ethnic identities have complicated the process 
further. 
The main objectives of this thesis are two-fold. It examines the process 
of nation-building in the comparative context of South Asia, but more 
specifically India and Pakistan. Second, it looks at the Baluch and 
Khalistan movements, and studies the failure of the two in the larger 
context of the strategies of nation-building and governance in their 
respective countries. It does so by looking at the nature of the 
respective movements; the role of the state; and patterns of external 
involvement. 
Most Third World state systems are legacies of colonial conquest and 
partition. According to Anthony Smith, the new states in Asia and 
Africa came under considerable pressure to create nations such as 
those that existed in Europe and America. Their commitment to 
nation-building implied that they created a national cultural and 
political identity that could differentiate them from their neighbours.3 
To this extent, most post-colonial Third World countries have 
embodied some aspects of the Western model of the nation-state in 
2Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism, The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994) p. 197. 
3 Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991) p. 112. 
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that they have all aspired to political unity and to the capability to 
prescribe rules of social behaviour .4 A nation-state can be defined as 
one in which the state's boundaries coincide with the nation's and the 
total population of the state shares a uniform culture. 
As with other Third World countries, the problems of national 
integration in South Asia need to be studied against the backdrop of 
partition and the process of nation-building since independence. 
Integration has been defined as 
the degree of cohesion that binds members of social systems together and is 
generally thought of in terms of values, institutions and communications which 
facilitate escalating sequences of social contact, cooperation and consensus.5 
Myron Weiner has delineated five aspects of integration including 
"the process of bringing culturally and socially discreate groups into a 
single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity," 
the establishment of "national central authority over subordinate 
political units or regimes which may or may not coincide with distinct 
cultural or social groups," the achievement of a "minimum value 
consensus necessary to maintain a social order," by promoting 
. common values through political socialization; and organization of 
society for some common purposes so that the leadership may carry 
4For a detailed discussion and a critique of the Western nation-state model see Partha 
Chatterjee,The Nation and its Fragments, Colonial and Post Colonial Histories '(New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993). Chatterjee argues that while in the outer 
material domain comprising the economy, state craft, science and technology the 
colonial state imitated the West, in the inner spiritual domain of national culture, 
the nation was already sovereign, even when the state was in the hands of the 
colonial power. See p. 6. 
5oonald G. Morrison and Hugh M. Stevenson, "Integration and Instability,"American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 66, September 1972, p. 903. Cited in Arthur G. Rubinoff, 
"Integration Theories and the Case of Goa," in Milton Israel (ed.), National Unity, 
The South Asian Experience (New Delhi: Promilla and Co. Publishers, 1983), p. 166. 
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out programmatic goals.6 Integration fundamentally presupposes the 
transformation of separate units into "components of a coherent 
system."7 
According to Myron Weiner, the scale and volume of conflict between 
social groups increases as societies modernize. As a result "traditional 
rivalries are aggravated and new conflicts are created as social 
relationships change."8 Walker Connors is also of t}:te view that such 
a process can lead to fragmentation, especially since modernisation 
makes the minorities more aware of the distinctions between 
themselves and others.9 However, some like Jyotindra Das Gupta are 
of the opinion that while inter-group conflicts in segmented societies 
are initially conducted on a communal basis, such politics have 
eventually led to the creation of interest groups, political parties and 
other institutions which have penetrated the body politic promoting 
integration in the long run. 10 
This has created its own dilemmas for the ruling elite of many Third 
World countries as they seek to integrate into the international order 
as modem states. The multi-ethnic nature of the newly created states 
makes integration a particularly difficult task for the central 
government in Third World societies. Attempts to "invent" a new 
political culture out of myriad groups has provoked fierce opposition 
6Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," The annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, no. 358, March 1965, pp. 53-54. 
7Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, (New Jersey: Englewood 
Cliffs, 1978), p. 198. 
8Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," op. cit, p. 59. 
9walker Connor, Ethnonationalism - The Quest for Understanding (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 37. 
IOJyotindra Das Gupta, Language, Conflict and National Development (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1970). 
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from minority ethnic groups, which have over the years become 
politically conscious entities. The state finds it difficult to contain, far 
less subdue, this form of ethnic nationalism giving rise. to different 
forms of conflict. Under the circumstances, few states can claim to be 
nation-states. 
In South Asia, each country has relied upon its own forms of nation-
building, some more successfully than others. But the essential 
contradiction between the nature of the state and the multi-ethnic 
social system persists, in varying degrees. 
In Pakistan, Islam has been used as a unifying force to bring different 
ethnic groups together in the absence of territorial integrity, a 
common language, and a sense of national community. In India, the 
central leadership attempted various strategies of nation-building in 
the 1950s and 1960s, which included the recognition of linguistic 
diversity, the secular nature of the Indian state, and special provisions 
for backward castes and minority communities. In Bangladesh, the 
constitution of 1972 was modelled on the principles of democracy, 
. socialism, nationalism and ~ecularism, with "Bengaliness" at the 
heart of the country's identity._ The secular platform has since been 
dropped in favour of Muslim Bangladeshi nationalism as part of the 
nation-building project. Similarly, Sri Lanka has been drawing upon 
Sinhalese and Buddhist identities to define its concept of a nation-
state. This trend became particularly strong when the Sri Lankan 
Freedom Party came into power in 1956. While some of these policies 
have been successful, others have exacerbated conflicts instead of 
resolving them. 
5 
In their acute form conflicts could become separtist or even 
secessionist. Inayatullah Baluch delineates six stages in the 
progression of an ethnic movement to becoming a secessionist one. It 
is, however, not essential for the movement to go through these 
stages in their natural order of progression. These stages are identified 
as: ethnic awareness; ethnic evaluation; demands for equality and 
justice in various spheres of life against real or perceived 
discrimination; demand for a separate province; bluff secesion to 
extract concessions without a serious determination to secede; and 
finally actual secession in which_ the ethnic group engages in a 
struggle for a separate state or its merger in a neighbouring political 
community in which it has members of its own ethnic community 
(irredentism).11 
Secession can be defined as a "unilateral act for independence by a 
group comprising territory in a sovereign, independent state 
undertaken in opposition to the metropole".12 International law does 
not recognise the right to secession. It recognises the right to self-
determination of peoples, but in the context of the right of the 
populations to free themselves of colonial rule to reorganise 
themselves as nation-states. Political theorists who have recently 
turned their attention to the problem of secession have favoured a 
more generous right than that allowed by international laws.13 The 
11 Inayatullah, Politics of Ethnicity and Separatism in South Asia (Lahore: Centre 
for South Asian Studies, 1988), p. 17. 
12Alexis Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Nonintervention: In Quest of 
a Normative Symbiosis, "Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 45, no. 2, Winter 1992, 
r- 401. 
3There are two basic perspectives underlying the arguments on secession. The less 
permissive liberal view argues that there is a restricted right to secede, and put s 
forth moral justifications in favour of maintaining existing states, and a right of 
secession. The wrongs that create a right of secession include unjust conquest, 
exploitation, the threat of extermination, and the threat of cultural extinction. The 
mo~e permissive liberal view believes that a group of people can seceede if they 
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states, however, remain wary of any further division of their 
territories. 
In South Asia, few attempts at secession have been successful, but the 
tendency remains strong among many groups including the Muhajirs 
in Pakistan, Nagas and Kashmiris in India, and Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
Separatism on the other hand is an active political movement within 
an independent state that aspires to some form of territorial 
separatism ranging from autonomy to independence. In order to 
understand its significance, the following issues need to be analysed: 
the factors accounting for the rise of separatism; the impact of 
separatism on the groups and the state from which they are seceding; 
the internal politics of separatism, including the rise of separatist 
leadership, its legitimisation and control; the international 
ramifications of movements seeking self-determination, and reaction 
of the international system; and more significantly why most groups 
fail to achieve a separate state. In an attempt to address these 
questions, the study employs contrasting profiles of the Baluch 
insurrection in Pakistan and the Khalistan movement in India. It 
hopes that their similarities and dissimilarities will provide insights 
into the complex phenomenon of separatism in South Asia as a 
whole. 
The Punjab problem, which posed a formidable challenge to the 
territorial integrity of India, was a result of concurrent social, 
perceive themselves as having a distinct culture so long as they do not violate the 
rights of others living in the teritory. The Communitarian argument holds that 
secessionist group should be a community of a kind suitable for statehood, and the 
claim to secede should be upheld only if there really is a community - not if people 
merely believe there is one or wish they were. See Percy B. Lehning, Theories of 
Secession (London: Routledge, 1988). 
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economic and political factors that alienated the Sikhs from the rest of 
the country. With the coming of the green revolution in 1965-66, 
Punjab became the bread-basket of India, providing much of the 
country's food supply. However, relative wealth and prosperity could 
not contain the popular disaffection that had crept into the political 
landscape of Punjab by the 1980s. The Sikhs demanded a political 
solution on issues relating to the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, 
the redistrihµtion of the Ravi Beas river waters, and greater autonomy 
for Punjab. The failure of state and federal governments to address 
these political and economic problems of the state facilitated the rise 
of fundamentalist leaders like Bhindranwale, who began to attract the 
Sikhs on a communal platform. Thus started a series of atrocities 
which continued to widen the chasm between the Sikhs and the 
federal government till 1990. However, after a decade-long war against 
the state, Punjab limped back to a state of normalcy by 1992. 
The Baluch movement presents a stark contrast to the Punjab case, 
and is an example of how underdevelopment has created grounds for 
insurgency and secessionism in Pakistan. The Baluch are spread. along 
900 miles of the Arabian sea coastline and inhabit one of the most 
barren and arid areas of Pakistan. They harbour deep resentment 
against the policies of the federal government which are regarded as 
discriminatory, exploitative and centralising. Despite being rich in 
natural resources, Baluchistan is the least populated and the most 
underdeveloped province in Pakistan, with low levels of socio-
economic development and political mobilisation. Further, the 
Baluch have been steadily marginalised in Baluchistan by the Sindhis, 
Punjabis and, in particular, the Pushtuns whose numbers have risen 
considerably after the Afghan crisis, resulting in an open conflict for 
8 
jobs, space, and business. Thus their sense of ethno-nationalism has 
been fuelled to a large extent by their perceived deprivation vis-a-vis 
the Punjabi ruling elite at the centre and the Pushtuns at the 
provincial level. The goals of the Baluch movement have ranged 
from provincial autonomy to the demand for an Independent 
Baluchistan and the movement for a "Greater Baluchistan" to include 
the Baluch areas of Iran and Afghanistan. 
While attempting to study the Baluch and the Khalistan movements, 
this thesis postulates that the course of any movement14 is contingent 
on a variety of factors. First is the nature of the movement itself: its 
leadership, organisational base, numerical strength and the historical 
and cultural forces which lend character and weight to the 
movement. Second is the response of governments to ethnic groups: 
the strategies employed by them vis-a-vis the respective groups -
coercion, conciliation or a blend of the two, and the socio-political and 
economic policies of the state towards them. Third is the level of 
external support provided by other countries to the groups in 
question, the role of the diaspora in sustaining the movement from 
outside, and the role of other organisations in providing arms and 
other forms of support to the groups. 
When a particular group becomes aware of its cultural attributes and 
becomes politically mobilised, a struggle against the state may be 
initiated. If the state has pursued policies that are perceived as being 
detrimental to the interests of the group, this could lead to further 
mobilisation of the groups against the state; depending on the 
14For an analysis of the dynamics of movements see Sidney Tarrow, Power in 
Movement, Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 
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response of the state in addressing their legitimate grievances and 
concerns, the movements may either be contained or flare into 
something big. State power is usually greater than that of the ethnic 
group and in some cases the state can deliver a crushing blow to a 
movement. But where the group's leadership base and infrastructure 
are strong, and the diaspora active, even the state finds it difficult to 
overcome the resistance. I 
If all the above are present - that is, the ethnic group is well organised 
and has a strong leadership base, the response of the state is more 
aggressive than conciliatory, and the group finds external support in 
the form of arms and finance - there is a greater possibility of the 
group desiring a separate state. The success of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka can be attributed to the concurrence of all 
these factors. Consequently it can be argued that the reasons why other 
movements have not followed suit is because they lack one or more 
of these conditions. 
The significance of study and literature review 
The thesis does not resort to any·one theory to explain the causes and 
consequences of ethnic conflict. Using a large instrumentarium 
developed by primordialist, instrumentalist, relative deprivation and 
internal colonialism schools of social anthropology and political 
science, a trans-disciplinary approach is adopted to study certain 
aspects of ethnicity. This work does not attempt to look into the 
complex genesis and dynamics of ethnicity as such but concentrates 
more specifically on the rise of separatism in the subcontinent. The 
functional relevance of the theories of ethnic behaviour lies in their 
10 
being able to explain the phenomenon of separatism, or at least some 
of its dimensions.IS 
There has been a steady flow of literature on the changing political 
climate of South Asian countries in the post-colonial situation. 
However, there has been little analysis of the issues in a comparative 
framework, especially on a regional basis. Most of the available 
literature has traced developments in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal and Bangladesh independently, without comparing or relating 
them to the region as a whole (notable exceptions are works by Ayesha 
Jalal and Urmila Phadnis.16) This study is the first attempt of its kind 
to look at separatism in a comparative perspective contrasting the 
Baluch in Pakistan with the Sikhs in India. 
In the case of the Baluch, most of the literature dwells upon the 
narrative of events rather than providing a significant 
contextualisation of those events or a critical analysis of motives, 
strategies, and tactics of the Baluch movement.17 Selig Harrison's 
15 A similar approach has been adopted by Douglas Dion who uses formal theories of 
politics to study ethnic violence which he treats as simply another form of violence. 
See Douglas Dion, "Competition and Ethnic Conflict, Artifactual?"Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 41, no. 5, October 1997, pp. 638-48. 
16Urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nationbuilding in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1989) and Ayesha Jalal Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia-
A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995). 
17some of the important primary sources include The White Paper on Baluchistan 
(Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1974) which gives the official version for the 
beginnings of the Baluch civil war but stops at 1974, well before the civil war ended. 
The volumes of theWhite Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime 
(Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979) provide a general narrative of the 
performance of the Bhutto government but appear biased and touch upon the Baluch 
problem in a superficial manner. Of the secondary sources, Inayatullah Baluch's The 
Problem of Greater Baluchistan - A Study of Baluchistan (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag 
Wiesbaden, 1987), Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch's Inside Baluchistan, Political 
Autobiography of Khan-e-Azam, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch (Karachi: Royal 
Book Company, 1975), and Sardar Mohammad Khan Baluch's History of the Baluch 
Race and Baluchistan (Karachi: Process Pakistan, 1958) give a lucid account of the 
historical and cultural basis of the Baluch movement but do not deal with the 
11 
work is one of the more informative accounts of the Baluch 
movement while Janmahmad traces the history of the movement to 
a more recent period.18 
For the Khalistan movement, the sources are numerous with a 
wealth of both primary and secondary information.19 Important 
primary sources used here include statistical abstracts, theWhite Paper 
on the Punjab Crisis, the Blue Paper on the Massacre in the Sikh 
Homeland20 and interviews with important political leaders. Among 
recent secondary works, Paul Brass, Robin Jeffrey, Ramesh K. 
Chauhan, and Sharda Jain21 provide a good analytical account of the 
Punjab crisis. 
political ramifications of Baluch nationalism. Tariq Ali's Can Pakistan Suroive; The 
Death of a State (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics 
in Pakistan, The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1980), Tahir Amin's Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan, Domestic and 
International Factors (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988), Satish Kumar's 
The New Pakistan (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978) fill up this lacuna but 
do not give a detailed, comprehensive coverage of the movement. 
18 Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, Soviet Temptations and the Emergence 
of Baluch Nationalism (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1981) and Janmahmad, Essays in Baluch National Struggle in Pakistan-
Emergence, Dimensions, Repercussions (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1989). 
19secondary sources on Sikh religion and history include Khushwant Singh, A 
History of the Sikhs, vols. 1 &2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Rajiv 
Kapur, Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); W. 
H. McLeod, The Sikhs: History, Religion, and Society (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989), Marc Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar, Mrs Gandhi's Last 
Battle (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), Christopher Shackle, The Sikhs (London: 
Minority Rights Group, 1984), Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh, Tragedy of 
Punjab: Operation Blue Star and After (New Delhi: Vision Books Ltd, 1984). These 
provide a straightforward, descriptive narrative of the Punjab crisis while a more 
analytical account is given in Pramod Kumar et al.,Punjab Crisis: Context and Trends 
(Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1984). For 
the external dimensions of the crisis, significant works include Ghani Jafar, The Sikh 
Volcano (Islamabad: Vanguard Books, t987) and Maqsood Ahmed Masod and Peter 
Stockdale, The Khalistan Riddle (islamabad: Modem Book Depot, 1988). 
20White Paper on the Punjab Agitation (1984), Blue Paper on the Massacre in the 
Sikh Homeland-In Response to Mrs Gandhi's White Paper dated 10 July 1984 (New 
York: World Sikh Organisation, 1984). 
21; Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 1991), Robin Jeffrey,What's Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic 
Conflict and the Test for Federalism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1994), Ramesh K. 
Chauhan, Punjab and the Nationality Question (New Delhi: Deep and Deep 
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Thesis outline 
A selective survey of the literature on ethnicity is contained in 
Chapter 1 which also provides a conceptual framework for the study. 
It introduces key terms such as ethnicity, nation, nationalism and 
separatism. The relevance of various models - primordialist, 
instrumentalist, cultural pluralist, Marxist, internal colonialism and 
relative deprivation - is also discussed here. It is, however, asserted 
that no one theory can be applied exclusively. to explain the 
emergence or persistence of conflict in society, including separatism. 
The second chapter provides further elucidation to the theoretical 
concepts outlined in Chapter 1. While this thesis concerns itelf 
primarily with the Baluch and Khalistan case studies, Chapter 2 
presents a general picture of the South Asian scene in order to gain a 
broader understanding of the processes at work in the region and in 
particular, India and Pakistan. These are particularly relevant to 
understanding the policies of both countries towards insurgent groups 
other than the Baluch and the Sikhs. The Sindhi and the Mohajir 
Quami Movements in Pakistan, and the cases of Kashmir and the 
North East in India are particularly instructive in this regard. 
Similarly the Chakmas of Bangladesh can be likened to the Baluch 
and Nort East tribal groups in India, to compare the policies of the 
respective countries in the treatment of their frontier tribal 
communities. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's case in Sri 
Lanka explains why some movements are still active while others 
have petered out. 
Publications, 1995), Sharda Jain, Politics of Terrorism in India - The Case of Punjab 
(New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995). 
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The socio-political and economic background to the Baluch and 
Khalistan case studies will be dealt with in Chapter 3 which focuses on 
the nature of the movements. The period selected for the study 
coincides with the gestation, operation, and decay of the respective 
movements. In the case of the Baluch, the study ranges from 1971, the 
beginning of the civil war, to 1981. This period covers the rule of 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and a few years of the rule of Zia ul Haq, thereby 
providing a contrast between the supposedly democratic regime of 
Bhutto and the military dictatorship of Zia in dealing with the crisis. 
The study stops at 1981, when the movement was in decline. There 
have been sporadic bouts of ethnic violence in Baluchistan between 
the Baluch and the Push tuns since, but the movement has. ceased to 
be an issue in contemporary Pakistani politics. Similarly, for Khalistan 
the period covered stretches from 1978, with the beginnings of 
religious fundamentalism under Sikh leader Sant Bhindranwale up 
to 1992, which was a watershed for the Khalistan movement. 
The strategies of India and Pakistan in dealing with the respective 
groups will be discussed in this penultimate chapter. It looks at the 
strategies employed by the respective governments to contain ethnic 
conflict and at how policies of nation-building affected minority 
communities. Both India and Pakistan have instituted policies to 
address the grievances of minority ethnic groups, but when faced with 
the threat of secession by the groups in question, they have displayed 
both conciliatory and coercive tactics to silence them. The nature of 
party politics and the inter-party conflict between the Akali party and 
the Congress at both state and national levels will also be dealt with as 
part of the overall framework of centre-state relations in India. 
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External interventions and their underlying causes form the 
substance of the last chapter. It studi~s the links of the Baluch and 
Khalistan movements with their diasporas and with other external 
powers that have claimed to have supported the movements at 
different periods of time. It is argued that an independent Khalistan 
and an independent or Greater Baluchistan were unlikely from the 
very outset, but lack of timely support from external powers made the 
realisation of these goals even more difficult. 
Methodology 
Data for the study have been drawn from government archival 
sources, documents produced by the movements, secondary studies 
and interviews. There is an abundance of primary and secondary 
sources on the Khalistan movement, and interviews with important 
political leaders were conducted during the course of my field work in 
New Delhi and Punjab in 1996 and 1998. 
In the case of the Baluch, the scarcity of primary literature, and more 
significantly the author's inability to gain access to Pakistan, made 
data collection difficult. Reliance therefore had to be placed on major 
secondary sources, gathered from libraries and archives in Canberra, 
London, and New Delhi. Interviews with expatriate Baluch 
personalities were carried out in London in June 1996; in some cases, 
anonymity was requested. I have used the sources to the best of my 
ability, but the field remains open for further research. 
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Chapterl 
THEORIES OF ETHNICITY 
Ethnic conflicts have been on the increase in recent years in both scale 
and reach. According to a survey of states in armed conflict in 1988, of 
a total of 111 such conflicts in the world, 63 were internal and 36 were 
described as "wars of state formation" i.e. conflicts involving one 
government and an opposition group demanding autonomy or 
secession for a particular ethnic group or region.1 Despite a slight 
decline, 96 armed conflicts2 were reported during the period 1989-95, 
out of which 35 remained active in 1995.3 
However, despite growing evidence to this effect, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the underlying causes and dynamics of 
ethnicity. 
lcited in Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Ethnic Conflicts and their Impact on International 
Society," International Social Science Journal, no. 127, February 1991, p. 117. 
2 According to Peter Wallenstein and Margareta Sollenberg, an armed conlict is a 
contested incompatibility which concerns government and/ or territory where the use 
of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. See Peter Wallenstein and Margareta 
Sollenberg, "The End of International War? Armed Conflict 1985-95," Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 33, no. 3, 1996, p. 367. 
3Jbid., p. 353. For a list of armed conflicts in the world, 1989-95 see pp. 358-69. 
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In fact, most scholars have tended to either ignore the question of ethnic diversity 
or look upon it as an 
ephemeral nuisance that would unquestionably give way to a common identity uniting all 
inhabitants of the state, regardless of ethnic heritage, as modem communication and 
transportation networks linked the state's various parts more closely. 4 . 
It was only in the 1970s that the question of ethnicity sparked new concern 
among social scientists because ethnic conflicts persisted despite the oft-repeated 
claims of modeinists that these would fade away in the course of time as political 
and economic interaction among people transcended parochial barriers for larger, 
broad-based communities. The fact that instead of declining, ethnic conflicts have 
been on the rise in both modernising and developed societies thus justifies the 
concern for ethnic issues in recent years. Before examining the causes of ethnic 
conflict, term~ such as "nation," "state," "nation-state," and an "ethnic group" 
need some elucidation. 
4Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying," in Ethnonationalism - The Quest for 
Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 29. 
Definitions of State, Nation, Nation-State and Ethnic Group 
VI. 
State, as commonly defined, is a politico j4!;iical entity which is identified by its 
sovereign right over a defined territory. As Smith points out: 
Generically the state comprises a set of differentiated autonomous and public institution 
which are territorial centralised and claim jurisdiction over a given territory including 
the monopoly over coercion and extraction. a 
According to him, the main functions of a modem state include among others 
defence of territory from any external incursion, be it physical or cultural, and 
conflict resolution within its borders wherein the state acts as an arbiter to contain 
conflict between competing elites and groups. 
Max Weber defines states as a societal organisation which claims authority over a 
given population in a specific territory wherein it imposes its will through a 
system of administration and well defined low.b Ishtiaq Ahmed conceives state as 
an arbiter which society has created to resolve disputes among members in 
accordance with universal rules and procedures.c He further argues that all states 
are expressions of organised power and are almost headed by power elites and 
dominant classes. In the ultimate analysis, the power of the state rests on its 
ability to handle both internal and external challenges.d Most contemporary 
theories of modem state can be broadly grouped under the group pluralist 
perspective and the Marxist perspective. Scholars subscribing for. the group 
a Anthony D. Smith, "State-Making and Nation-Buildings," in John A. Hall (ed.) States in 
History (New York: B. Blackwell, 1986), p. 235. 
b Max Weber, "Basic Categories of Social Organisation," in W.G. Runciman (ed.), Weer 
Selections in Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 41. 
c Ishtiaq Ahmed, State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia (london: Pinter 
Publications, 1998), p. 27. 
d Ibid, p. 30 
and creates agencies which serve the interests of particular category of 
population. The state is not an independent force that acts either to prevent 
organisation of some groups or to promote organisations of others. e 
The classical Marxists, on the other hand, see the state as preserving the 
dominant economic mode of production and promoting the interests of the 
dominant class. It is seen as an organ of class domination by bourgeoisie in its 
struggle with proletariat. Neo-Marxists scholars, however, argue that the state is 
not just a product of class struggle but is a relatively autonomous force. The 
state apparatus develops interests of its own in maintaining its power and control. 
While pursuing this objective they may act independently or even go against what 
the dominant group desires.f 
Paul Brass elucidates the point further by stating that the "state tends both to 
favours some classes and ethnic groups at particular points in time as also 
develop relationships with elites to serve its own interests" .8 He also argues that a 
state particularly, in developing societies, is both a resource and distributor of 
resources on the one hand and a source and promoter of new values on the other. 
This often leads to struggles for control at the centre over the state itself over 
which groups engage in a continuing struggles in society undergoing 
secularisation, modernisation and industrialisation.h Nation, on the other hand, is 
generally defined as a politico cultural entity which can be identified by its 
"character" and collective rights. i 
e For details see Alfred Stepan, The State and Society : Peru in Comparative Perspective (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 11-16. 
fFor a useful discussion of these views see Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism - Theory and 
Comparison (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 250-51. 
g Ibid., p. 255. 
h Ibid., pp. 272-75. 
i Ishtiaq Ahmed, op. cit., p. 36 
Definitions of nation abound. To Stalin, a nation was a historically constituted 
stable community of people with a common language, territory, economic life, 
and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture. 5 Max Weber 
defined the nation as a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest 
itself into a state of its own. 6 A nation could also be seen as a particular type of 
ethnic community, or rather, as an ethnic community politicised, with recognised 
group rights in the political system. 7 
For Walker Connor, conceptualising the nation is difficult because the essence of 
a nation is intangible. This essence, according to him "is a psycological bond that 
joins people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, 
from all other people in the most vital way. "8 In other words what ultimately 
matters is not what is but what people believe is. He defines a state as a 
territorial political unit which can be quantified in terms of its area and 
population. 
It can thus be said that while states are political and legal entities that exercise 
sovereignty over a specified territory and wield power over its inhabitants, 
nations are sociological collectivities based on ethnic and cultural affinities as well 
as shared perceptions of these affinities that may or may not be constituted into 
states, but which, in any case become politically relevant when they acquire 
political (national) consciousness. 9 A state could comprise many nations, but a 
5See Joseph Stalin. "The Nation," in John Hutchinson and Anthony D, Smith (eds), 
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 20. 
6Max Weber, "The Nation," in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds), Nationalism, op. 
cit., p. 25. 
7Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism - Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1990), p. 20. 
8Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ..... " in John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds), Nationalism, op. cit., p. 36. 
9Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question, Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1990), p. 1. 
nation may or may not constitute a state. At the same time a nation may exist 
without a state and a state may exist without a nation. 
The two may come together to form a nation-state. In other words, a nation-
state could be a nation having political sovereignty or it could be used to describe 
a territorial-political unit (a state) whose borders 
P. -r.o 
coincide with the territorial distribution of a national group.1 o 
However, the construction of a nation-state has proved to be a 
challenging task in the modern world where the multi-ethnic 
character of the state makes it difficult for the nation and the state to 
blend into one another. According to Walker Connor, of a survey of 
132 entities considered to be states in 1971 only 12 states (9.1 percent) 
could be described as nation-states.II Yet the concept of the nation-
state is what most states aspire to in contemporary political society, the 
driving force being the ideology of nationalism. 
There are many dimensions of nationalism but the most important 
variants are, first, what preceded the establishment of the nation-state, 
and, second, what form of nationalism is pursued by the present 
government in power. This distinction is particularly relevant for 
developing societies in Asia and Africa where in the early years of 
achieving independence nationalist sentiments were an expression of 
anti-colonialism which attempted to gloss over ethnic, religious, 
regional and other differences. The second phase, commonly referred 
to as nation-building, marked the beginning of post-colonial 
nationalism, in which the state assumed control over the various 
groups who in turn pledged undying allegiance to the state, which 
saw itself as the nation. 
An ethnic group or ethnie has been defined by Anthony Smith as 
"named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories 
and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a 
IOwalker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation" in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith 
(eds), Nationalism, op. cit., p. 39. 
llfuid., p. 39. 
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sense of solidarity."12 Myths of descent and shared history are based 
on an emotional appeal to one's own sense of social self-definition 
and solidarity; language, religion, social customs, folklore, food, and 
music help bind members together to make them a_ware of how 
different they are vis-a-vis other ethnic groups; a symbolic 
geographical centre helps members of the ethnie to relate to one 
another even when they are scattered across the globe; and a strong 
sense of belonging and a feeling of solidarity override class, factional 
and regional divisions during times of stress and danger.13 Closely 
related to the dimensions of identity formation and ethnic groups is 
the notion of ethnicity which may be seen as a device as much as a 
focus for group mobilisation by its leadership through the select use of 
ethnic symbols for socio-cultural and politico-economic purposes.14 
Conflict is likely if ethnic passions are politically mobilised and 
threaten the sanctity of existing political structures. 
Though many theories of ethnicity have been propounded, there is 
no one comprehensive theory or ideology which explains, in its 
entirety, the causes and consequences of ethnic conflict. Processes of 
ethnic group formations and ethnic conflict have been largely studied 
within the broad framework of various schools such as primordialist, 
modernist, instrumentalist, Marxist, relative deprivation, and 
internal colonialism.15 
12Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1986), p. 32. 
131bid.,, pp. 24-30. 
14Urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1990), p. 16. 
15for a broad overview of theories of ethnicity see John Rex and David Mason (eds), 
Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986). 
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The primordialist theory 
The primordialist school argues that ethnic identities are not chosen 
but given: they proceed from the cultural givens of the past, such as 
immediate contiguity and kin connection; sense of belonging to a 
religious community; speaking a particular language or dialect; and 
following certain social practices. The concept of primordialism was 
first introduced by Shils, who argued that primordial attachments to 
kin, territory, and religion were characterised by a state of intense and 
comprehensive solidarity, "coerciveness," "ineffable significance," 
"fervour and passion"; and "sacredness."16 However, he did not 
elaborate on primordial sentiments apart from stating that they 
differed from ties to other social units. 
This concept was developed further by Clifford Geertz who attributed 
a key role to primordial loyalties in the political development of post-
colonial states. According to Geertz, 
these congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an 
ineffable and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves. One is 
bound to one's kinsmen, ones's neighbor, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as the 
result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or 
incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable 
absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.17 
The primordial perspective focuses primarily on the emotional 
strength of ethnic bonds which can persist for hundreds or thousands 
of years and can override loyalties to other important collectivities or 
affiliations. Thus, even though the strength of such primordial bonds 
might vary in different cases, every person, in every society, at almost 
16James McKay, "An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationist 
Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena," Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 5, no. 4, October 
1982, p. 396. 
17C1ifford Geertz, Old Societies and New States, The Quest for Modernity in Asia and 
Africa (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 104. 
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all times, will have some attachments which will flow from a sense of 
natural affinity rather than social interaction. Such attachments 
provide a basis for the formation of social and political groupings 
which continue to influence the daily lives of people. There are many 
such loyalties in the new states, but while loyalties based on class, 
party, or business can at best threaten a revolution, disaffection based 
on primordial ties of race, language or culture can have far greater 
repercussions on the integrity of nation-states and can lead to a 
possible redrawing or reorganisation of states through partition, 
irredentism or merger of state territories18 . 
Primordial factors have also been emphasised in varying degrees by 
other scholars such as Greeley,19 who maintains that despite the 
effects of modernisation, primordial sentiments still endure among 
the descendants of European immigrants in Canada and the USA; and 
Da Silva,20 who argues that the continued vigour of Basque 
nationalism is because of the emotional power of the Basques' group 
identity. Similarly, several analysts have commented on how a state 
like Lebanon has modernised without a corresponding decline in the 
primordial loyalties of the inhabitants.21 According to Pierre L. van 
den Berghe, both ethnicity and race (in the social sense) are, in fact, 
extensions of the idiom of kinship, and, therefore, ethnic and race 
sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attenuated form 
181bid., p. 261. 
19 A. Greeley, Ethnicity in the United States: A Preliminary Reconaissance (New 
York: Wiley, 1974 ). 
20 M. Da Silva, "Modernisation and Ethnic Conflict The Case of the Basques," 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 7, 1975, pp. 227-51. · 
21See H. Barakat, "Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social 
Mosaic," Middle East Journal, Vol 27, 1973, pp. 301-18. 
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of kin selection which can be expected to persist even in industrial 
societies.22 
Despite the benefits of its approach, the primordialist position came 
under severe attack in the 1950s and 1960s when social scientists 
treated ethnicity as one affiliation among many, highly changeable 
and responsive to circumstances. The primordialist position has been 
attacked on several fronts.23 First, primordial sentiments are usually 
static in nature and are not seen to change or display dynamic 
properties because of their atavistic attributes. This position does not 
explain the fluidity of ethnic relationships and the waxing and 
waning of ethnic sentiments in different circumstances. This 
circumstantial fluidity can hardly be reconciled with the primordialist 
sentiment.24 Second, primordialism stops at asserting the nature of 
ethnic sentiment without giving any further explanation of it, relying 
largely on nebulous romantic ideologies of nationalists. Third, the 
sense of primacy about ethnicity in primordial literature is so great 
that rather than viewing ethnicity as a possible focus of identity it is 
seen as the cardinal orientation, not taking into account those people 
who might not feel ethnic at all and are not psychologically aberrant 
as a result. Fourth, the severity of ethnic conflict is linked so strongly 
to the intense emotional power of primordial attachments that it 
ignores the fact that people can have their consciousness raised to 
highly emotional levels which have no primordial orientations. 
22van den berghe, "Race and ethnicity: A Sociological Perspective," Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Vol. l, no. 4, October 1978, p. 403. 
23For details see James McKay, op. cit., pp. 398-99. 
24van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (The Netherlands: Elsevier, 1981), pp. 17-
18. 
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Thus, even though the primordial perspective is very useful for 
understanding the emotional basis of ethnicity and the tenacity of 
ethnic bonds, it is unable to account for social change and other 
political and economic influences, failing thereby to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the ethnic phenomena. If one believes 
that primordial attachments exist prior to all interaction, it is hard to 
account for the emergence of new ethnic groups under colonial rule 
in rural areas and towns.25 
Far from primordial sentiments being natural "givens," some 
scholars argue that they need to be constantly renewed and modified, 
and require creative effort and investment.26 An ethnic identity may 
also be carefully constructed by an upwardly mobile entrepreneur 
looking for a political base, or by introducing ethnic disputes into civil 
service or university.27 The main objection to primordialism, then, 
according to Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, is that 
it offers no mechanism for the genesis of its phenomena, nor does it recognise or 
explicate any significant relationship between ethnic attachments and the 
ongoing social experiences of ethnic members. 28 
They feel that while ethnicity is an affect issue, distinct from strictly 
material or instrumental issues, this by no means makes it primordial 
because emotions are not always primordial but have a clear and 
25Kasfir Nelson, "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation," World Politics, Vol. 31, 
no. 3, April 1979, p. 368. 
26ttoben and Hefner, "The Integrativ.e Revolution Revisited," World Development, 
Vol.19, no. l, 1990, p. 18. 
27fuid., p. 376. 
28Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, "The Poverty of Primordialism: The 
Demystification of Ethnic Attachments," Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 16, no. 2, 
April 1993, p. 194. 
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analysable sociogenesis, a fact not recognised by the primordialist school.29 
The modernist theory 
The modernisation paradigm which has also been influential in the social sciences 
for a long time saw ethnic conflicts as vestigial and irrational residues of pre-
industrial societies, doomed to be swept aside by the process of modernisation. In 
case they persisted, they were seen as obstacles to change or as the consequences 
of incomplete modernisation. Another view within the modernisation paradigm 
argued that ethnic conflict is an integral part - even a product - of the process of 
modernisation. 30 This idea was first advanced by Karl W. Deutsch who 
conceived social mobilisation as "an overall process of change, which happens to 
substantial parts of the population in 
F· I. o 
29Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, op. cit., p. 200. 
30Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985), p. 99. 
countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of 
life."31 
Deutsch believed that within any geographical setting and any 
population, economic, social and technological developments 
mobilise individuals for more intensive communication. A decisive 
factor in national assimilation was found to be the fundamental 
process of social mobilisation which accompanied the growth of 
markets, industries, and towns, and eventually of literacy and mass 
communication, and it is this rate of assimilation which, together 
with the process of mobilisation, determined the outcome of national 
development. The rate of assimilation was itself dependent on a 
variety of factors such as similarity in communication habits; facilities 
for learning and teaching; frequency of contacts; material rewards and 
penalties; values and desires and symbols and barriers.32 
Deutsch has, however, come under criticism for his inconsistent 
position. Walker Connor feels that while, on one hand, Deutsch 
believes that increased contacts between culturally diverse people 
might increase antagonisms,33 there are other times where Deutsch is 
convinced that modernisation in such forms as urbanisation, 
industrialisation, and communication will lead to assimilation.34 
31 Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilisation and Political Development," American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 55, no. 3, September 1961, p. 493. 
32for details see Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication - An inquiry 
into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1953), pp. 156-64. 
33fuid., p. 126. 
34for a good critique of Deutsch's theory see Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism - The 
Quest for Understanding, op. cit., pp. 30-35. 
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Furthermore, while modernisation theory postulates that as the 
society modernises, greater political and economic interaction among 
people and widespread communication networks will break down 
people's parochial identities with ethnic groups and replace them 
with loyalties to larger groups, there has been a sharp increase in the 
incidence of ethnic conflicts through the 1970s to the 1990s. Multi-
ethnic states at all levels of modernity and socio-economic 
development have been affected by such conflict. Examples include 
the technologically advanced regions of Western Europe such as 
Spain with its problems of Basques, Catalans, and on a lower level, the 
Galicians; rivalry of Walloon and Flemish people within Belgium, 
and South Tyroleans' dissatisfaction with Italy. 
Thus far from reducing conflict, there is a substantial body of data 
which supports the proposition that material increases in what 
Deutsch termed social communication and mobilisation tend to 
increase cultural awareness and exacerbate ethnic conflict.35 These 
advances in communication not only make the individual more 
aware of other ethnic groups but make him acutely conscious of his 
own identity as well. 
Marxist perspective: neo-Marxists and the world system approach 
The Marxists offer yet another insight, viewing ethnic conflict as a 
means of detracting from the consciousness of class interests and as 
being manipulated by political leadership and vested interests. Many 
Marxist theories have come under criticism for their inability to come 
to terms with racism except as a functional need for capitalism or as 
35Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism , op. cit., p. 37. 
27 
an ideology that prevents workers from understanding their class 
interests. However, most theorists of modernisation, having realised 
the futility of the argument that ethnic identities will wither away as 
modernisation progresses, now believe that there are other factors 
that help to keep ethnic conflicts alive in various societies. 
The neo-Marxists, inspired by the teachings of Marx, interpret race and 
ethnicity within the context of the mode of production which, 
according to some, also opens up the danger of reductionism or 
viewing ethnicity as secondary to class formations.36 One of the early 
contributors to the neo-Marxian theory of race, Oliver C. Cox, believed 
that racial exploitation and race prejudice developed among 
Europeans with the rise of capitalism and nationalism, and because of 
the world-wide ramifications of capitalism, all racial antagonisms can 
be traced to the policies of the capitalist people, the white people of 
Europe and North America. He maintained that the continuing need 
to keep Indian and later African labour in a servile status to assure 
profits marked the beginning of racial antagonism. According to Cox, 
racial division of labour benefited the capitalist class but had adverse 
inplications for the entire proletariat, white or black, by dividing them 
along racial lines.37 However, to suggest that capitalism caused racism, 
or needed racism, is to understate the complexity of emerging 
economic, social and cultural forces. 
Michael Reich improved Cox's theory and devised by means of 
econometric analyses a model of a capitalist economy rooted in Marx's 
conception of the antagonism between capitalists and workers to 
36See Arthur Brittan and Mary Maynard, Sexism, Racism and Oppression (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 2-3. 
37oliver C. Cox, Caste, Class and Race (New York: Monthly Review, 1959). 
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explain racial inequality.38 He showed how racism could be functional 
for the capitalist class and how it could be reinforced in a modern 
market economy in which profitability remains the prime motive for 
production. 
While neo-Marxist theories look at racism as an independent 
phenomenon operating as a cause in its own right, they still maintain 
that understanding the effects of such a cause requires situating racism 
within relations of production. According to Sidney Wilhelm, 
"racism exists regardless of class distinctions yet it will be 
implemented in ways that reflect class interests."39 According to 
Richard Thompson, 
Marxist theories, be they of racism and sexism or some other social phenomenon, 
must take the particular economic structure in which the phenomena occur as 
the primary framework of analysis ... the economic structure is primary to the 
extent that it is the underlying framework that both unifies the social whole 
and determines in a structural sense how other aspects such as racism will 
function and be reproduced.40 
World system theory 
Yet another variation of the Marxist approach is the world system 
theory developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in 1974, which 
interprets the underdevelopment of the third world as a result of 
exploitation by the advanced capitalist countries. According to this 
theory, lesser developed countries become dependent on the 
developed countries whose economic interests are seen as inimical to 
38Michael Reich, Racial Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 
269. 
39Sydney M. Wilhelm, Black in a White America (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1983), p. 
145. . 
40Richard Thompson, Theories of Ethnicity: A Critical Appraisal (New York: Green 
Wood Press, 1989), p. 169. 
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development in the third world. This basic conception has been 
applied to race and ethnicity. Ethnic processes are viewed in a single, 
unitary framework to account for their complex manifestations in 
various parts of the world. 
The modem world system refers to the capitalist world economy that 
originated in Northwestern Europe during the sixteenth century and 
has since expanded to encompass the entire world and its inhabitants. 
The substance of Wallerstein' s theory rests on the premise that the 
contemporary world consists of a single mode of production, 
capitalism, with the aim of production for profit in a world market.41 
Unlike the traditional Marxist definition, which equates Marxism 
with the prevalence of wage-labour relations, the world system does 
not presuppose the creation of wage-labour relations. In fact it is 
characterised by the existence of a single international division of 
labour that comprises different modes of labour control such as 
slavery and coerced cash crop labour, as well as free wage labour. 
The world system is made up of three components: the core, 
semiperiphery, and periphery.42 A particular state's or region's 
standing in the world system is determined by the degree to which it 
is a surplus-extracting state or region (core) or a surplus-producing 
state or region (the periphery). The core areas possess indigenous 
41According to Richard Thompson, there is little difference in Wallerstein's view 
between production of profit by individuals and production of profits by states such as 
the former Soviet Union, Cuba and China. It is believed that both forms of production 
are capitalist to the extent that they produce commodities for a world market and 
seek individual or collective advantages in the world market. Ibid., p. 107. 
42 All regions occupy one of the three categories and function within the system which 
is dynamic and thus allows individual states or regions to change their standing in the 
world economy. This dynamism stems from three basic antinomies present in the 
capitalist system: contradiction between the economy and polity; supply and demand; 
and capital and labour. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy 
(Cambidge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 273. 
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capitalist enterprises that are technologically sophisticated, whereas 
peripheral economies are at the financial mercy of core states and lack 
both an industrial base, and a large indigenous capitalist class. They 
tend to produce labour-intensive agricultural and industrial products 
for export in firms in which the producers do not own the means of 
production. 43 
The three components, however, operate a~ a single entity in which 
the surplus extraction by the core produces impoverishment at the 
periphery, preventing simultaneous levels of development for an 
areas. The dependence of peripheral or semiperipheral states on core 
states is both economic and political.44 
The class structures in the core and peripheral areas as enumerated by 
Wallerstein provide the crucial links in understanding his position 
I 
with regard to race and ethnicity. According to him, dominant core 
areas expanded to incorporate small, weak, and culturally and racially 
distinct peoples into the international division of labour. And while 
this happened racism developed as an ideology that rationalised and 
justified domination of people. Racial, ethnic, and other groups are 
but blurred collective representations of classes.45 
43For example, United States, Japan and Western Europe are designated as core 
regions while peripheral regions include countries such as Bolivia, Ethiopia and 
Zaire. Semiperipheral regions (Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia) exhibit some 
characteristics of the core areas and some features of the periphery areas acting in 
part as a peripheral zone for core countries and a core country for some peripheral 
areas. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, op. cit., p. 97. 
44Tue core states are highly bureaucratised and stable with large armies, and possess 
a high degree of legitimacy among their constituents. Conversely, states that consist 
mainly of peripheral zones tend to be unstable, have a small and relatively 
unprofessional and inefficient bureaucracy and small armies, and often lack 
l~timacy among their constituents. See Richard Thompson, op. cit., p. 114. 
4 Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 181. 
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Similarly, Susan Olzak Kiyoteru Tsutsui traces the inequalities 
generated by the world system to ethnic mobilisation which occurs if 
dominant groups reassert their dominance over newly competing 
groups or as formerly disadvantaged groups challenge the existing 
power structure.46 She concludes that ethnic conflict is more frequent 
in core countries, but it is shaped within an institutional context of 
civil rights and liberties. In peripheral nations, ethnic conflict is far 
less effective but the transformation of ethnic protests, however 
feeble, into armed rebellions depends on the history of the ethnic 
movements and reactions by government authorities.47 
Despite the explanatory power of the world system perspective it 
suffers from many limitations. The main criticism stems from its 
seeking to interpret world events by means of a single unifying 
framework. According to one source, the division of the world into 
the core, semiperiphery and periphery regions obscures more specific 
and important differences among states which occupy the same 
position in the world economy with respect to their modes of 
production48 and social formation. For example, China and Canada, 
categorised as semiperipheral countries, do not, as the world system 
theories suggest, produce the same forms of ethnic social 
organisation.49 Wallerstein believes that the peripheral regions 
merely react to the dictates of the core zones and that the internal 
institutions, modes of production, indigenous cultures, and class 
structures of the peripheral countries have little importance in the 
46Tsutsui, Susan 0., "Status in the World System and Ethnic Mobilisation," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, no. 6, December 1998, p. 695. 
47Ibid., pp. 691-715. 
48Richard Thompson, op. cit., p. 121. 
49for a comparison of the two countries see ibid., pp. 127-35. Also see Anthony Brewer, 
Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1980), p. 264. 
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historical development of the world system or even their own 
national system. 
Such a view dismisses the specific internal conditions that exist in 
peripheral regions. According to one critic, 
the effort of analysis should be oriented towards the elaboration of concepts 
capable of explaining how the general trends in capitalist expansion are 
transformed into specific relationships between men, classes and states, how 
these specific relations in tum react upon the general trends of the capitalist 
system, how internal and external processes of political domination reflect one 
another, both in their capabilities and contradictions.SO 
W allerstein has also come under criticism from the Marxists for 
redefining capitalism by excluding wage-labour relations and not 
differentiating among capitalist and non-capitalist forms of 
commodity production, surplus appropriation, and the modus 
operandi of different modes of production. Marxists such as Robert 
Brenner maintain that because of the exclusion of wage-labour 
relations, Wallerstein is unable to explain the dynamics of capitalism 
and hence cannot really distinguish between its earlier and later stages 
of development or appreciate the qualitative differences between the 
capitalist and other modes of production.SI 
Finally, as pointed out by some scholars, the world system theory does 
not explain the rise of revolutionary or socialist movements. It is 
based on the assumption that the capitalist world system is the only 
world system and that all existing socialist states are nothing but 
50Gabriel Palma, Dependency and Development: A Critical Overview (London: 
Francis Pitner, 1981), pp. 61-62. 
51Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-
Smithian Marxism," New Left Review, no. 104, 1977, pp. 25-87. 
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integral parts of the capitalist world system that reinforce rather than 
counter the system.52 
Instrumentalist theory 
The instrumentalist theory does not treat ethnicity as a given but as 
social and political construction of the elites who draw upon, distort 
and manipulate certain cultural symbols of the groups they represent 
to protect the interests of the groups or derive political and economic 
advantages for the groups as well as for themselves. 
According to Paul Brass, 
ethnicity is the study of the process by which elites and counter elites within 
ethnic groups select aspects of the group's culture, attach new value and 
meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilise the group, to defend its 
interests, and to compete with other groups.53 
Brass contends that ethnic identity arises out of specific types of 
interactions between the leadership of centralising states and elites 
from non-dominant ethnic groups and it is this elite competition 
which precipitates ethnic conflict. The conflicts arise out of political 
and economic factors rather than the cultural values of the groups in 
question, because the cultural practices are often transformed into 
political symbols by the elites who are competing with each other for 
control over territory, status, and power. 
52see Alex Dupuy and Barry Truchil, "The Limits of the World-System Perspective," 
in Rhonda F. Levine and Jerry Lembcke (eds), Recapturing Marxism, An Appraisal of 
Recent Trends in Sociological Theory (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 130-34. 
53Paul Brass, "Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the 
Muslims in South Asia," in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds), Political Identity 
in South Asia (London: Curzon Press Ltd, 1979), p. 41. 
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The instrumentalists believe that modernisation and 
industrialisation in multi-ethnic states tend to proceed unevenly and 
often benefit one group at the cost of another. However, this 
inequality between the different ethnic groups or regions does not 
transform into communal or national consciousness by itself. It is 
only when certain individuals make a conscious effort to mobilise the 
group in question that the group becomes aware of its 
disadvantageous or advantageous position vis-a-vis others. 
According to Brass, this form of ethnic self-consciousness occurs only 
when there is some conflict either between indigenous and external 
elites or amongst indigenous elites. These manifest themselves as 
conflicts between a local aristocracy attempting to maintain its 
privileges against an alien conqueror; between competing religious 
elites from different ethnic groups; between religious elites and the 
native aristocracy within an ethnic group; and between native 
religious elites and an alien aristocracy.54 
Whether or not an ethnic group, mobilised by its elites goes on to 
make major political demands and how far it succeeds depends 
principally on four factors - the perception of an unequal distribution 
of resources against or in favour of the group; the degree to which the 
process of building communal consciousness has involved the 
creation of the organizational resources necessary to build a political 
movement; the response of the government to the demands and 
grievances of the group; and the general political context.SS 
54for details see Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism-Theory and Comparison 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 26-30. 
5SPaul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, op. cit., p. 41. 
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Nationalism is most likely to develop when new elites arise to challenge a system 
of stratification or an existing pattern of distribution of economic resources and 
political power between ethnically distinct and rival groups or ethnically 
distinctive regions. It may focus directly on specific job opportunities or on the 
allocation of the investment capital and other resources. 
The success of the movement is also dependent upon both the character of 
internal social and political communication and organization. The central 
argument of the instrumentalists is that for an ethnic movement to succeed, it is 
necessary that the elites are able to pursue, or at least appear to pursue, 
effectively the interests of other social classes within the ethnic group. 56 If the 
immediate demands of its elites are satisfied in the political and economic 
systems, the movement may peter out. 
The movement must also be able to be strong enough to withstand government 
efforts to suppress it or undercut its political support. Government policies and 
institutional mechanisms may influence a group's capacity to survive as a separate 
entity. The policies available to governments to limit the influence of ethnic 
groups range from the most extreme forms of repression, including genocide and 
deportation to policies designed to undercut potential bases for ethnic group 
mobilization through assimilation of ethnic group leaders into the structures of 
power and wealth in society.57 Some times governments may choose to follow 
pluralist policies by establishing political structures such as federalism or by 
conceding to different ethnic groups the right to receive education through the 
medium of their mother tongue and protect, preserve and promote their culture in 
a variety of ways. 
56paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, op. cit., p. 46. 
571bid., p. 50. 
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The movement is also influenced by the general political context, such as the 
willingness of the elites of the dominant group to share power with aspirant 
ethnic group leaders and the potential availability of alternative political arenas. 
When the willingness to share power does not exist, the society could be headed 
for conflict. 
The fact that new cultural groups can be created for purposes of economic and 
political domination does not, however, mean that primordialist sentiments are 
not important in the study of ethnic conflicts. The instrumentalist theory 
recognises the persistence of atavistic attributes such as race, colour, religion, and 
language, but also maintains that the mere persistence of these among the groups 
is no indication that an ethnic movement will arise among them or whether such 
movements will be effective in mobilising their members. According to Paul 
Brass, 
Such cultural persistence suggests only that it is likely that the groups can be mobilised 
on the basis of specific appeals .... and that, when ethnic appeals are made, the pre-
existing communal and educational institutions of the groups will, if made available for 
the purpose, provide an effective means of political mobilisation. 58 
He uses this example in the case of South Asia where he argues that the Muslim 
identity evolved out of direct competition between Hindus and Muslims. The 
cow, for instance holds a special significance for the Hindus; it is a venerated 
animal and killing and eating beef is not a general practice amongst the Hindus. It 
could be used by the Hindu religious and political groups both as a potential 
rallying symbol to unite the Hindus, as well as a ploy against the Muslims. Paul 
Brass also shows how political mobilisation among Muslims was based upon the 
58Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, op. cit., p. 74. 
38 
exploitation of selective symbols of identity such as the Urdu language, which 
was the lingua franca of the Muslims in India. 59 Hindi and Urdu, the two 
languages spoken mainly in the north of India, are quite similar to each other but 
both Hindu and Muslim elites have used the Urdu-Hindi controversy to 
emphasise the differences between the Hindus and Muslims and to make either 
community believe that a threat to the language was equivalent to an affront to 
their respective religions. 
As with most theories, while the instrumentalist theory has considerable 
explanatory power for some groups in certain situations, it does not satisfactorily 
account for all ethnic phenomena. For one thing, explanations which deal 
exclusively with political and economic factors tend to underrate the emotional 
power of ethnic bonds and exaggerate the influence of materialism on human 
behaviour.60 
59Ibid., pp. 96-102. 
60Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism, op. cit., pp. 42-47. 
Second, not all ethnic groups pursue activities that are geared towards 
deriving economic and political benefits - some groups indulge in 
activities that are socially disadvantageous, and sometimes even 
contrary to self-preservation; Third, this theory does not explain why 
a particular movement is successful at a given time and not at others. 
For example, while one cannot deny the role of the ruling elites - both 
regional and national - in sustaining 
movements, the fact that they have not been able to do so consistently 
points to a major flaw in the mobilisationist approach. 
This has led some scholars to incorporate both the primordialist and 
instrumentalist elements to explain the rise of conflict in multi-ethnic 
societies. According to Anthony Smith, 
any realistic account of ethnic identity and ethno-genesis must eschew the polar 
extremes of the primordialist-instrumentalist debate and its concerns with, on 
the one hand, fixity of cultural patterns in nature and, on the other, strategic 
manipulability of ethnic sentiments and continuous cultural malleability.61 
Relative deprivation 
Another theory that helps to explain political mobilisation is the 
concept of relative deprivation defined by Ted Gurr as the actors' 
perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their 
value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of 
life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value 
capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of 
getting and keeping.62 This discrepancy often leads to a propensity for 
aggressive behaviour and the potential for violence depends on the 
61 For details see Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 
25-26. 
62Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 24. 
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intensity of discontent and the proportion of the group's members 
who are intensely discontented. 
Relative deprivation, however, is largely based on the perception of 
the groups in question with regard to what they mean by deprivation. 
Some groups might consider themselves to be deprived with respect 
to their expectations even though others might not consider them to 
be in a state of want. Similarly, while some observers might view a 
particular group to be in a disadvantageous state, the group itself 
might be satisfied or less unhappy with its given socio-economic 
condition. The value expectations of a group are the average value 
positions to which its members believe they are justifiably entitled. 
While value position is the amount or level of a value actually 
attained, value potential refers to the capabilities that men believe 
they will be able to attain in the course of time. Most of the time, the 
latter is more important than the former in determining how people 
assess their capabilities.63 
Members of ethnic groups do not necessarily suffer from feelings of 
absolute deprivation but only of relative deprivation; they compare 
themselves with those groups that are in a slightly more privileged 
position than they are. Although the material and social position of 
the group may have improved in absolute terms, what is of 
significance to them is their progress in relation to other groups.64 A 
feeling of relative backwardness or deprivation on the part of the 
ethnic group, inhabiting regions that are often underdeveloped 
compared to the more developed core areas, gives rise to ethnic 
63Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op.cit., p. 27 
64Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), p. 28. 
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protests and separatist movements aimed at rectifying their disadvantageous 
position. 
Most of the theories seeking to explain violent collective behaviour emphasise the 
concept of relative deprivation, which may be related to most of the 
"preconditions of revolution". Theorists like Zollschan believe that all 
revolutionary activity begins with an exigency: a discrepancy between a 
consciously or unconsciously desired or expected state of affairs and an actual 
situation.65 Similarly both Hoselitz and Willner, while bringing out differences 
between expectations and aspirations, contend that unrealised aspirations may 
produce feelings of disappointment but unfulfilled expectations result in feelings 
of deprivation which serve as a catalyst for revolutionary action.66 
65See George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch (eds), Exp/orations in Social Change (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 264. 
66Bert Hoselitz and Ann Wilner, "Economic Development, Political Strategies, and American 
Aid," in Mortan A. Kaplan (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 
363. 
The theory of relative deprivation is, however, not without its 
limitations. Even though the theory sounds plausible, its central 
concept is not altogether clear. For one thing, relative deprivation can 
manifest itself in different ways: economic, political, and social, and it 
is not clear which kind of deprivation is being talked about in each 
case, and whether its effect on political behaviour is uniform. 
Second, relative deprivation theory is fundamentally atomistic. One 
individual's aggressive violence propensities are accorded as much 
weight as those of the next. Thus according to James Rule, 
the logic of the theory implies that intense frustration by a few should yield 
rebelliousness equal to moderate frustration on the part of many, though this 
implication has not been pursued.67 
Third, between a sense of actually feeling deprived and engaging in 
ways to rectify the situation, one is presupposing two conditions: a 
political regime that allows for political protest; and a well organised 
movement which can co-ordinate the efforts of the ethnic group in 
question to improve its relatively disadvantageous position. Since 
these conditions are not met in most cases, the theory of relative 
deprivation can only partly explain the emergence of ethnic conflicts. 
Furthermore, this theory seems to only account for relatively 
disadvantaged groups in backward peripheral areas. It does not 
explain why the economically prosperous provinces of the Basques 
and Catalonia in Spain are susceptible to ethnic strife, despite enjoying 
higher economic standards than the core regions of Castile and 
Aragon. 
67James B. Rule, Theories of Civil Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), p. 202. 
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Internal colonialism 
A variant of the relative deprivation theory is the model of internal 
colonialism. Its main proponent, Michael Hechter, explains the 
politicisation of ethnic identities in the form of two collectivities or 
cultural groups: the core and the periphery. Most modem states were 
initially composed of two or more distinct cultural groups. In the 
course of their development, effective bureaucratic administrations 
arose in certain . regions which later became the modem states of 
Western Europe. Each of these small core areas developed socio-
economic and cultural patterns quite distinct from those in the 
outlying peripheral regions. As these core regions advanced 
economically and technologically, their political influence and control 
extended outwards to the eventual boundaries of the modem states. 
This arrangement, produced a "cultural division of labour" in which 
the high status of the core region provided it with a rationale to 
maintain a status quo and defend the system of stratification which 
was heavily weighted in its favour. For members of the periphery this 
cultural difference became a symbol of oppression and at times a 
reason for mobilisation of protest for autonomy and secession of the 
peripheral region from the core area.68 
Using this model Hechter shows how, in the sixteenth century, 
British state unification and British capitalism turned the peripheral 
regions of Ireland, Wales and Scotland into internal colonies. He 
explains the rise of ethnic nationalism in Ireland, Wales and Scotland, 
against the backdrop of British national development, as a reaction to 
68Kenneth Mc Roberts, "Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec," Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, Vol. 2, no. 3, July 1979, pp. 294-95. 
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an exploitative industrialism and its associated hierarchical cultural 
division of labour. This, according to him, is reflective of the ways in 
which the central elites use their political and economic prowess to 
perpetuate the subordination and impoverishment of peripheral 
populations. 
According to Hechter, "national development is a process which may 
be said to occur when the separate cultural identities of regions begin 
to lose social significance, and become blurred."69 It assumes that the 
establishment of one national culture would merge the core and 
periphery into an all encompassing cultural system to which all 
members of the society have primary identification and loyalty. 
He refers to two models of national development of which the second 
is one of internal colonialism. The internal colonialism model 
provides an adequate explanation of the persistence of ethnic identity 
among peripheral groups in complex societies. This model advances 
the view that instead of leading to social structural convergence from 
increased core-periphery contact, industrialisation results in an 
unequal distribution of wealth and power among various groups of 
which the superordinate group, or core, seeks to monopolise its 
advantages through policies which aim to institutionalise the existing 
stratification system (also termed cultural division of labour) which 
results in distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups. The 
process of acculturation does not occur because it is in the interest of 
the core group to retain some sort of cultural superiority over the 
69Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism - The Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 5. 
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periphery. Similarly, even in the economic sphere, the peripheral economy is 
dependent on and complementary to that of the core. 
Another scholar, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, described internal colonialism as a 
phenomenon that 
corresponds to a structure of social relations based on the domination and exploitation 
among culturally heterogeneous, distinct groups. If it has a specific difference with 
respect to other relations based on superordination, it inheres in the cultural 
heterogeneity which the conquest of some peoples by others historically produces. 70 
He traces the roots of internal colonialism to the great independence movements 
of the old colonies, a carry-over from the colonial times. With the end of colonial 
rule and the creation of new independent nation-states, there arose a need for a 
professional educated class, entrepreneurs, skilled craftsmen and capital to help 
the new state carry out its administrative functions. Gradually, the domination of 
foreigners over natives was replaced by the domination and exploitation of 
natives by the natives themselves.71 Thus while the end of colonialism marked the 
end of colonial rule, it did not stop the oppression by some groups of the others. 
Though the theory of internal colonialism brings out the nature of a plural society 
quite effectively, it suffers from many limitations. First, there is a problem of 
spelling out the number and degree of variables of dependence which must be 
present for a particular area to be designated an internal colony.72 For example, if 
one of the conditions is that the region suffers from lack of services and depends 
on a single primary resource - agricultural or mineral - then the case of Scotland 
does not fit the model. Hechter recently recognised the need to amend the model 
70Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, "Internal Colonialism and National Development," Comparative 
International Development, Vol. 1, 1965, p. 33. 
711bid., p. 27. 
nsee Hechter, Internal Colonialism, op. cit., p. 33. 
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to take account of an alternative system of the division of labour, the segmental 
type, in which members interact wholly within the boundaries of their own group 
and as a result "group members monopolise certain niches in the occupational 
structure. "73 
Second, the internal colonial model does not explain why it was only toward the 
end of the last century that Celtic nationalism assumed political form. Even if one 
takes industrialisation to be the cause, one still cannot say why Welsh and 
Scottish nationalism gained political support in the 1960s and not before or after 
the Second World War. Hechter explains this by using the theory of relative 
deprivation:, which is ambiguous as already discussed above, and also modifies the 
P.T o 
73See Hechter and Levi, "The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements," Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Vol. 2, no. 3, 1979, pp. 263. 
economic basis of his argument in favour of political factors, that is, 
the state policies as the basis of separatism and ethno-nationalism . 
Third, internal colonialism focuses mainly on ethnic regions in 
metropolitan states that constitute the core of modem capitalism. 
According to Anthony Smith, the model possesses little relevance for 
non-western areas like Middle East or Africa, where, despite some 
western commercial penetration, there was little capitalism or 
industry at the moment when ethnic nationalism emerged. Yet in 
some regions where there was rapid economic development and 
educational expansion - Ibo, Baganda and Karen are examples - ethnic 
nationalism emerged as forcibly as in more depressed and backward 
areas.74 
Fourth, it is not clear why, according to the model, social discontent in 
depressed and dependent regions need assume ethnic form and 
content. If this were the case, then depressed regions in ethnically 
homogeneous states like the north of England, or backward regions 
within a plural state like the South of Italy, should also have been 
embroiled in ethnic strife. Thus it is clear that even though it was 
believed for a long time that economic growth would diminish ethnic 
antagonisms and bring about cultural assimilation, the experiences of 
ethnic groups like Catalans, Uzbeks and Tajiks, who have enjoyed 
higher living standards than their neighbours, disprove the above 
theory. While economic decline may exacerbate ethnic differences in 
some cases., ~ . -· · the ethnic factor may 
operate quite independently of the economic differentials in some 
instances. The main limitations of the model is that while it 
74Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival, op. cit., p. 33. 
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illuminates economic relationships of the ethnic groups, it overlooks 
other attributes and so obscures the independent causal force of 
ethnicity despite rapid economic change. 
According to Kenneth McRoberts, if not applied carefully, the core-
periphery model can also lead to two other forms of distortions: a type 
of cultural holism and failure to assign proper weight to cultural 
divisions of labour.75 He maintains that however well the core-
periphery distinction may characterise the aggregate relations between 
regions, it cannot fully define the position of individuals within each 
of the regions. Second, cultural division of labour does not have to be 
fully coterminous with the division between regions. Individuals 
from the core could be sent to the peripheral areas and vice versa. 
This experience of being a minority within a culturally alien core 
could produce a much more intense attachment to the independence 
of the periphery than would have been produced either by core-
periphery inter-regional relations or by ethnic stratification within the 
periphery. These distinctions are critical to the understanding of 
autonomist movements but the model of internal colonialism 
appears to explain the cultural division of labour only in a limiting 
case where two regions, locked in a core-periphery relationship, are 
each composed exclusively of members of a single culture.76 
Theory of Cultural Pluralism 
The theory of cultural pluralism was first developed by J. S. Furnivall 
from his colonial experience in South East Asia, where the coexistence 
75Kenneth McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism: The Case of Qubec," Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, Vol. 2, no. 3, July 1979, p. 295. 
76Kenneth McRoberts, op. cit., p. 296. 
48 
of indigenous Asian, immigrant Asian, and European populations 
within the same political unit led him to emphasise their cultural 
distinctiveness in a pluralistic state. Fumivall believed that the 
political form of the plural society is one of colonial domination in 
which the Western superstructure of business and administration is 
imposed on the native world bringing a forced union of the different 
sections of the population.77 This uri.ion is in the strictest sense a 
medley of peoples living with each other 
for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own 
culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but 
only in the market place, in buying and selling.78 
Fumivall emphasises the importance of economic factors which act as 
determinants, creating and maintaining the plural society in 
situations of cultural and social diversity under colonial domination. 
Integration of various groups is not based on a voluntary consensus 
but is imposed by the colonial power and the force of economic 
circumstances. Fumivall's plural society is characterised therefore by 
"cultural divergence, the limitation of cross-cultural contacts to 
economic relations, economic specialisation by cultural sectors (an 
ethnic division of labour), a lack of shared values, and the absence of 
common will. "79 Such a society is held together by dint of the force 
supplied by the colonial power. 
The same theory has been further refined by M.G. Smith, who also 
sees plural societies as characterised by cultural diversity but uses a 
77J.S. Furnivall, "Some Problems of Tropical Economy," in Rita Hinden (ed), Fabian 
Colonial Essays (London: Allen and Unwin, 1945), p. 68. 
78J.S Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1948), p. 304. 
79J.S. Furnivall," Some Problems of Tropical Economy," op. cit., pp. 161-84. 
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different theoretical framework to explain the concept of a plural 
society. According to Smith, cultural pluralism consists of the 
coexistence within a single society of groups possessing "mutually 
incompatible" institutional systems like social structures, value and 
belief patterns and systems of action. A society is deemed culturally 
plural only when there is a formal diversity in the basic system of 
compulsory institutions.so 
The main thrust of Smith's theory of cultural pluralism is as follows. 
First, populations that contain groups practising different forms of 
institutional system exhibit a corresponding diversity of cultural, 
social, and ideological patterns. Since "any institutional system tends 
toward internal integration and consistency, each of these 
differentiated groups will tend to form a closed socio-cultural unit."81 
Second, where culturally divergent groups together form a common 
society, the imperative for maintenance of this inclusive unit 
involves a type of political order in which one of the cultural sections 
is subordinated to the other.82 Since a society needs a "community of 
values,"83 it is believed that a society embracing groups displaying 
wide cultural differences can only be held together through 
subordination. According to Smith, 
Given the fundamental differences of belief, value, and organisation that 
connote pluralism, the monopoly of power by one cultural section is the essential 
precondition for the maintenance of the total society in its current form.84 
80M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1965), p. 82. 
81Ibid., p. 88. 
82 M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, op: cit., p. 62. 
83Ib·d . 1 ., p. Xl. 
84Ibid., p. 86. 
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Third, plural societies are "defined by dissensus and pregnant with 
conflict .... "85 and this conflict arises out of the basic cultural 
incompatibility which is at the heart of the instability that threatens a 
plural society. 
According to Smith, a society is a plural society when one cultural 
section dominates the others; if each functioned independently of the 
another, then each would constitute a separate society and there 
would be no source of conflict. Thus where there is ethnic pluralism, 
there is a strong tendency toward domination by one of the groups.86 
This propensity to dominate arises from the incompatibility of 
institutions and values among the groups. In Smith's analysis, 
cultural pluralism is the major determinant of the structure of a 
plural society and is as prominent as economic forces in Furnivall"s 
analysis. 
This theory of cultural pluralism which seeks to explain the 
conditions of instability in a plural society does not, however, take 
into consideration those institutions and beliefs that are held in 
common by the members of a plural society , and which could help in 
diminishing rather than fostering conflict. Cultural pluralism 
automatically imposes the structural necessity for domination by one 
of the cultural sections, excluding the prospect of consensus or 
integration between the various groups. The theory also fails to look 
into political variables such as leadership and envisages the entire 
85Ib·d ... 1 ., p. Xlll. · 
86smith, "Some Developments in The Analytic Framework of Pluralism," in Kuper 
and Smith (eds}, Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 
p. 434. 
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interaction of groups only in cultural terms. 87 It neglects the role of elites, 
particularly those with convergent goals and aspirations. Finally, the biggest 
failing of the cultural pluralist theory is that it does not explain why there is so 
much ethnic conflict among strata of those groups that are culturally and socially 
most similar. 
It can be seen from the foregoing that no one theory is adequate to describe an 
ethnic situation in its ·entirety. In fact, most ethnic situations, at a given point of 
time, relate to more than one model. All these theories need to be studied in 
conjunction with one another as none of them can be applied independently. Thus 
while laying the theoretical framework for this study, an attempt will be made to 
draw upon a number of theories and variables, which at best explain an ethnic 
situation at a given point of time, but do not provide a comprehensive and 
complete analysis of any movement. 
This work would seek to examine the rise and growth of separatists movements 
within the framework of three main variables: (i) the nature of the movement, (ii) 
the response of the state and (iii) patterns and levels of external support. The 
nature of the movement remains contingent on a variety of factors like 
historical/cultural genesis; degree of political mobilisation and organisation of 
strength. The course of the movement is also influenced by the leadership 
patterns and the role of elites. While the movements may rise for a variety of 
reasons including social economic variables and political factors, the state, 
however, remains central in both providing the initial impetus for political 
mobilisation and responding to ethnic challenges. 
87Leo Despres, "The Implications of Nationalist Politics in British Guiana for the Development 
of Cultural Theory," American Anthropologist, Vol. 66, October 1964, pp. 1051-77. 
The response of the state in accommodating the legitimate demands of ethnic 
group becomes a crucial factor in exacerbating as well as defusing a movement. 
The state formulates its strategies to deal with the ethnic challenge either through 
an assimilative or an integrative framework. The assimilative framework may 
succeed in quelling the movement in the short run but tends to stimulates than 
suppress ethno-nationalism in the long run. The integrated framework, premised 
on partial accommodation of ethnic group's demands, is generally more effective 
in defusing the conflict. However, within either framework the state may use a 
variety of strategies ranging from co-option to conciliation or/and confrontation 
to coercion. 
To the extent that the demands and aspirations of the ethnic groups are 
accommodated through open democratic processes the ethnic threat gets receded. 
Whether ethnic assertions remain dormant or become more militant depends upon 
the state and its capability to accommodate the demands of the ethnic groups. 
The inability of the state to respond to the ethnic challenge exacerbate conflicts 
between the state and the contending group(s). If conciliatory policies are 
adopted at an early stage, there are better chances of defusing the ethnic conflict. 
The ethnic conflicts, however, could tend to become more intractable if the 
demands for access to political power and greater autonomy do not receive 
sensitive or timely attention. The use of the coercive power of the state against 
resurgent ethno-nationalism often pushes the aggrieved groups to the extreme 
path of political violence and in some cases a bid for secession. Secessionists 
movement which challenge the integrity of the state are invariably met by the 
state through coercion and repression. 
5 2. (L) 
Secession is difficult to achieve because the might of the state is generally greater 
than that of separatists groups. The state may, however, find it difficult to 
overcome their resistance if the separatists groups are able to secure external 
support, both moral and material - in the form of finance, weaponry training and 
providing safe sanctuaries for insurgence - which helps them to sustain their 
challenge to the state. The involvement of the external powers is contingent of a 
variety of factors: kinship linkages, geo-strategic location, and capabilities of the 
. adversaries. External intervention not only encourages separatist ambitions but 
also sustain prolonged conflict. However, the failure of the external powers to 
meet the expectations of the ethnic groups for a variety of reasons including 
international reactions on negative domestic opinion, economic compulsion, and 
lack of timely support can lead to the visible decline of the movements. 
This work subscribes to the model that while the ethnic movements may be 
triggered off by a number of factors which create the conditions for rise and 
growth of separatism, these generally either survive or fade away to the extent 
that they are shaped by the respective state policies and sustained by external 
support. Before moving to the specific case studies, this theoretical framework 
will be applied to the rise of separatism in South Asia as a whole. 
Chapter2 
ETIINICITY AND NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTH ASIA 
The process of nation-building has proved to be very complex and 
intractable in South Asia. There are many similarities in the cultural 
and political structures of South Asian countries. Most of them are 
multi-ethnic, plural societies which have faced challenges of varying 
degrees and intensity to their national integrity. Legacies of colonial 
rule have made the process of nation-building even more difficult. 
Yet despite the commonalities, each country developed its own 
pattern of governance after achieving independence from colonial 
rule. This chapter seeks to examine the causes of ethno-nationalism 
in the region and the effect of policies adopted by different states in the 
post-colonial era. An effort will also be made to analyse why some 
countries in the region have been more successful than others in 
addressing the concerns of their respective ethnic groups. 
With a view to better understanding the situation in South Asia, 
several movements are discussed, albeit briefly. These are of the 
Muhajirs and Sindhis in Pakistan; the Chakmas in Bangladesh; the 
Tamils in Sri Lanka; and the Kashmir and North-east insurgencies in 
India. The movements shed light on the response of the state in 
South Asia, both comparatively and collectively. For example, the 
tribal problems of the Chakmas in Bangladesh, the North-east in 
India, and the Baluch in South-west Pakistan are indicative of the 
problems encountered by the respective states in integrating the tribes 
into the national framework. Similarly the Kashmir imbroglio and 
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the presence of organisations such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka exemplify the salience of the external 
linkages in the region; while at the inter-state level, the case studies of 
the Sindhis and Muhajirs provide valuable insights into the workings 
of the Pakistani federal state in relation to other ethnic communities 
such as the Baluch. 
Against the background of the previous chapter, a number of theories 
have been applied in explaining these movements. For instance, the 
model of internal colonialism has been used to study the ethnic 
behaviour of the Sindhis, Baluch and Pakistan's former East Bengal, 
while the relative deprivation theory has been used to explain the 
case of the Baluch in Pakistan. 
Nation-building in South Asia 
The process of nation-building in Third World countries has been 
made more complex by the onerous task of integrating heterogeneous 
ethnic groups into the mainstream of national politics. This is partly 
because most of these countries gained independence from colonial 
rule without having completed the process of nation formation. As 
newly independent nations, these countries had little choice but to 
follow an ideal, universalised model of the nation-state: a model that 
had been perfected by the European nation-states themselves through 
"wars, bloody nationalist revolutions and colonisation."1 No other 
identity than that of a nation-state was recognised in the international 
order for the emerging independent states in Asia and Africa.2 
to.L. Sheth, "State Nation and Ethnicity: Experience of Third World Countries," 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24. no. 12, 25 March 1989, p. 622. 
2 -D.L. Sheth, op. cit., p. 622. 
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It may be pointed out that European states themselves took several 
centuries to emerge as modern nation-states. They had also evolved a 
gradualist approach towards creating a stable state system, based on the 
principle of national self-determination, experiencing several phases 
of turbulence in the process of development. Even today, some of 
these nations face problems of varying magnitudes, as illustrated by 
the festering problem of northern Ireland in United Kingdom and the 
unresolved problem of Quebec in Canada. The task of nation-building 
in the less developed countries has thus been rendered more difficult 
by the need to compress the process into a few decades, and without 
"having the time to go through various sequences and stages as the 
Western developed nations could."3 
In the event, most Third World states have been confronted with the 
task of establishing political, social and economic institutions as well 
as the P!oblem of forging a cohesive nationalism by accommodating 
the diverse and heterogeneous populations within their boundaries. 
The task has not been easy, but it has been made even more difficult 
by the unwillingness or inability, or both, of the majority groups to 
recognise the legitimate particularist demands of the minority groups. 
Once these countries achieved independence, most ethnic majorities, 
which had upheld the principle of self-determination in the course of 
their national struggles, were quick to renounce the principle in their 
eagerness to achieve national integration. Claims for autonomy and 
the preservation of a distinct way of life put forward by the minority 
groups were seen as secessionist· moves and generally suppressed with 
ruthless zeal. 
3Baladas Ghoshal, "South Asian Security Dynamics: Domestic and Internal Factors: 
The Case of India," in Iftekharuzzaman (ed.), South Asia Security: Primacy of 
International Dimension (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1995), p. 5. 
55 
South Asia, comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal, like the rest of the Third World, iS 
confronted with a wide range of internal challenges. According to one 
estimate, of the ethnic groups in the world which have demanded or 
are demanding separate provinces within the same country, or greater 
autonomy for their existing provinces, or a separate, secessionist state, 
77 percent are located in Asia and Africa and the remaining 23 percent 
are in Europe and North America.4 South Asia seems to have a large 
share of these movements. Despite different regime patterns, the 
general trend in almost all the countries has been towards an 
expansion of state control and increasing centralisation. A proclivity 
towards violence is yet another feature of South Asian states, where 
poverty, illiteracy, rapid population growth, and narcotics contribute 
substantially towards the rise of militancy. The presence of the 
"external factor" has also helped to sustain the movements over 
longer periods of time. 
The rise of ethno-nationalism m South Asia 
Structure of pre-colonial societies 
The rise of ethno-nationalism in South Asia can be attributed to the 
nature of pre-colonial societies and the impact of colonial rule upon 
them. The historical legacy and structure of the pre-colonial South 
Asian societies has had a profound influence on the demands and 
struggles of the ethnic groups.5 For example, the claim of pre-colonial 
Tamil separatists in Northern Sri Lanka provides a certain legitimacy 
4 Inayatullah, Politics of Ethnicity and Separatism in South Asia (Lahore: Centre for 
South Asian Studies, 1988), p. 2. 
S1nayatullah, op. cit., p. 23. 
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to their claim for a Tamil Eelam in what they term their traditional 
homeland. Similar claims to a historical ethnic homeland can be seen 
among other ethno-nationalists in South Asia including the Sikhs in 
India; Baluch and Pushtuns in Pakistan; and Chakmas in Bangladesh. 
Pre-colonial tribal or feudal structures of some societies have also 
been a source of conflict between states in South Asia, and amongst 
some ethnic groups who feel threatened by the state and other groups. 
Sometimes the post-colonial state has encroached on the traditional 
autonomy and privileges of groups which even the colonial powers 
did not disturb. This has led to demands for autonomy or 
independence from movements like those in North-eastern India and 
the Baluch movement in Pakistan. 
Impact of colonial rule on the post-colonial state 
The policies of the colonial rulers were carried over by the new 
independent states, providing a fertile ground for the rise of ethno-
na tionalism in the post-colonial era. The movement for 
independence from colonial rule created a temporary but essentially 
fragile unity among divergent ethnic groups; when anti-colonial 
nationalist fervour declined, their differences came to the surface.6 
For instance, the anti-colonial struggle in Ceylon, which was 
moderate, did not weld the two ethnic communities together, 
although there was some temporary unity among the Sinhalese and 
Tamil elite. In India too, the nationalist movement was mass-based, 
but it failed to bridge the widening gap between Hindus and Muslims. 
61nayatullah, op. cit., p. 25. 
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Language, culture, religion and ethnicity of the minorities were 
handled by the newly independent South Asian· states in much the 
same way as their colonial predecessors had manipulated such forces 
or ignored them in constructing their colonial systems. According to 
Ross Mallick, "the post-colonial state is actually the colonial state with 
new rulers. "7 He describes the post-colonial state as an amalgam of 
colonial legacies and Western values, existing uneasily with local 
cultures, and regards the recent upsurge of ethnic sentiments as a 
throwback to the colonial era.s 
The policy of centralising the pre-colonial states and putting them 
into a political and administrative straitjacket, regardless of their 
ethnic and religious identities, mobilised the separatist ambitions of 
many groups. For example, the new state of Bangladesh, founded on a 
strong linguistic identity, tried to integrate the Buddhist and non-
Bengali-speaking tribal minority into the Muslim Bengali culture 
leading to a violent clash between the tribal guerrillas and the 
Bangladesh army in 1976. 
Added to this, uneven development resulting from the policies of the 
colonial powers led to the less-developed areas clamouring for a 
greater share in development. The colonial powers' preferential 
treatment of certain ethnic groups over others - for control and 
stability in military-bureaucratic structures - led to an imbalance vis-a-
vis other groups. For example, the prominent positions of Tamils in 
the Sri Lankan bureaucracy, and of the Punjabis, and to some extent 
the Pushtuns, in Pakistan's military establishment, led to a feeling of 
7Ross Mallick, Development, Ethnicity and Human Rights (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1980), p. 338. 
Slbid., p. 339. 
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discrimination among other communities. Rectification of these 
grievances became the basis of demands of the movements in East 
Pakistan and Sindh. 
The state in South Asia 
The state remains central in both creating and responding to ethnic 
challenges. According to one Ghoshal, 
It all depends on how a state manages its developmental problems. Depending 
upon the state's capability to accommodate the grievances of ethnic groups, 
these assertions fluctuate from dormancy to militancy.9 
Although the levels of ethnic dissonance, intensity of ethno-national 
challenges, and the state's response have varied from country to 
country, all states in South Asian have found such challenges difficult 
to manage. The two major policy frameworks within which a state 
operates are (i) assimilative and (ii) integrative. The first is premised 
upon the incorporation of the identity or identities of the subordinate 
groups into the larger national identity through promotion or 
imposition of a common "national" language, religion and culture, in 
either a unitary or a federal framework. Where the dominant ethnic 
gr~up controlling the state structure is disproportionately strong and 
other subordinate groups are weak the policy may succeed in the short 
run, but it may stimulate rather than suppress ethno-nationalism in 
the long run.IO 
The integrative policy framework is essentially a partial 
accommodation of various. ethnic groups using varying degrees of 
9Baladas Ghoshal, op. cit., p. 165. 
lOinayatullah, op. cit., p. 19. 
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coercion. The elite from the dominant ethnic group insists that the 
subordinate ethnic groups accept the major symbols or premises of the 
larger political community while retaining a certain degree of cultural 
and political autonomy and control over their resources.11 Such a 
policy works best when the level of ethno-nationalism is not high and 
. 
there is a federal system in which each federating unit has the power 
to protect its cultural traits. 
According to Inayatullah, the choice of policy framework, assimilative 
or integrative, is a function of 
the peculiar historical development of the society in question, the nature of 
regimes, the political orientation of the elite holding power in these regimes, 
their perception of the nature of internal threat to the unity of the society 
emerging from ethnic diversity.12 
For instance, military regimes and civilian authoritarian regimes 
having centralised and unitary structures are generally disposed to 
adopt assimilative policies, while non-military and democratic 
regimes tend to decentralise power and adopt integrative policies. 
Response of the state 
Within either framework, the response of the state may vary from 
indifference to accommodation, substitution-manipulation, coercion 
and repression.13 The first response, indifference, is usually the result 
of a lack of understanding of ethno-nationalism, political myopia or 
sheer ignorance. The second accommodates the demands of 
politicised ethnic groups for an equal partnership in the system. This 
lllbid., p. 19. 
12Ibid., p. 20. 
13Jnayatullah, op. cit., p. 21. 
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approach is usually employed to freeze the politicisation of ethnicity 
before it moves to the stage of secessionism. A substitutive-
manipulative response is an effort to persuade ethnic groups to 
reduce their demands in exchange for something else, but may 
become manipulative if ethnic groups are tricked into giving up their 
claims for something insignificant . 
. Most of South Asia, with the notable exception of India is ethnically 
centralised. In India, the central body politic comprises many groups 
but no one group is dominant.1 4 The rest of South Asia is 
characterised by "few groups large enough as to have the issue and 
extent of their interaction being a constant theme of politics at the 
centre."15 In such systems the centre is not a neutral arbiter but a focal 
point of competition.16 For example, in post-1971 Pakistan, the ethnic 
centrality of the Punjabis remains unaltered, but the multiplicity of 
other groups in the centralised ethnic system has provided the 
dominant group with greater clout and less vulnerability. In Sri 
Lanka, a sizeable Tamil population in the North and the North-east of 
the country and its cultural affinity with the Tamils of Tamil Nadu, 
have led to a self-perceived minority complex among the Sinhalese 
community.17 
The ruling elite's initial reluctance or failure to decentralise political 
and economic authority and encourage cultural plurality tends to 
exacerbate the inherent ethno-national contradictions in South Asia. 
140ne might believe that the dominant group is the Hindus, but this is a very broad 
category subsuming many other subgroups. See Urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and 
Nationbuilding in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 46. 
15 Phadnis, op. cit., p. 46. 
16oonald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985), pp. 39-40. 
17oonald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, op.cit., p. 47. 
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The use of the coercive power of the state to preserve regime interests 
against resurgent sub-nationalism pushes the aggrieved groups to the 
extreme path of political violence and in, some cases, secessionism. 
Having described state strategies for dealing with minorities in South 
Asia in broad terms, the strategies of each state, in dealing with 
movements that continue to challenge the centrality of the state, are 
discussed below. 
India 
The ethnic mosaic of India is truly awesome. It has many cultural 
markers for group identity such as race, religion, tribe, caste, and 
language. According to some analysts, India is not a nation-state but a 
"developing multi-national state."18 The basic postulate for this 
argument is that there is a distinction between "political integration of 
diverse peoples through politics, policies, procedures and institutions, 
and national integration through assimilation of diverse peoples to a 
common national culture."19 India, according to Brass, has followed 
pluralistic policies in relation to various linguistic, religious and other 
minorities to develop workable means to maintain "political unity in 
the world's most culturally diverse country."20 Electoral politics has 
helped in the gradual penetration of shared values and practices into 
increasing segments and recesses of society. 
18Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 1991), p. 168. 
19Ibid., p. 168. 
20Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, op.cit., p. 168. 
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As Hoffman has put it, 
The future of Indian integration lies in the continuation, widening and 
reinforcing of what exists now. And that is a sense of national unity or 
integration that arises and is maintained by continued bargaining, consensus 
building, arbitration, mediation and intensive group interaction taking/'lace 
within a loose framework of democratic formal rules and informal norms~ 
India's efforts at nation-building may be regarded as one of the more 
successful attempts by a state, particularly in view of the size and 
diversity of the country. It has sought to promote national integration 
by reconciling culturally pluralistic demands through a democratic 
political system. Under Nehru, a consensual system evolved in which 
a balance was sought between various factions. The Congress was able 
to convert itself into a "party of consensus", dominating the whole 
political landscape and enjoying wide legitimacy.22 Its task became 
even more pressing in the wake of the partition of the country in 1947 
and the ensuing violence, as well as the task of integrating more than 
500 Indian states into the Indian union.23 Consequently, the 
federating units or states were assigned administrative tasks and 
autonomy but within the purview of a centre which could turn 
unitary during situations of "emergency" as interpreted by it. 24 
These will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4 but suffice it to 
state at this point, and as argued by Ramesh Thakur, the 
constitutional bias in favour of the centre in India is all too evident 
21Steven Hoffoman, "Social Psychology, Policy and National Integration in India," in 
Israel Milton (ed.), National Unity: The South Asian Experience (New Delhi: 
Promila Publishers, 1983), p. 110. 
22 Rajni Kothari, "The Congress System in India," Asian Survey, Vol. 4, no. 12, 
December 1964, pp. 1161-73. Also see Stanley A. Kochenack, The Congress Party of 
India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) and Myron Weiner, Party Building 
in a New Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). 
23Phadnis, op. cit., p. 86. 
24Phadnis, op. cit., p. 87. The constitution of India provides for three different kinds 
of emergencies. It could be imposed due to war, external aggression and armed 
rebellion; failure of constitutional machinery in the states; and financial crisis. 
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not only in the provision to dismiss state legislatures, but in the 
financial dependence of the states on the centre; the centralised 
bureaucratic, police and judicial services; lack of dual citizenship; and 
the centralised nature of major political parties in the country.25 
Strategies of the Indian state 
The Indian state has employed several means to cope with the 
challenges of nation building. It has adopted preferential policies for 
the backward groups and other constitutional measures for various 
minorities.26 Reorganisation of states on linguistic and tribal criteria 
also underlined the Indian state's recognition of its vast ethnic 
diversity. The adoption of a multilingual policy at the centre and 
linguistic reorganisation of states has also facilitated the consolidation 
of a process of dual nationalism, a recognition of most Indians as 
members of two nations; a Sikh, Bengali or Tamil nation at one level 
of identity and an Indian nation at another.27 In fact, it is this 
multiplicity of groups that has enabled the Indian state to deal with 
one conflict at a time and, to the extent possible, contain it locally. 
This contributes to its image as an arbiter of the claims of various 
ethnic communities and unlike, say, Pakistan, it is not seen as an actor 
in the conflicts. 
The success of India in forging a multi-national state can be explained 
by several factors. According to Marshall Bouton, democracy provided 
25Ramesh Thakur, The Government and Politics of India (London: Macmillan Press, 
1995), p. 73. 
26 For details on affirmative policies towards the religious minorities, backward 
castes and scheduled castes and tribes see Partha S. Ghosh, "Positive Discrimination 
in India: A Political Analysis," Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. 15, no. 2, July 1997, pp. 
135-69. 
27Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism op. cit., p. 169. 
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a highly effective alternative for disgruntled regions and groups to 
extremism and violence. When a group's demands were 
accommodated their stake in the political process led them to "buy 
in."28 For instance, New Delhi's policy of not imposing Hindi as the 
official language effectively blunted rising Tamil nationalism. The 
victory of the Tamil regional party, Dravida Munnetra Kazagam, 
(DMK) in 1967 resulted in the amendment of the Language Act under 
which English would continue to serve as the official language of 
India until all non-Hindi speaking states agreed to switch over to 
Hindi. 
Despite increasing stresses and strains, India has also been able to 
maintain its essentially secular framework. As some analysts have put 
it, 
Despite the long strides made by the forces of Hindutva, the heterogeneity of 
Indian and 'Hindu' society has continued to be a formidable obstacle in the way 
of triumph of religiously based majoritarianism.29 
Another factpr that has kept the state intact is the dynamism of Indian 
federalism. India's federal system has generally encouraged 
negotiation, compromise and co-operation. This has been particularly 
evident in the North-east where Delhi has sought to accommodate 
demands for autonomy, and co-opted ethnic movements amidst 
rising violence. The Indian government's extension of 
administration to the outlying tribal areas - under loose control 
during British India - was largely perceived by the indigenous 
population as a ploy to destroy their tribal culture and traditions. The 
28Marshall Bouton, "India's Problem is not Politics," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, no. 3, 
May-June 1998, p. 86. 
29sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia - History, Culture, Political 
Economy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 228. 
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unsettled situation in the North-east is a product of deep-rooted 
political and economic factors. Crisis of identity, cross-border ethnic 
links, and support of external powers not only sustain the irredentist 
fervour in the area but also make for insurrection for secession from 
India. 
North-east 
Unlike Bangladesh and to some extent Pakistan, Indian strategy 
towards its tribal communities has remained "firm and yet 
accommodative, coercive as also persuasive, inclusionary and not 
exclusionary."30 In the 1950s and 1960s, when the Nagas and the 
Mizos resorted to full-scale insurrections for independence, the centre 
responded by creating a separate state of Nagaland in 1963 and gave 
Mizoram union territory status in 1972. When the Mizo National 
Front (MNF)31 pursued its aim of achieving an independent 
Mizoram, on the basis of a forceful blend of tribalism and Christianity, 
and charges of economic neglect, a negotiated settlement was 
reached.32 In June 1986, the centre agreed to accord statehood to 
Mizoram after the MNF agreed to end insurgency. Laldenga, the rebel 
leader, took over the new government as chief minister in August 
1986. Though it still constitutes a security threat, like all tribal 
communities bordering other countries, Naga insurgency has been 
losing much of its steam. Similarly, the 1988 Accord with the Tripura 
National Volunteers has tempered the insurgency in Tripura, 
30urmila Phadnis, op. cit, p.164. 
31 For details on the MNF ideology see B.B. Goswami, The Mizo Unrest: A Study of 
Politicisation of Culture Oaipur: Aalekh Publication, 1979), pp. 149-51. 
32For details see C. Narayana Rao, "Crisis in Mizoram," in B.L. Abbi (ed.), North 
East Region: Problems and Prospects of Development (Chandigarh: Centre for 
Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1984), pp. 240-48. 
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although the situation is not fully settled. In Manipur, the situation is 
more volatile, with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) working for 
liberation of the Manipur valley.33 
Assam presents yet another picture of centre-periphery accomodation 
in the North-east, and conforms to the internal colonialism model. It 
perceives itself as the victim of the massive inflow of non-Assamese, 
mainly east Bengali immigrants,34 which has led to increasing 
alienation of land, loss of employment opportunities, and economic 
hardships for the Assamese population,35 who are fast becoming a 
minority in their own homeland. With low literacy rates and a per 
capita income that did not compare well with other states, the 
Assamese blamed their persisting underdevelopment on the influx of 
outsiders and the unresponsiveness of the centre. 
Almqst 62 percent of the personnel in the state service are non-
Assamese while in the central services Assamese make up only 10 
percent of total employees.36 Feelings of economic discrimination are 
also widespread given the fact that, despite being the largest supplier 
of crude oil, tea and plywood, Assam receives very little as its share of 
royalties from the centre. But again, after protracted negotiations, 
33M.K. Narayanan, "National Security: The International Dimension," Rajiv Gandhi 
Institute for Contemporary Studies, Paper no.16, 1994, pp. 19-21. 
34To study the flow of migrants and the demographic transformation of Assam see 
Atul Goswami and Jayanta Kumar Gogoi, "Migration and Demographic 
Transformation of Assam -1901-1971," in B.L. Abbi (ed.), op. cit., pp. 60-80. 
35This includes Assamese language speakers who in 1980 constituted 59 percent of the 
population of Assam, but the situation is complicated by the fact that the small 
minority includes Muslim immigrants and descendants from Bangladesh, making it a 
less homogeneous group. 
36Jyotindra Das Gupta, "Ethnicity, Democracy, and Development in India: Assam in a 
General Perspective," in Atul Kohli (ed.), India's Democracy - An Analysis of 
Changing State-Society Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 
157. 
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following the Assam accord37 which contained an agreement on the 
cut-off year for the grant of legal residence to the "foreigners", the 
Assam Gana Parishad, which had spearheaded the agitation, formed 
the government. According to Phadnis, "the victory of the Assam 
Gana Parishad provided the centre some respite to the extent its 
strategies had worked to keep the local issues localised as much as 
possible."38 The concessions were essentially symbolic but the accord 
served both parties equally.39 Assam now presents a picture of relative 
stability, notwithstanding the fact that in the past few years a more 
radical organisation, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), 
comprising insurgent groups from the North-east, is waging an armed 
struggle for the liberation of Assam. 
The Indian government's ability to quell insurgencies has also been 
demonstrated in Punjab which has returned to normalcy after a 
decade of sustained violence. The case of Punjab will be discussed 
extensively in the subsequent chapters. 
This is, however, not to suggest that Indian democracy is without its 
flaws. In fact, many of the contemporary challenges in India can be 
traced to gradual undermining of the essential synthesis and tolerance 
of Indian pluralism. Strains in centre-state relations have resulted 
partly from the in-built centrist bias in the Indian constitution and 
37Tue accord was signed between Indian Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and leaders of 
the Assam movement on 15 August 1985. Under the accord, illegal migrants who 
entered the state between January 1966 and March 1971 would be disenfranchised for 
ten years and those who came after March 1971 would be deported. For details on 
negotiations leading to the accord, see Sanjib Baruah, "Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, 
and Political Turmoil - Assam, 1979-85," Asian Survey, Vol. 26, no.11, November 1986, 
pp. 1190-1205. 
38urmila Phadnis, op. cit., p. 97. Also see Sanjib Baruah, "Lessons of Assam," 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 21 .. no. 7, 15 February 1986, pp. 282-84. 
39Jyotindra Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 165. 
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partly from the functioning of the political process~s,40 which have 
tended to reinforce the unitarian tendencies of the Indian federal 
organisation. Although in the initial decades of independence 
Congress was able to counter the ceritralised politics of predominantly 
linguistic regionalism, increasing recourse to "covert 
authoritarianism" and the failure of the state to redress economic 
inequalities and social injustice led to deepening tensions between the 
centre and different regional nuclei of power.41 
The advent of non-Congress governments in various states in 1967 
was followed by the first signs of discontent with the existing 
framework of centre-state relations and the demand for greater 
autonomy for the states. This period coincided with the prime-
ministership of Mrs Gandhi, under whom, as noted by Ramesh 
Thakur, "Congress became the mechanism for centralising and 
exacerbating conflicts instead of attenuating and reconciling them."42 
Demands for state-level autonomy, often portrayed as "threats to 
national integrity," provided a justification for the centre to impose its 
direct rule in the states, thus aggravating regional tensions. 
In his study on the crisis of governability in India, Atul Kohli points 
to four variables that may have influenced the nature of political 
change in the country: deinstitutionalising the role of national and 
regional leaders; the impact of weak political parties; undisciplined 
40The Legislative, administrative and financial arrangements are heavily weighted 
in favour of the central government. The residuary power vested in the centre for 
transfer of functions from the state list to the Union list, administrative clout in the 
use of emergency powers to impose president's rule, and immense fiscal powers have 
all strengthened the centre's claims over the states. 
41Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia, op. cit., p. 224. 
42Ramesh Thakur, The Government and Politics of India (London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd, 1995), p. 349. 
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political mobilisation of various caste, ethnic, religious, and other 
types of groups; and increasing conflicts between the haves and have-
nots in the civil society.43 There is no doubt that next to political party 
alliances, caste loyalty is a significant determinant of electoral 
outcomes. Of late, the rise of Hindu fundamentalism has also 
deepened the communal division between the Hindus and Muslims, 
posing a serious challenge to the secular foundations of the Indian 
st~te. The situation in Kashmir reflects this dilemma and has to be 
seen as part of this broader dimension of Indian politics. 
Kashmir 
Kashmir poses a serious challenge to the secular make-up of India 
being the only Muslim-dominated state in the country. New Delhi 
does not want to let Kashmir go because if it were to secede, it would 
undermine the very basis of the plural and secular nature of the 
Indian state. A product of partition, over which two major wars were 
fought in 1948 and 1965, it remains a major bone of contention 
between India and Pakistan. The area held by India comprises the 
Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh (roughly 45 percent of the 
territory); while Pakistan controls Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas 
(35 percent); and China the Aksai region in North-east Ladakh (20 
percent). 
Jammu and Kashmir was one of three princely states not to accede to 
either India or Pakistan after the British granted independence to 
India. The Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, however, 
43Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 387. 
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signed the Instrument of Accession dated 26 October 1947 and 
requested India to defend the state against the tribal invasion from the 
Frontier tribesmen of Pakistan. India regards the Instrument of 
Accession as legal, final and irrevocable and considers Kashmir an 
integral part of the country. Pakistan, on the other hand, contests this 
claim and believes that a UN sponsored plebiscite should be held to 
determine the wishes of the people of Kashmir.44 The dispute centres 
essentially around the valley region which, as evident from Table 2.1, 
is predominantly Muslim, as opposed to J ammu and Ladakh which 
have a larger concentration of Hindus and Buddhists respectively. 
44Tue accession was at that time conditional on a plebiscite but the offer was 
retracted by Nehru in 1954 when Pakistan joined the Western-sponsored South East 
Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Pakistan has since viewed this as a breach of 
faith and there is a feeling in some quarters that the plebiscite was not held because 
India refused to withdraw its forces from Kashmir and because it felt that it could not 
win the people's vote. See Ghulam Nabi Fai, "The Plebiscite Solution for Kashmir 
When and How," in Raju G.C. Thomas (ed.), Perspectives on Kashmir; The Roots of 
Conflict in South Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 168-74. 
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Table 2.1 45 Population of Jammu and Kashmir State, 1981(a) 
Region Population % Muslims % Hindus % others 
% of State 
Population 
Kashmir 3,134,904 94.96 4.59 0.05 
Valley 52.36% 
Jammu 2, 718, 113 29.60 66.25 4.15 
45.39% 
Ladakh 134,372 46.04 2.66 51.30 
2.24% (Buddhist) -
Total State 5,987,389 64.19 32.24 3.57 
100.00 % 
a 1991 Census figures are not available 
Given the particular circumstances of Kashmir's accession to India, a 
special status was accorded to it under Article 370 whereby 
employment and ownership of property were restricted to Kashmiri 
citizens. But gradually the highly interventionist policies of the 
Indian state, including the installation of centrally approved state 
governments, incremental abrogation of article 373,46 and political 
and economic mismanagement of the state, turned the Kashmiris 
against the centre. Heavily rigged assembly elections in 1987 led to 
further disillusionment among mainstream leaders. Rising 
4Scensus 1981, Government of India. Cited in Ashutosh Varshney, "Three 
Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir Has Been a Problem," in Raju G.C. 
Thomas (ed.), Perspectives on Kashmir, op. cit., p. 207. · 
46For details see Reeta Chowdhury Tremblay, "Nation, Identity, and the Intervening 
Role of the State - A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir," Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 69, no. 4, Winter 1996-97, p. 484. 
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unemployment among educated youth, widespread poverty, and 
skewed allocation of resources for development deepened the feeling 
that there was discrimination by the centre.47 The centre's policies of 
repressing opposition politics led to the failure of the National 
Conference, the regional party led by Farooq Abdullah, to strike firm 
roots in Kashmir.48 The political and economic disllusionment 
ultimately contributed to the rise of militancy in the state. 
The contemporary Kashmir problem contains a volatile mixture of 
self-determination (including national self-determination) and 
Islamic fundamentalism.49 The fact that the Kashmir problem has 
both internal and external dimensions has accentuated the scope of 
the conflict. Its differing implications for India and Pakistan makes 
resolution of the conflict more difficult.SO India claims that Pakistan's 
47 Despite massive financial assistance to the state, economic growth has failed to 
keep pace with the increase in population, with no significant rise in real per capita 
incomes. The development of industry has been minimal while agriculture has not 
contributed much to the state GDP. This has been particularly detrimental to the 
state economy which has one of the lowest capital endowments in the country and is 
heavily dependent on imports of food, fuel and other capital goods. See Rita 
Tremblay, op. cit., p. 485. 
48 According to Puri, "The National Conference symbolised, in particular, the anger of 
the people of Kashmir against the dismissal of the duly elected government of Farooq 
Abdullah in 1984. When two years later he joined hands with the party responsible 
for his dismissal, his National Conference ceased to be an instrument of protest and 
was instead perceived by the people of Kashmir to be an instrument of humiliation." 
For details see Balraj Puri, "Rajiv-Farooq Accord: What Went Wrong," Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. 24, no. 30, pp. 1689-90. Also see Asghar Ali Engineer, 
"Kashmir - Autonomy Only Solution," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 30, no. 35, 
EP· 2167-68. 
9Links between Islam and Kashmir have been dealt with well in Balraj Puri, 
"Kashmiri Muslims, Islam and Kashmiri tradition," Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. 25, no. 6, 10February1990, pp. 307-8. 
50The reading material on Kashmir is extensive. For details of the historical roots of 
the problem see Gowher Rizvi, "Nehru and the Indo-Pakistan Rivalry over Kashmir 
1947-64," Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 4, no. l, 1995, pp. 17-37; Sisir K. Gupta, 
Kashmir: A Study in Inda-Pak Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1967). 
Some other recent works include M. J. Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale (New Delhi: 
Viking, 1991); Balraj Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency (New Delhi: Orient 
Longman, 1993). For a critical appraisal of the Indian state see Paula Newberg, 
Double Betrayal - Repression and Insurgency in Kashmir (Washington D.C: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1995). 
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continued help in terms of planning and co-ordination, training of 
militants across the border, supply of sophisticated arms and· 
substantial funds, has given a tremendous boost to militancy in 
Kashmir; while Pakistan admits to providing moral support to the 
insurgents in the valley awash with ''blood and tears" and "crying for 
freedom."51 
Although the prospects for restoration of political dialogue have 
remained dim in the face of killings and atrocities by both the 
militants and the para-military forces,52 the Indian government has 
not given up its efforts at various levels, including the use of force, to 
curb militancy. Steady efforts to initiate a political process to facilitate 
elections bore fruit in 1996 when parliamentary and state assembly 
elections led to the installation of the National Conference 
government in the state. 
Militancy has not been stamped out, and the valley remains hostage 
to the gun culture; but frustration with prolonged violence, economic 
dislocation and hardship, and disillusionment with the militants' 
intrusion in their private lives has led the weary people of Kashmir to 
long for normalcy and peace. It is of course not clear if there will be an 
51statement made by Benazir Bhutto. Cited in James Clad and Salamat Ali, "Indo-
Pak tension Mounts over Kashmir - Will Words Lead to War?" Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Vol. 148, no. 17, April 26, 1990, p. 10. Also see Edward Desmond, "The 
Insurgency in Kashmir (1989-1991)," Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 4, no. 1, 1995, pp. 
8-16. 
52According to an official estimate, between 1990 and 1993 some 7,600 civilians were 
killed by militants and military troops, although Kashmiri groups maintain that 
during the last four years, the figure has gone up to 20,000. During the same period 
para-military forces have lost 694 lives. Figures cited in Rita Chowdhari Tremblay, 
op. cit., p. 473. 
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easy and early return of total normalcy, but a political resolution of 
the crisis is not outside the realms of possibility.S3 
The growing clamour for autonomy may continue to be at times 
compounded by sporadic militancy and violence, as in Punjab, 
Kashmir or the North-east. At the same time, it needs to be pointed 
out that India's very functioning - in a continent-size country with a 
large, ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diversified population -
poses difficulties in making generalisations. As Marshall Bouton has 
concluded, despite gigantic socio-economic problems and the 
prolonged incapacity of the government to resolve them, democratic 
politics has not been undermined. India's vibrant democracy has been 
"the ultimate source of the state legitimacy, the major avenue of 
group mobility and the main ingredient in the glue that has kept the 
country together."S4 
Although India's elections in 1998, which gave no single party a 
majority and resulted in yet another coalition government at the 
centre, have aroused fears regarding India's political viability in some 
quarters, the reality continues to defy such fears. 
As Bouton has put it, 
India's political system has for several years been in transition from Congress 
Party dominance to a more splintered picture in which regional and caste-based 
parties control most states, alongside a still unclear political pattern at the 
centre. But neither the frequent changes of government nor the rise of the 
Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) as the national party should be mistaken for 
threats to India's underlying stability or its very unity. Rather they are 
integral to the latest stage ... of a social and political transformation made 
possible by democracy itself.SS 
S3For an excellent analysis of the Indian government's options in Kashmir see Sumit 
Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, "India and the Crisis in Kashmir," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, 
no. 5, May 1994, pp. 401-16. 
S4Marshall Bouton, op. cit., p. 82. 
sslbid., pp. 80-81. 
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Despite the growing ineffectiveness of government, social turmoil and frequent 
challenges to national authority in the name of religion, caste and regional 
identities, India has shown a remarkable resilience in sustaining its democratic 
federal framework. This has over the years provided fairly effective mechanisms 
for negotiation, compromise and cooperation amongst its diverse and competing 
regional groups. 
The process of widening and reinforcing electoral mobilisation has provided 
growing opportunities for more and more marginalised groups. Even as pressures 
from diverse groups are continously sought to be defused by a process of 
bargaining, consensus building and intensive group interaction, regional parties 
and groups are finding their own place in the political arena. 
India has had twelve general elections so far - generally free and fair - which 
itself is a remarkable exercise, considering that it involves an electorate of over 
600 million people. The ballot box has mobilised numerous linguistic, ethnic, and 
caste groups in the states, as also parties to represent them. At the same time, 
because the electorate is so divided by ethnicity, language, caste and religion, 
there are very few issues in India which can swing a broad political or geographic 
spectrum of the Indian electorate. The competitive party system limits religious 
revivalist movements. 
Thus over the long term, even the not-so-moderate parties like BJP are pushed 
towards moderation and power-sharing. "Extremist and separatist appeals almost 
always wind up being repudiated at the ballot box."56 For instance, in Punjab, 
56Marshall Bouton, op. cit., p. 83. 
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despite a decade of separatist violence and repression, voters strongly endorsed 
the moderate Sikh party once the political process was permitted to function. 
Although doubts continue periodically to be expressed about India's ability to 
remain united, India's nation·building record over the last five decade.s continues 
to be strong. The country's international boundaries have not changed after 1947 
despite several secessionist threats and the remaining challenges to national 
integrity. A combination of coercive power and political accommodation by the 
state has not allowed separatist demands to go beyond a point; rather they are 
used as bargaining chips in seeking greater autonomy within the federal 
framework. 
Pakistan 
Ethnic conflict has presented the most formidable challenge to Pakistan since its 
inception. It has already led to two civil wars and to the secession of the 
country's most populous province, East Pakistan, in 1971. Despite these 
experiences, ethnic conflict has continued unabated. The effervescence of ethnic 
politics has continued under democratic governments since 1988. According to 
one source, the root of the problem [the crisis of national identity] is largely due 
to the ruling elite's hesitation to commit the state to policies which would foster a 
viable national identity. 57 
57Seyyed Nasr, "State, Society and the Crisis of National Unity," in Rasul Bakhsh Rais (ed.), 
State, Society and Democratic Change in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 
103. 
This has been the result of the interplay of the 
particular mix of Islamicity and ethnic consciousness in the Pakistan movement, the 
ruling elite's largely political and unitarian attachment to Islam, Pakistan's feudal socio-
economic structure and the impact of the country's national economic policy since 
1947.58 
Pakistan has been under military rule for twenty-five of the fifty years of its 
existence and has had a poor record of parliamentary democracy. After the death 
of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, no leader was able to provide effective 
leadership to the country. The initial confusion and delay in producing a stable 
political order under which people could participate in the decision-making 
process retarded the growth of political institutions.-It- was only in 1956, after 
nine years of independence, that Pakistan was able to frame and adopt a 
democratic constitution for itself. And even after that, an atmosphere of political 
uncertainty prevailed in the absence of political parties of national stature. The 
rapid decline of the Muslim League and the formation of new parties led to the 
formation of coalition governments from 1954 onwards, initiating unstable party 
. 
politics in the country. 
It was against this background that martial law was declared by General A yub 
Khan in October 1958, marking a historic turning point in Pakistan's history. 
From then on, as Khalid Bin Sayeed has put it, Pakistani leaders have been only 
marginally concerned about the development of democratic institutions, obsessed 
as they have been with "following a strategy of survival through strengthening 
state structures and institutions through the bureaucracy and the army which has 
led to increasing ethnic, class and other conflicts. "59 
58Seyyed Nasr, "State, Society and the Crisis of National Unity," op. cit., p. 103. 
59Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Some Reflections on the Democratic Process," in Rasul Bux Rais, (ed.), 
op. cit., p. 2. 
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For example, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was in power from 1971 to 1977, took 
several measures to strengthen his own power base and directed his institutional 
reform at the civil bureaucracy and military establishment to effectively curb their 
autonomy. Several steps were taken to neutralise the military establishment 
including the removal of many senior officers and the restructuring of the military 
high command with a view to diluting the powers of the respective chiefs. Z.A. 
Bhutto also struck at the power of the bureaucracy by dismissing hundreds of 
civil servants and introducing a system of lateral entry.6° However, he was soon 
to realise that he could not function effectively without the support of the 
powerful military-bureaucratic combine. Given his failure to mobilise the 
organisational base of the PPP and the growing antagonism from several 
powerful lobbies in the country, Z. A Bhutto was forced to increasingly lean on 
the coercive instrument of the state authority including the Federal Security 
Police, which was used to quell the protest against his dictatorial rule by his 
political opponents. Under his rule repressive measures were used against party 
off'• f\en-ts and coercive measures were deployed to quell unrest in Baluchistan 
and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). 
Zia ul Haq's military regime embarked on a similar, systematic process of stifling 
political opposition and legitimising his rule by exploiting Islam.61 
6° For details see Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia-A Comparative 
and Historical Perspective (Lahore: Sang-e-meel Publications, 1995), pp. 80-85. Also see 
Khalid bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: Nature and direction of Change (New York: Praeger 
Publications, 1980), pp. 104-110. 
61 Craig Baxter and Javed Burki, Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul Haq 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 35-39. For details on Zia's rule see Mushahid Hussain, 
Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1991); Surendra Nath Kaushik, 
Politics of Jslamisation in Pakistan: A Study of The Zia Regime (New Delhi: South Asian 
Publishers, 1993). 
Through the difficult course of events during Pakistan's five decades 
of independence, multiple nationalities were ignored or repressed and 
the much desired national fabric could not be woven to accommodate 
the country's many ethnicities.62 Islam could not substitute for 
effective political management.63 The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 
challenged the basis of Pakistan's Islamic ideal. It was a painful 
reminder that religion alone could not bring about a cohesive 
national identity, nor could it compensate for the lack of political 
power sharing, and existing widespread economic, social and cultural 
disparities. 
Before partition, Muslims claimed to be a distinct nation on the basis 
of religion but "once Pakistan was created, Islam no longer paraded as 
ethnicity but was charged with the task of containing it."64 While 
Muslim separation was most popular in Muslim-minority provinces 
in India, Pakistan was created in Muslim-majority areas in North 
western India and Bengal. The language of the Muslim-minority 
provinces was Urdu which had very little following in Sindh, 
Baluchistan or Bengal; nor did Sindhis, Punjabis, Bengalis, Biharis or 
Hyderabadis follow the same customs and mores; they were different 
people who, save for their religion, shared more with their Hindu 
neighbours than with Muslims of other provinces.65 
62Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan's Nationality Dilemma;" in Ziring (ed.), Subcontinent 
in World Politics (New York: Praeger,1978), pp. 88-114. 
63Lawrence Ziring, "Political Development: Issues and Perspectives" in Rais Bux 
(ed.), op. cit., p. 24. 
64Seyyed Nasr, op. cit, p. 105. 
65Ibid., p. 105. Also see Selig Harrison, "Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan,''. in Joseph V. 
Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peace Making in Multi Ethnic Society (Lexington: 
Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 301-26. 
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Emphasis on cultural and linguistic assimilation in Pakistan was 
based on the mistaken premise that Bengalis, Sindhis, Baluchis and 
Pushtuns would willingly surrender their rich historical and cultural 
tradition in return for a narrowly defined Pakistani identity that 
traced its roots to northern India. There were few, if any, efforts on the 
part of the central elites to incorporate the history, language or 
cultural experiences of Pakistan's different ethnic groups into a 
modern sense of national identity. Urdu, spoken by barely 8 percent of 
the population, was declared the national language in Pakistan; this in 
turn had important ramifications for the education, civil service 
employment and economic development of other communities. It 
contributed to severe tensions between the centre and provinces, 
deepened urban-rural differences, and intensified conflicts. 
The mix of Islam and ethnicity on which Pakistan was p~mised did 
not by itself constitute a national identity. According to Seyyed Nasr, 
the success of achieving a secular national identity would have 
depended on wide-scale social reform and equitable distribution of 
resources but this was never achieved because· it ran counter to the 
class interests of the ruling elite and defied their developmental 
agenda.66 
66Seyyed Nasr, op. cit., p. 107. 
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As he concludes, during the early years, Pakistan's economic policy 
reflected class interests and as such led to an inequitable distribution of 
resources among different classes as well as different regions and ethnic groups. 
Not only did these policies not promote national unity, on balance they 
undermined it. 67 
At this time in Pakistan the economic interests of Muhajir and 
Punjabi politicians, bureaucrats and army officers, along with the 
Punjabi-Sindhi landed classes, produced a ruling class which has been 
termed by a noted Pakistani scholar a Salariat. 68 The result was that 
Islam became a tool in the hands of the ruling elites in dealing with 
problems which threatened the state as well as those which pertained 
to factional rivalries.69 The secessionist movement in East Pakistan 
and the present turmoil in Sindh will be studied to examine the 
fragility of Pakistan's federal structure. 
East Pakistan 
The first to object to Punjabi dominance were the Bengalis. Between 
1955 and 1971, the West wing had been brought under one-unit to 
obscure the distinctive identities of the less numerous linguistic 
groups in Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan, and also to seek parity with 
the Bengalis who formed the East wing. 
67.Seyyed Nasr, op. cit., p. 107. 
68Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity, Muslim Society and Pak Ideology," in Anita M. Weiss 
(ed.), Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 
21-22. 
69syyed Nasr, p. 109. To see how Islam has been used as an ideology by successive 
governments in Pakistan see Stanley J. Tambiah, Leveling Crowds - Ethnonationalist 
Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), pp. 194-210. 
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Prior to 1971, the Bengalis in the East wing, who constituted half of 
Pakistan's total population, remained woefully under-represented in 
the civil bureaucracy and military. Resentment at the imposition of 
Urdu as the sole national language led to further alienation among 
the Bengalis. By the 1960s, the religious affinities which had bound 
the two wings of Pakistan had been eroded by an acute sense of 
political denial and economic exploitation. Regional imbalance 
between the two wings was sharpened by the wide difference in per 
capita income, allocation of resources, and representation in the 
military and bureaucracy.70 
East Pakistanis were especially concerned that income derived from 
East Pakistan was not invested back into that province but was used to 
subsidise the development of West Pakistan in general and Punjab in 
particular, making East Pakistan a virtual colony of Pakistan.71 The 
demand for autonomy, as articulated in the six point program of the 
Awami League, was in effect a demand for democratisation and 
effective federalism,72 envisaging the transfer of power over currency, 
and the utilisation of foreign exchange earnings to the regional 
government, and a return to the parliamentary form of government 
within a truly federal framework.73 According to Urmila Phadnis, 
70For details see Urmila Phad.nis, op. cit., 170-74. 
71 Even though East Pakistan provided most of the foreign exchange, central 
expenditure, in particular foreign exchange for development, was concentrated in the 
west wing. West Pakistan used its East wing to develop Karachi and Punjab. Raw 
materials were brought from the East to develop goods in the West wing and the 
finished products were sold back to the East. Between 1948 and 1953, exports from 
West Pakistan to the East exceeded imports from East to West by 909 million rupees. 
See Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1983), p. 46, 85-87. 
72For text of the six point program see Ramendu Mazumdar (ed), Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, Bangladesh, My Bangladesh, Selected Speeches and Statements, October 
28, 1970 to March 26, 1971 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), pp. 127-28. 
73For an analysis see Raunaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration 
(Dhaka: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
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"liberation" of East Pakistan was more in terms of emancipation of the area from 
economic and political fetters. It did not imply secession, but secession was an 
option which was kept handy in case political expediency warranted it.74 
Eventually, the West wing's power elite's unwillingness to share power resulted in 
the secession of the East wing from Pakistan. 
Some scholars, however, have also underlined the crucial role played by India in 
providing diplomatic, financial, military support to the East Bengalis. Indeed 
Indian military intervention in late 1971 on behalf of the Bengalis has been seen 
by some scholars as the decisive factor behind the success of the Bengali 
secessionist movement greatly enhancing its audibility, visibility and acceptability 
which most secessionist movements find hard to achieve. 75 At the same time it is 
pertinent to point out that while India's role in the emergence of Bangladesh is 
significant, the seeds of discord were present in the lopsided distribution of 
political and economic power between the two wings which engendered the 
conflict that was precipitated further by Pakistan's policy of repression in East 
Pakistan. 
Even after the secession of the East wing, little changed. Although the new 
democratic regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tried to be responsive to smaller 
provinces by giving them equal representation with Punjab in the Upper House 
under the 1973 constitution, this made little difference, as the Senate had no 
financial power. 
74Urmila Phadnis, op. cit, p. 173. 
75 Rajat Ganguly, Kin State Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts, Lessons from South Asia (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998), pp. 125. 
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With the dismantling of the one-unit system, the Punjabis constituted nearly 60 
percent of the population and 70 percent of the military services. They also 
dominated the federal bureaucracy and formed a large percentage of civil servants 
and police forces in the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. But there was no 
system of weighted representation to ensure that the strength of the smaller 
provinces in the National Assembly was equal to if not greater than that of the 
Punjab. 
As Hamza Alavi has pointed out, unlike India, where no single ethnic group can 
be identified as the dominant holder of state power at the centre, ethnic 
movements in Pakistan are directed against the central power, demanding 
regional autonomy. The autocratic power of the central government is identified 
by disadvantaged regional groups as Punjabi domination.76 
As a consequence, while a similar situation has resulted in negotiation with a 
variety of local groups in the exercise of state power in India, in Pakistan, by 
contrast, the dominance of a single group of Punjabis in the military and 
bureaucracy has worked to the disadvantage of other groups. The predominantly 
Punjabi military and federal bureaucracy in Pakistan has engendered feelings of 
alienation among the Sindhis, Muhajirs and Baluch in terms of access to 
employment opportunities, better social services and an adequate share of 
financial resources. The case of the Baluch, one of the main case studies of this 
thesis, will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
76Hamza Alavi, "Problems of Ethnicity in Pakistan," Paper presented at the International 
Conference on "Cooperation for Peace, Security and Development in Southern Asia and the 
Pacific Region," 17-19 January 1988, New Delhi. 
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Sindh 
The situation in Sindh has remained extremely complicated because it is a multi-
ethnic province. The battle lines are drawn at many levels: between the Sindhis 
and Muhajirs; Muhajirs and Pushtuns; and between the Sindhi and Muhajirs 
against the Punjabis. 
Initially overwhelmingly Muhajir in composition, the pattern of urban population 
in Sindh changed over the years with the entry of large numbers of Pushtuns and 
Punjabis to the industrial centres of Sindh. 77 With Punjabis dominating most 
positions of wealth and power in the province, both Sindhis and Muhajirs found 
themselves increasingly relegated to the background. Although Sindhis remain the 
formal majority in statistical terms, a number of demographic changes have taken 
place since the early 1980s. Not much data is available on the 1998 census 
conducted in Pakistan but some scholars believe that the Muhajirs, who have 
steadily grown in number since 1981, remain effectively disenfranchised in 
Sindh.78 
This made for a sense of growing resentment, particularly among the Muhajirs, 
who lost out heavily in the new situation of Punjabi domination. From being in a 
position of dominance (1947-51), then of partnership with the Punjabi elite 
(1951-71), the Muhajirs found themselves being left out in the cold. The entry of 
the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) into the political landscape in 1984 saw 
the beginning of demands for the recognition of the Muhajirs as the fifth 
77In the 1981 census, Sindhis accounted for only 52 percent of the population of Sindh with 
Muhajirs accounting for 22 percent. In urban areas Muhajirs are estimated to account for over 
50 percent of the population. 
78M.B. Naqvi, "Ethno-nationalism in Pakistan: Cross Border Overlaps," South Asian Survey, 
Vol. 4, no. 2, July-Oecember 1997, p. 220. 
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nationality of Pakistan. Grievances of the Muhajirs range from discrimination in 
employment and admission to educational institutions, to perceived discrimination 
by the provincial government composed of native Sindhis and the Punjabi-
dominated federal bureaucracy and army. 
Muhajirs, who constitute 40 percent of the total population of Sindh and 12 
percent of the total population of Pakistan, feel they are not getting a 
proportionate share in jobs and admissions to state-owned educational institutions 
in urban Sindh.79 The nationalisation of banks and industries in 1972 and the 
introduction of the rural-urban quota system in jobs in federal and provincial 
institutions deepened the cleavages between the Muhajirs and the Sindhis. The 
Muhajirs want the end of the quota system and allocation of government jobs.:a:ml 
P. T.D 
79Kaiser Bengali, "Defining Mohajir Grievances," Dawn (Karachi), 13 February 1996. 
and admission to educational institutions on the basis of merit. Their 
other demands include the repatriation of Biharis (those who went to 
Bangladesh after the 1971 war)·~ :.J" ~ ... J to Pakistan; and the 
division of the Sindh and creation of a Muhajir province, the . 
boundaries of which remain vague and undefined.so Thus, at one 
level, the Muhajirs have been locked into a fierce confrontation with 
the establishment. Operation Clean-Up, launched in May 1992 by the 
MQM, initiated a period of sustained violence in Karachi. At another 
level, the confrontation created tensions with the Sindhis who 
demanded that all Muhajirs be sent back to their native country.Bl 
Sindhi nationalism, on the other hand, is based on Sindhi language, 
culture and history. The Sindhis have had a deep-seated resentment 
of Muhajir control of the province, particularly the urban centres. 
Before the coming of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, most of the land in the 
province was allotted to armed forces personnel or refugees from 
India, depriving the Sindhis of their share in the province.82 They 
were also poorly represented in the federal bureaucracy, with most of 
the high ranking positions going to Muhajirs or Punjabis who had 
either established residence or obtained Sindhi domicile certificates.83 
The demands of the Sindhis include the discontinuance of migration 
from other provinces into Sindh; exclusion of non-Sindhis from 
employment and business in Sindh; reconstitution of electoral 
districts in a way that old Sindhis will fill at least two-thirds of the 
S<>Mehtab Ali Shah, "The Emergence of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in 
Pakistan and its Implications for Regional Security," Round Table, no. 348, October 
1998, pp. 510-511. 
Bloaily Jang (Karachi) 4 July 1995. 
82For details see Farida Shaheed, "The Pathan-Muhajir Conflicts, 1985-6: A 
National Perspective," in Veena Das (ed.), Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots 
and Survivors in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 199. 
83 Anwar H. Syed, "Political Parties and the Nationality Question in Pakistan," 
Journal of South Asian and Middle fa.stern Studies, Vol.12, no. l, 1988, p. 55. 
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seats in the provincial assembly and two-thirds of Sindh's quota of 
seats in the national assembly; and restriction of the federal 
government's powers to defence, foreign affairs, currency, and 
communications. They define a Sindhi as a person who was born in 
Sindh or has lived in Sindh for twenty-five years.84 
Extremist organisations such as the Jiye Sindh Tehrik, the Jiye Sindh 
Qaum Parast Party and the Jiye Sindh Taraqqi Pasand Party have 
moved one step further and openly espoused the creation of a 
separate Sindh state or Sindhu Desh. G. M. Sayed, one of the 
proponents of Sindhu Desh and founder of the Jiye Sindh Mahaz 
(Long Live Sindh Front), wanted a Sindhu Desh based on the 
principles of secularism, socialism, democracy and nationalism. It 
envisaged among other things, a redistribution of agricultural land 
from non-Sindhis to Sindhis; management and control of trade, 
commerce, banks, insurance compa1:1ies, and government agencies by 
Sindhi speaking permanent residents of Sindh; equitable land reform; 
strict separation of religion and state; and the declaration of Sindhi as 
the sole national and official language of Sindh.85 
Bhutto tried to redress the imbalance in Sindh by channelling more 
development resources to the province and making Sindhi the sole 
official language, but he had to backtrack on the Sindhi Language Act 
in the face of violent riots between Sindhi and Urdu speaking people 
in urban Sindh. The situation was worsened by the fact that the state 
sought to create inter-ethnic alliances and manipulate ethnic rivalries 
B4Anwar H. Syed, "Political Parties and the Nationality Question in Pakistan," op. 
cit, p. 60. 
85 For the main socio-economic and political features of Sindhu Desh see G. M. Sayed, 
A Case for Sindhu Desh ( Bombay: Sorah Publishers, 1985), pp. 80-85. 
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to its advantage. Zia appealed to Islam in the hope of defusing ethnic 
tensions, but failed to solve the crisis in Sindh. He did not rescind the 
quota systems introduced in Sindh by the PPP. At the same time, he 
projected the interests of the non-Sindhi military-bureaucratic-
industrial complex. His politics failed to satisfy either the Sindhis or 
the Muhajirs, the latter objecting to what they perceived as the 
government's pro-Sindhi policies and its support for Punjabi and 
Pathan intrusion into urban Sindh. Sindh has since been transformed 
into a cauldron of discontent.86 Although the MQM has been 
consistently winning credibility in urban Sindh in all four general 
elections, and extending support to both the Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif 
governments at the centre, it has not brought the political solution of 
the problem any nearer.. Sindh has remained embroiled in anarchy 
and held tenuously by the armed might of the state since the army 
crackdown in 1992. This has fostered anti-Punjabi sentiments in the 
province. 
Some scholars like Ayesha J alal are of the view that it is the real 
politik, not ethnic discord, that has been the propelling factor in the 
alignment of political forces in Sindh.87 She claims that the 
underlying causes of Sindh's crisis are undeniably political and 
' 
economic in nature, traceable to the most inequitable state structure.88 
But whichever perspective one takes, there is no denying that as long 
as regional inequities persist within the state structure, and vast 
86Jn 1983 a Sindhi uprising was put down by the armed might of the state. Mohajir 
anger manifested itself in the form of anti-Pathan riots in 1985-86, and the province 
became engulfed in a protracted conflict between the MQM and the PPP. For details of 
the riots see Stanley J. Tambiah, Leveling Crowds - Ethnonationalist Conflicts and 
Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 
pp. 183-94. 
87 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, op. cit., p. 197. 
88Ibid., p. 197. 
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sections of the poor in provinces like Sindh and Baluchistan remain 
powerless, Pakistan's federal dilemma will continue; the fundamental 
question is: how to reconcile the simmering contradictions between 
its all-embracing Islamic identity and ethnic pulls? 
Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka is a functioning democracy but, unlike India and Pakistan, it 
is a unitary state and not a federation. The case of Sri Lanka is 
instructive in two respects: it underlines the importance of external 
linkages in sustaining a movement (Tamil nationalism in this case) 
for almost two decades; and, more significantly, it shows the inability 
of the Sri Lankan state to combat this challenge. While the democratic 
framework has imparted a certain degree of legitimacy to the state, 
successive governments have been unable to resolve the intractable 
ethnic issue. 
The growing schism between the Sinhalese majority, comprising 
about 74 percent of the Sri Lankan population, and the Tamil 
minority which accounts for 18 percent of the population, has led to 
an upsurge of ethnic conflict in the island.89 According to S.D. Muni, 
ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka is essentially of its own making. There is no 
record of Sinhala-Tamil communal strife in the country's pre-
89 According to the 1988 census, Sri Lanka comprises many ethnic groups of which the 
Sinhalese are in a majority (74 percent), followed by Tamils (18 percent), Moors (7 
percent) and Burghers, Malays and Veddhas (one percent). See Mahfuzul H. 
Chowdhury, "Ethnic Conflicts and Problems of National Integration in Bangladesh, 
India and Sri Lanka," in Naveed Ahmad Tahir (ed.), The Politics of Ethnicity and 
Nationalism in Europe and South Asia (Area Study Centre for Europe, University of 
Karachi and Hanns Seidal Foundation, 1997), p. 138. 
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independence history. 90 In fact, quite unlike the Baluch in Pakistan or 
the Sikhs in Punjab, the Tamils in Sri Lanka had a fair share in the 
power structure of colonial Sri Lanka. But since independence, and 
particularly during the last two decades, the Tamils started feeling 
alienated from the political mainstream, leading to a demand for 
Eelam, a separate Tamil state. Both the SLFP (Sri Lankan Freedom 
Party) and United National Party (UNP), which have shared power 
alternately since 1956, adopted measures which were perceived by the 
Tamils as being discriminatory against them. 
The roots of the crisis may be traced to a set of policies initiated in the 
post-independence period by successive Sri Lankan governments in 
the fields of education, employment and economic actiVities, which 
were inimical to the interests of minority communities such as the 
Tamils.91 . The passing of the Official Language Act in 1956, declaring 
Sinhala to be the office language of Sri Lanka, had an adverse effect on 
the Tamils by limiting their opportunities in government service and 
other employment.92 Regarded as a betrayal by the Sinhalese 
leadership,93 the language issue was perhaps "the pivotal factor that 
90s. D. Muni, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and India's Response," in Dagmor Bemstorff 
and Dieter Braun (eds), Political Transition in South Asia - Regional Cooperation, 
Ethnic Conflict, Political Participation (Stuttgart: Franzsteiner Verlag, 1991), p. 54. 
91For details see James Manor (ed.), Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis (London, Croom 
Helm, 1984); S.J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka-Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of 
Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
92For example, out of 100 people selected in the 1973 Administrative Service 
Examination, only four were Tamils and two Muslims; the rest were Sinhalese. See 
Walter Schwarz, The Tamils of Sri Lanka, Minority Rights Group Report No. 25 
(London, 1988) p. 10. For ethnic representation in Selected Government Employment 
Categories from 1948-1981 see Ambalavanar Sivarajah, Politics of Tamil 
Nationalism in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1996), p. 85. 
93Jt was considered to be a betrayal because following the outbreak of violence on the 
language issue, a pact was signed on 20 July 1957 by the then prime minister, S.W.R.D 
Bandaranaike, recognising Tamil as the language of the national minority and the 
language of administration in the Northern and Eastern provinces, but it was 
repudiated in the face of Sinhalese pressure. See C.R. de Silva, "The Sinhalese-
Tamil Rift in Sri Lanka,"in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds), The 
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drove the two communities asunder in the post-independence 
period."94 Subsequently, changes in the admission policy seeking to 
reduce the percentage of Tamil tertiary students added to the 
frustration of Tamil youth. Standardising schemes and district quotas 
were introduced in 1974 to effectively restrict the entry of Tamil 
students in universities.95 Similarly, the land settlement policies of 
the government were seen as a means for changing the demographic 
character of the Tamil populace in the Eastern and Northern 
provinces. 
Up to the 1970s, Tamil nationalism was largely a reaction to the 
imposition of pro-Sinhalese policies, but by 1972 the demand for 
autonomy changed to that of secession. The 1972 constitution, 
incorporating the principle of unitary structure, was heavily biased 
against Tamil interests. Subsequently, all Tamil members of 
parliament walked out in protest to form the Tamil United Front 
comprising virtually all Tamil groups and parties. Given the 
Sinhalese intransigence, and having been persistently thwarted in 
their quest for solving legitimate Tamil demands within the existing 
state framework, the Front, reconstituted as the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF), raised the demand for Tamil Eelam, a 
separate homeland for the Tamils. President Jayewardene's 
conciliatory measures - designating Tamil as an associate language, 
States of South Asia - Problems of National Integration (London: C. Hurst & Co, 
1982), pp. 166-68. 
94see C.R. de Silva,"The Sinhalese-Tamil Rift in Sri Lanka,"in A. Jeyaratnam 
Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds), The States of South Asia, op. cit., p. 164. Also see 
Robert N. Kearney, "Language and the Rise of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," Asian 
Survey, Vol. 18, no. 5, May 1978, pp. 521-34. 
95for example, the percentage of Tamil students in engineering colleges fell from 48.3 
percent of the total in 1969 to 24.4 percent in 1973 and 14.2 percent in 1975. Cited in C.R 
de Silva, "The Sinhalese-Tamil Rift in Sri Lanka,"in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and 
Dennis Dalton (eds), op. cit., p. 168. 
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amending education procedures, and offering limited autonomy 
through district councils - came too late and were too little to assuage 
the deep sense of Tamil deprivation.96 
This has been the main obstacle to peace between the two 
communities. In the early years, efforts to provide a modicum of 
regional autonomy to the Tamils floundered because the parties, 
when in opposition, spared no efforts to cash in on Sinhalese 
Buddhist sentiments to frustrate any move for a structural 
rearrangement of the administrative system.97 According to James 
Manor the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka was also a result of the failure of 
the national political elite to endow local governments with 
substantive powers which were necessary to transform them into 
strong, vital elements of a broadly-based organisation.98 
Later in the late 1970s, when the Jayewardene government tried to 
win over the Tamils, the Tamil leadership had hardened its posture, 
demanding outright secession. The L TTE has since stood firm on its 
demand for a sovereign socialist state of Eelam. 
96 A second republican Constitution enacted under Jayewardene in 1978 contained many 
measures to win back the Tamils. For example, both Tamil and Sinhala were 
recognised as national languages; all laws and official reports were required to be 
published in both languages; the distinction between "citizenship by descent" and 
'citizen by registration' was abolished and all citizens were deemed to be citizens of 
Sri Lanka. See C.R. de Silva, "The Sinhalese-Tamil Rift in Sri Lanka," in A. 
Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton (ed.), op. cit., p.169. Also see S. Bhaduri and A. 
Karim, The Sri Lankan Crisis (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1990), p. 13. 
97For example, the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957, which included 
concessions fo the Tamils on a number of issues in the Northern and Eastern provinces, 
was repudiated soon after under pressure from the Sinhalese lobby. Similarly the non-
acceptance of the proposal on the devolution of powers between the centre and the 
provinces by the SLFP in 1986 marked a continuation of the same trend. See Phadnis, 
op.cit., pp. 198-99. . 
98James Manor, "The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka," The Journal of 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 17, no. 1, March 1979, p. 22. 
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It has justified it on the basis that: 
We have a homeland, a historically constituted habitation with a well 
defined territory embracing the Northern and Eastern provinces, distinct 
language, a rich culture and tradition, a unique economic life and a lengthy 
history extending to over three thousand years. As a nation, we have the 
inalienable right of self-determination.99 . 
Eelam is envisaged as a secular, democratic, socialist state which 
would guarantee the democratic liberties and freedom of all its 
citizens, and in which all forms of exploitation and social oppression 
would be abolished. It stands for the abolition of Sinhalese 
colonisation of Tamil areas and the recognition of Muslims in the 
new state. 
The Tamil leadership wanted sovereignty but the government was 
not willing to accept this position on the grounds that "Sri Lanka is a 
unitary republic, though made up of a plurality of peoples. Therefore 
divided sovereignty is inconceivable."100 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE) 
Consequently, violence became an endemic feature of the Sri Lankan 
polity, with the rise of several militant organisations espousing the 
Tamil and Sinhalese causes.101 Of these, the LTTE has emerged as one 
of the world's most feared organisations; and any resolution to the 
crisis depends on its willingness to negotiate. Generally speaking, 
99Jshtiaq Ahmed, State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia (London: 
Pinter Publications, 1998), p. 265. 
lOOstatement made by J.R Jayewardene in Dennis Austin and Anirudha Gupta, "Lions 
and Tigers - The Crisis in Sri Lanka," Conflict Studies, 211, May 1988, p. 3. 
lOlsome of these include People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE); 
the Marxist-Leninist Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS); the 
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPLRM); and the Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organisation (TELO). 
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most states in South Asia have been able to overcome organised 
militancy after a certain period of time. The case of the L TfE merits 
. 
special attention in that it has continued to pose a grave challenge to 
the Sri Lankan state for almost two decades with little or no respite, 
making it a "success story" without parallel in the region. It may be 
instructive at this point to consider its strategies and strengths. 
Drawing on the loyalties and resources of members of a global Tamil 
diaspora, the LTTE has evolved a complex network linking 
commercial companies and small business, informal banking 
channels, a fleet of ships, political offices, human rights organisations, 
arms dealers and foreign mercenaries.102 As Rohan Gunaratne says, 
By late 1995, 40 percent of LTfE War budget was generated from overseas. Since 
the loss of Jaffna peninsula in early 1996, 60 percent of the LTI'E war budget is 
being generated from overseas. The L TIE has been en§aged in a number of 
ventures that continue to bring them a massive revenue.10 
At home, the LTTE, with an estimated number of 4000 to 15,000 
fighters, has used suicide bombers and explosives to target prominent 
people and institutions.104 There are reports of L TfE procuring arms 
from South-east Asia, particularly Burma, Thailand, and Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Pakistan; it has effective anti-aircraft capability, 
specifically surface-to-air missiles, and a stock of sophisticated 
explosives.105 
102 Asiaweek, 26 July 1996. 
103Rohan Gunaratne, International and Regional Security: Implications of the Sri 
Lankan Insurgency (United Kingdom: Alumni Association of Bandaranaike Centre for 
International Studies, 1997), pp. 23-24. 
1041t has killed a number of prominent Sri Lankan leaders including President 
Premadasa in May 1993, Gainamius Dissanayake, the opposition leader, in October 
1994, and TULF leaders A. Amrithalingam in 1989 and A. Thungadurai in 1997. 
105 Asiaweek, 26 July 1996. 
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In recent years, the LTTE's intransigence on the question of 
sovereignty, its abrupt pulling out of the peace talks set in motion by 
present President Kumaratunga, and its rejection of the President's 
plans for constitutional reforms have eroded its standing in the 
international community106 and pushed back· the process of finding a 
compromise solution. Commenting on the LTTE's rejection of the 
peace talks and breaking of the ceasefire in 1995, President 
Kumaratunga made it clear that while she remained committed to a 
peaceful settlement of the ethnic crisis, she did not underestimate the 
ruthlessness and chicanery of LTTE, which she termed "the most 
ruthless and most effective guerrilla organisation in the 20th 
century. "107 
There is no disputing that the Tamil militant struggle could not have 
been sustained in the initial stages without India's moral and material 
support. India's position, however, remained geared to expediting a 
negotiated settlement within the framework of the existing situation 
for the Tamils, with whom, although separated by nationality and 
citizenship, its own Tamils had deep emotional ties. The Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord signed by the Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and 
President Jayewardene in July 1987108 offered a brief respite, but did 
little in the face of LTTE's uncompromising stance on sovereignty. 
106Jn 1997, the US termed LITE a terrorist organisation. Earlier in 1995, Canada, 
which has a large concentration of Tamils, had classified Tamil guerrillas as a 
terrorist group. Britain is also taking steps to clamp down on foreign groups which use 
Britain as a base to plot or finance terrorist activities to be carried out in their 
ori~al home countries. 
10 India Today, 15 May 1995. 
108The Accord provided for the stationing of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPI<F) 
for the restoration of peace and normalcy in the area; the surrender of arms by 
militants following amnesty; formation of an interim administrative council in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces; the holding of elections in the area and devolution of 
powers at the provincial level. For the text of the Accord see Ambalavanar 
Sivarajah, Politics of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: South Asian 
Publishers, 1996), Appendix, pp. 205-211. 
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The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), sent to enforce the cessation of 
hostilities, was slowly drawn into a guerrilla war with the L1TE itself. 
After the IPKF's withdrawal in 1989, the island plunged into one crisis 
after another. The victory of the People's Alliance under the 
leadership of President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1994, on the 
slogan of peace and normalcy, provided some hope, but it has 
remained largely unfulfilled because of the LTTE's unrelenting 
position on the issue. Although she exhibited great courage and 
statesmanship in getting the peace process in motion, by lifting the 
ban on essential supplies to the north, and then launching a massive 
relief and rehabilitation program for the strife-tom region, the peace 
talks stalled over the LTTE's demand for an alternate land route to the 
peninsula and the right of L TIE cadres to carry arms in the Eastern 
province. Even though the Sri Lankan troops captured Jaffna in 1995, 
they are still to crush the L TTE and restore civil administration in the 
area.109 
Meanwhile, President Kumaratunga's constitutional reform process, 
designed to end the ethnic conflict, has been virtually grounded as the 
ruling and opposition parties remain at loggerheads over the draft of 
the new constitution,110 which envisages a quasi-federal arrangement 
or union of states in place of the present unitary state. Under this 
scheme, the provincial governments would have exclusive powers to 
make laws on the specified devolved subjects, and execute them. 
Such power would not be granted to the provincial governments by 
109News Time (Hyderabad), 1 July 1998. 
l lOfor details on the devolution debate see Sri Lanka: The Devolution Debate 
(Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1996). 
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the central government but would be derived from the constitution. 
As an analyst has put it, 
Since independence, this is the first major step to make a constitutional 
framework to accommodate the interests of minority communities. This marks a 
deviation from the notion. of majoritarian democracy which up to now has 
determined the democratic set up in Sri Lanka. This may be a step towards 
consensual politics away from the present conflictual politics.111 
In order to win moderate Tamil support and find a long-term 
solution to the ethnic crisis, the government came out with draft 
constitutional reforms to make Sri Lanka a federal state and grant 
substantial powers to Tamil majority areas. The offer of a political 
package was part of the government's two-pronged campaign against 
the Tigers. At the same time it kept military pressure on them in the 
North. The government, with only a one-seat majority in Parliament, 
would, however, need the opposition's support for the peace package, 
as constitutional changes require the support of a two-thirds majority 
in Parliament. 
Even as the draft constitution is mired in the government-opposition 
tussle, the LITE, which unilaterally broke off political negotiations in 
1995, shows no serious intent to resume negotiations. So far no 
government in Sri Lanka has been willing to undertake the structural 
changes to redress the ethnic imbalance. All efforts at devolution and 
decentralisation of power which could have allowed a measure of 
autonomy to the Tamils without destroying the integrity of the 
nation-state have been rejected. The result has been a growing 
division between the two communities which has escalated from 
peaceful protests to terrorism and a full blown separatist movement. 
lllDaily News (Colombo), 17 December 1996. 
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It is clear that a viable settlement in Sri Lanka can be sustained only if 
the two communities accept each other's legitimate roles in nation-
building within the essential framework of the territorial integrity of 
Sri Lanka. There is a growing realisation that Sri Lankan forces cannot 
win the guerrilla war with the L TTE, which has been acquiring 
increasingly sophisticated weaponry. The LTTE, on its part, may 
sustain a prolonged struggle, but cannot attain Eelam and retain it. So 
long as Sinhalese distrust of substantive decentralisation remains 
entrenched and the LTTE, without whose participation no viable 
settlement can hold, remains opposed to a peaceful settlement, 
nothing substantial can be achieved.112 This is more so because the 
L TTE receives tremendous support from the Tamil diaspora, unlike 
the expatriate Sikh population, which was never able to render large-
scale assistance to the Khalistan movement. 
Bangladesh 
Among the multi-ethnic plural states in South Asia, Bangladesh is 
perhaps the only one characterized by homogeneity. Yet it was 
confronted with the problem of integrating its small but significant 
tribal minority. The problem of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), 
occupying 10 percent of Bangladesh territory and only one per cent of 
its population, has its roots in the economic and cultural 
marginalisation of the tribals, a problem that has over the years been 
made more intractable by the policies of successive Bangladeshi 
governments. 
112For details see Edward Appathurai, "Communal Politics and National Integration 
in Sri Lanka," in Milton Israel (ed.), op. cit., pp. 211-29. 
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As noted by Syed Anwar Hussain, 
At the inception of statehood, Bangladesh with its near demographic 
homogeneity did not appear to be poised for such an eventuality. But over the 
years, ethnic turmoil that originated in the CHT has not only jeopardised the 
nation-building process but also created sources of insecurity for Bangladesh 
with cross border ramifications.113 
Bangladesh had to some extent inherited the problem. The Pakistani 
government's policies, after the withdrawal of the British, were 
geared to evading the special status of CHT. Its policy of emphasising 
a single religion, Islam, and a single language, which excluded any 
belief in multiculturalism and pluralism, further marginalised the 
tribals who remained a minority both in socio-cultural terms and in 
power sharing structures. Its policy of encouraging internal migration 
and developmental projects like the Kaptai Dam uprooted a large 
majority of tribals from their lands. Disruption of traditional social 
organisation and economic systems, lack of employment 
opportunities, and land alienation led to growing disenchantment 
among the tribals. 
Ironically, in the new state of Bangladesh, the Awami League, which 
had itself led a powerful autonomist movement, failed to recognize 
the implications of outright denial of tribal autonomy.114 The five 
point charter of demands put forth by the tribals in 1972 was rejected 
by Mujibur Rahman's government (1971-1975), which emphasized 
the need to subsume any parochial aspirations under the broad rubric 
of Bengali nationalism. According to one source, the difficulty in 
113syed Anwar Hussain, "Ethnicity and Security of Bangladesh" in Ifte.kharuzzaman 
(ed.), op. cit., p. 174. 
114For details see Ajay Darshan Behera, "Insurgency in the Bangladesh Hills -
Chakmas Search for Autonomy," Strategic Analysis, Vol. 19, no. 7, October 1996, p. 
990. 
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finding a solution to the Chakma problem lies in the Islamic political 
structure of Bangladesh. It does not provide enough scope for 
accommodation to the Chakmas because they are neither Muslims 
nor do they identify themselves with Bengali speaking people.115 
Declaration of Bangladesh as a unicultural and unilingual state in 
1974, through a bill in parliament, raised fears among the tribals of the 
extinction of their cultural identity in the unitary political system.116 
To the people of CHT, the state-sponsored model of nationhood, in 
its Bengali and Bangladeshi variants, remains a tool of "Bengali 
hegemonism and dominance."117 
By the time the first elected government of Bangladesh realised the 
seriousness of the situation and stopped the steady influx of Bengali 
population to the CHT in 1973, the tribals had moved to aggressive 
political and military mobilisation to challenge the government. The 
government's military offensive, underlined by its setting up of 
military cantonments in CHT, only made matters worse. Soon after, 
the tribal leaders formed a broad-based front, Parbattya Chattagram 
Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS), to embark on a sustained movement to 
challenge the government. In 1973, an armed wing, Shanti Bahini, 
was added. The CHT tribals remained engaged in low-level 
insurgency against the government for more than two decades. 
115sarojini Sharan and Franklin Vivekananda, Asia - The 21st Critical Century - The 
Question of Sub-nationalism in South Asia, Case Studies from Sri Lanka, India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh (Sweden: Bethany Books, 1991), p. 142. 
116Syed Anwar Hussain, "Insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tractsi Problems of 
Ethnic Minorities in Bangladesh," Asian Studies,Vol. 4, no. l, 1996. 
117 Ameena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts in Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 1997), pp. 3-4. 
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Successive regimes have tried to assuage the tribals by starting a 
political dialogue and accelerating economic development of the 
region, but with little success. General Ziaur Rahman's (1975-81) mass 
rehabilitation programs to settle Bengalis in the tribal areas, and the 
expansion of the military cantonments to counter the insurgents, 
were viewed as a ploy to marginalise the tribals. According to one 
estimate, 400,000 Bengalis were settled in the CHT hills. These settlers 
were perceived as pushing the Hill people from their ancestral 
homelands, grabbing their lands, monopolising transport operations, 
and ruthlessly exploiting the Hill people.118 
Similarly, even though Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1982-90) created 
three local government bodies in the area, and provided for limited 
autonomy by the devolution of some powers to these elected councils, 
the Shanti Bahini objected to the councils on the grounds that the 
members were hand-picked by the government which was playing a 
classic game of divide and rule. Some reconciliation was under way 
in 1992, when the democratic government of Khaleeda Zia took some 
steps to expedite a political solution by adding some more subjects to 
the three councils and declaring a general amnesty for the rebels. 
Since 1992, the Shanti Bahini leaders have been engaged in holding 
peace talks with the government. 119 
118 Am.eena Mohsin, op. cit., p. 117. 
119over the years the tribal demands underwent qualitative changes. In 1992, the 
PCJSS put forth a 15-point charter of demands which although not differing in 
substance from its earlier demands, for the first time talked about regional autonomy 
instead of provincial autonomy. The demand for regional autonomy underlined the 
Shanti Bahini's inclination to opt for a political rather than a military solution of 
the problem. The demand basically envisaged a solution within the framework of the 
Bangladesh Constitution, albeit under an amended institution. See Syed Anwar 
Hussain, "State and Ethnicity: The Case of Bangladesh," South Asian Survey, Vol. 4, 
no. l, 1996, pp. 221-34. 
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The tribals' demands have over the years centred mainly on: (i) the 
status of a separate administrative area in CHT with a regional council 
to be elected by the Hill people and empowered to look after issues 
concerning regional administration and development; (ii) 
amalgamation of the three hill districts, Rangamati, Bandaroan and 
Khagrachari into a single administrative and political unit; (iii) 
expulsion of non-tribals from CHT and facilitation of return of tribals 
who crossed the bord~r after 1960; (iv) rehabilitation of all members of 
PCJSS and (v) withdrawal of armed forces from CHT except the 
Bangladesh Rifles, a paramilitary border control force, to facilitate a 
peaceful military solution. However, as has been pointed out by 
Hussain, 
No government in Bangladesh, democratic, military or autocratic, has had any 
clearly thought out and articulated policy towards the Hill people. Since 1972, 
each government having inherited the problem and driven by the emergency of 
circumstances sought to rise to the occasion through ad hoc responses. In fact, 
the nature of such responses has always been conditioned by regime 
perceptions.120 
The government responses since 1972-1996 have shown that they did 
not differ much whether in a democracy or autocracy. In fact the 
attitude of the majority ruling elite vis-a-vis the issue remained the 
same throughout.121 The demand for autonomy by the tribals has 
been interpreted by successive governments in Bangladesh as a 
secessionist movement undermining the sovereignty of the state.122 
It is here that the external dimension is brought to the fore. 
Historically, loyalty of the Hill people has been seen as suspect. Before 
partition some tribal leaders had made overtures for uniting CHT 
120syed Anwar Hussain, "State and Ethnicity," op. cit., p. 225. 
121fu·d 225 1 ., p. . 
122Behera, op. cit, p. 985. 
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with India, and in 1971 some Chakma leaders engaged in anti-
Bangladesh campaigning. Closely intertwined with the burden of 
history is the vast geopolitical significance of CHT, with forest 
resources and petroleum potential, adjoining India and Myanmar, 
which underlies the government's policy of exercising central 
control.123 The influx of tribals into Tripura in India and the cross-
border linkages of insurgents with Indian tribals also tends to 
complicate the issue of autonomy.124 There were also reports of 
Shanti Bahini and ULFA operating jointly along the Indo-Bangladesh 
border, and of Indian intelligence agencies assisting Shanti Bahini 
with arms, bases and training.125 
Over the years, however, the movement seems to have lost much of 
its initial stridency. Personality clashes and splits within the PCJSS 
since 1982 have undermined not only the unity of the tribals but also 
the effectiveness of the movement.126 The government's policies, a 
mix of persuasive and coercive strategies of developmental assistance, 
limited devolution of powers to local bodies, and heavy military 
deployment in the region (by one estimate five brigades of the army 
with 50,000 military personnel), contributed towards weakening the 
movement. The demographic profile of the region has also changed 
123Most of the refugees fled to Tripura in May 1986, when the Bangladesh army and 
Bengali Muslim settlers went on a rampage in CHT in retaliation for a series of 
killings by the local ethnic guerrillas, the Shanti Bahini. See Berti! Lintner and 
Rangamati, "Bangladesh, Intractable Hills," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 148, 
no. 14, 5 April 1990, p. 22. 
124Chakma insurgents had reportedly established linkages with Indian rebels in 
Mizoram and Nagaland and Burmese communist groups and procured arms from them. 
See Kazi Montu, "Tribal Insurgency in CHT," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 15, 
no. 36, 6 September 1980, p. 1511. 
12Ssanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India's 
North East (New Delhi: Viking Publishers, 1994), p. 298. 
126Behera, op. cit., p. 994. According to one estimate, with growing infighting and 
desertions, the number of Shanti Bahini in 1991 had declined drastically to about 
3000, with only 2000 belonging to the armed cadre. See Syed Anwar Hussain, 
"Ethnicity and Security in Bangladesh" in Iftekharuzzaman (ed.), op. cit, p. 179. 
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with state-sponsored settlement programs of successive governments; 
according to one estimate, over the last four decades the tribal 
population has declined from 93 percent of the population to 51 
percent.127 Moreover, with the cooling of India's support to the 
Chakmas since 1980, when a military accord was signed between the 
two governments to contain insurgent activities on both sides of the 
border, the Shanti Bahini has found it difficult to replenish its losses. 
Thus, as has been the case with other ethnic groups in South Asia, the 
weakness of the tribal communities, the tremendous coercive powers 
of the state, and the decline in external support has facilitated the task 
of the centre in coping with the violent autonomist movement in 
Bangladesh.128 
It has become increasingly clear that a long-term settlement of the 
CHT problem would need a sustained policy to assuage the tribal 
' 
grievances, centring on the threat to their cultural identity, 
detribalisation through Bengali settlement and insufficient economic 
development resulting in their alienation from their land, economic 
life and cultural roots. 129 
Although since 1992, the ceasefire has remained in place and 
negotiations with the government have continued, the coming to 
power of the Awami League government under Sheikh Haseena saw 
a more co-ordinated effort at a negotiated settlement of the problem 
and ending of the two-decade-old insurgency, which by some 
127Jmtiaz Ahmad, "Refugees and Security: The experience of Bangladesh," in S.D. 
Muni and Lok Raj Baral (eds), Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia (New 
Delhi: Konarak Publishers, 1996), p. 131. 
128Behera, op. cit, p. 1002 
129Shah Alam, "Self-determination, Territorial Integrity and Ethnicity," in 
Iftekharuzzaman (ed.), op. cit., p. 207. 
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estimates, had taken some 20,000 innocent lives.130 A 68-point 
agreement was signed between the Bangladesh government and 
PCJSS on 2 December 1997 to give regional autonomy to the CHT 
tribals.131 The accord has been made under the ambit of the 
constitution, upholding the political, social, cultural and economic 
rights of all citizens, including the tribals in the CHT. Under the 
agreement, the Shanti Bahini have consented to surrender their arms 
within a specified time, and the government has agreed to give 
general amnesty to all armed members. The temporary camps of the 
army in the Hill districts would be dismantled in phases, following 
the return of tribal insurgents to normal life.132 But the government 
has also made it clear that it would not remove the army or Bengali 
settlers from the Hill regions. 
Although the accord remains in place, the unfavourable response of 
the main opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) on 
the issue underlines the need for more sustained efforts to evolve a 
national consensus to fulfil the long-term aspirations of the tribals for 
substantive devolution of powers within the framework of regional 
autonomy. The BNP, led by former prime minister Khaleeda Zia, 
remains opposed to the accord, which it sees as undermining the 
sovereignty of the country.133 
130The Hindu, 8 December 1997. 
131Tue historic accord, signed after protracted negotiations between government 
representatives and tribal leaders, envisages a Regional Council - with a five year 
tenure - with two-thirds of its 22 members elected by the tribal people, to supervise 
and co-ordinate public administration, law and order and developmental activities in 
the hill districts. 
132 See Bangladesh Observer (Dhaka) 3 December 1997. Also see International 
Herald Tribune (Paris}, 3 December 1997. 
133The Times of India (New Delhi}, 12 June 1998. 
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After sixteen years of military rule, Bangladesh became a democracy in 
1991. But the challenges continue. At the heart of a long-term solution 
lie the larger questions of accommodating the Bangladeshi identity in 
the face of cultural distinctiveness of smaller minority groups. The 
nation is yet to find· a middle ground between lingua-centric 
secularism and its distinctive Islamic identity.134 
Lessons from the South Asian Experience 
A number of observations can be made from the foregoing discussion. 
After independence most states grappled with fundamental issues of 
institutional development and distribution of political power as a 
nation-state, with some more willing than others to recognise and 
accommodate ethnic, linguistic and religious differences. The quest 
for a unified nation-state led to the adoption of different strategies for 
fostering a sense of nationhood among ethnically and linguistically 
diverse groups in the region. 
This has not necessarily been achieved. South Asia is replete with 
examples of groups demanding autonomy for themselves on the basis 
of language and culture; access to education, civil service 
employment, social services, land and territory; control over natural 
and fiscal resources, and representative local government structures. 
As mentioned earlier, the dynamics of ethnic polarisation and politics 
depends essentially on four variables: persistence of unequal 
distribution of resources; degree of evolution of ethnic consciousness 
into organisation of a political movement; the government's 
134M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh at 26: Encountering Bifurcated History and a 
Divided National Identity," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 
21, no. 3, Spring 1998, p. 54. 
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response to ethnic demands; and the general political context.135 In 
South Asia conflicts are influenced by these factors. They are also 
moulded by particular circumstances to serve the interests of idealists 
and ideologues, visionaries and opportunists, political leaders and 
ethnic power brokers of various kinds.136 
At times, ethnic identities compete with the "national identity" 
because the national ideology which attempts to subsume such 
national identities is in fact itself ethnocentric. This is well-illustrated 
in the case· of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. India does not have 
any identifiable ruling group, which gives it an edge over its 
neighbours. India's democratic system has enabled its regional 
political economies and electoral processes to maintain greater 
resilience against central interference, unlike Pakistan, where there 
appears to be less room for manoeuvre.137 India functions in an 
essentially plural social tradition in which the governmental 
structure provides only one among many centres. 
Every South Asian state has witnessed the rise of ethnic sentiments 
but what vary significantly are the strategies employed by the states to 
contain the crises. If autonomy is granted at an early stage and 
respected by the state, there are good chances of defusing the separatist 
tendency. The situation with Tamil speakers in India is a case· in 
point. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that ethnic 
movements become secessionist when demands for larger autonomy 
or other grievances of minority or ethnic groups have not received 
135Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, op.cit., pp. 41-68. Also see Paul Brass 
"Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," Ethnicity, Vol. 3, September 1976, p. 226. 
136Paul Brass Ethnicity and Nationalism, op. cit., p. 285. 
137 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, op. cit., p. 200. 
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sensitive or timely political attention. This is particularly true of some 
movements in South Asia, which if handled in a more 
accommodating manner, might not have become as militant and 
intractable as they are today. For instance, the imposition of central 
rule, a mismatched alliance between Congress-I and the National 
Conference, rigged elections in 1987 and the maladministration of 
Farooq Abdullah contributed to alienating the people of Kashmir in 
India and to the escalation of militancy. Similarly, in Sri Lanka the 
Tamil leadership adhered to its autonomist demand all through the 
1950s and 1960s and it was only in the face of continued intransigence 
by the Sri Lankan government that they adopted a militant posture in 
1972. 
According to James Manor, awakening and decay are the two factors 
responsible for the present crisis in India.138 But this argument can be 
extended to the political climate of the region as a whole. Awakening, 
in some respects, has entailed a gradual development among all 
groups and fostered a sense of political maturity and an 
understanding of representative politics in the region. But this has 
happened when the states themselves are in decay and have become 
less able to respond to such challenges, leading to greater conflicts and 
violence. Pushed further, these have assumed separatist overtones. 
Although a framework of dispersed, diffused sovereignties under a 
loose confederal arrangement is a viable option in multinational 
states, it may not be acceptable to most nation-states. Moreover, 
redrawing the map of nations cannot solve questions of peace and 
138James Manor, "Collective Conflict in India," Conflict Studies, 212, June 1988, pp. 2-
3. 
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reconciliation if it fails to take note of the multiple identities and 
fluidity, flexibility and mutability of the process of identity formation. 
As is evident in the case of East Bengal, or the Chakmas in 
Bangladesh, the liberated minorities of today could tum into the 
oppressed majorities of tomorrow in the new states. As noted by 
Akram H. Chowdhury, "Elites elsewhere, once in charge of 
governments, have forgotten their own struggles and have used the 
tools of repression borrowed from their adversaries."139 
It seems indisputable, however, that if the state is to survive it all, it 
must seek a rapprochement with the forces of mass nationalism.140 
As has already been pointed out, ethnic conflicts and upheavals are 
not caused by pursuit of self-determination but denial of self-
determination in the absence of effective political and legal 
institutions in a truly democratic framework. As expressed by Ayesha 
Jalal, "A renegotiation of the powers of the centre with its varied 
constituent units would seem to be the most sensible way towards the 
resolution of South Asia's centre-region conflicts."141 
At the internal level, decentralisation of state and society are 
prerequisites for finding lasting solutions. At the same time, the 
establishment of regional stability and order may have a benign 
influence on the centre-regional relationships in South Asia. The 
multiplicity of identities can function as a boon rather than a threat to 
democracy and improve the prospects of mutual understanding and 
139 Akram H. Chowdhury, "Self-Determination: The Chittagong and Bangladesh," in 
David P. Forsythe (ed.), Human Rights and Development (New York: St Martin's 
Press, 1989), p. 300. 
140Robert A. Dahl, "Democracy, Majority rule and Gorbachev's Referendum," Dissent 
Fall, 1991, pp. 491-96. 
141 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia, op. cit., p. 228. 
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cooperation in the region. In the following chapters we will examine 
these issues in the specific contexts of the Baluch in Pakistan and the 
Sikhs in India. 
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Chapter3 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASES OF THE BALUCH IN PAKISTAN AND 
THE SIKHS IN INDIAN PUNJAB 
This chapter looks at the socio-economic histories of the Baluch and 
Khalistan movements .. and studies their impact on the political 
system. The two movements differ from each other in more ways 
than one. The Baluch, constituting a mere four percent of Pakistan's 
population, are a nomadic community, with low literacy rates and 
even lower levels of socio-economic development. The Sikhs, on the 
other hand, are a settled agricultural community with one of the 
highest per capita incomes in India, and followers of Sikhism, a faith 
distinct from Hinduism, which is the faith of the majority of the 
people in India. What is striking, however, is that despite the vast 
disparity in economic growth and development, and variations in 
social structure, both groups wanted to secede from their respective 
countries. 
The Baluch represent, to a certain extent, a case of internal 
colonialism and relative deprivation. Their ethnic mobilisation can 
be explained on the basis of their perceptions of being turned into a 
colony within Pakistan, and the feelings of relative deprivation vis-_a-
vis other ethnic groups such as the Punjabis at the federal level and 
the Pushtuns at the provincial level. The Sikhs, on the other hand, 
were disillusioned by the political and economic policies of the Indian 
state with regard to Punjab. But unlike the Baluch, mobilisation of 
these grievances along religious lines by the state and central elites 
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was a major factor contributing to the rise of the Khalistan 
movement. 
The Baluch in Pakistan 
Origins 
The tribal groups known as the Baluch are found mainly in the region 
stretching from Western Pakistan to Eastern Iran. They have a history 
going back almost two thousand years, but very little is known about 
their origin because most of their history has been preserved in an 
oral and undated form, without being substantiated by documented 
evidence. 
According to the Daptar Sha'ar (a chronicle of genealogies and an 
ancient ballad of Baluch tribes), the Baluch and Kurds were kindred 
branches of the tribe that migrated eastwards from Aleppo (now in 
Syria), in search of water and fresh pasture lands, shortly before the 
time of Christ.1 The Western viewpoint is that the Baluch were first 
identified as inhabiting an area in North-western Iran, adjacent to the 
southern coasts of the Caspian Sea.2 Nevertheless both the Baluch and 
the Western scholars agree that the Baluch moved into the coastal 
areas along the southern shores of the Caspian Sea and later migrated 
to Iran and Pakistani Baluchistan between the sixth and fourteenth 
centuries. The origin of the Baluch remains a mystery. Most theories 
regard the Baluch as original inhabitants of the land or as descendants 
lselig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, Soviet Temptations and Baluch 
Nationalism (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981) p. 10. 
2Robert G. Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pathans, Minority Rights Group Report no 48 
(London: Minority Rights Group, 1987), p. 4. 
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of the Turkman branch of the Altaic group, the Iranian and Indian 
branches of the Aryans, or the Arab and Chaldean branches of the 
Semitic group.3 It is difficult to categorise a typical Baluch, since most 
tribes have been mixed with different ethnic and racial groups and in 
appearance exhibit mixed characteristics. 
Histpry and Society 
In terms of their history and social beliefs, the Baluch have been 
remarkably successful in preserving a distinct identity of their own. 
They take great pride in their language, folklore traditions and value 
systems, which serve as a binding force for all the Baluch scattered in 
Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Reliving 
their past through books, magazines and folk traditions, the Baluch 
revel in glorifying the achievements of their national heroes and are 
very conscious of their historical antecedents and cultural traditions. 
The first nation builder cited in Baluch historical accounts is Mir 
Chakar Rind, who ruled from the Makran coast to the present day 
Marri area in the South of Quetta from 1487 to 1511. Though his 
kingdom was destroyed by a civil war between the Rinds and Lasharis, 
he is supposed to have made a valiant effort to unite the Baluch.4 He 
was hailed as a Baluch Attila, and his army's exploits during the Rind-
Lashari war are idealised as the Iliad of the Baluch race.5 
3for details see Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan - A Study of 
Baluchistan (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1987), pp. 36-41; for the Chaldean 
origin see Sardar Muhammad Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan 
(Karchi: Process Pakistan, 1958), pp. 16-18; 22-25. 
4M.Longworth Dames, The Baluch Race: A Historical and Etymological Sketch 
(London: 1904), p. 43. 
SMohammad Khan Baluch, op. cit., p. 48. 
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Mir Chakar's death was followed by several attempts on the part of 
the Mughal empire to control the Baluch who were, however, able to 
preserve their independence. In 1666, the Ahmedzai tribe established 
the Kalat confederacy. But the Ahmedzai Khans, being little more 
than tribal chiefs, exercised practically no power beyond twenty to 
thirty miles from Kalat proper.6 Abdullah Khan, who ascended the 
throne in AD 1713, was the first chief of the Ahmedzai branch who 
claimed allegiance of Baluch tribes scattered from Kandahar 
(Afghanistan) across the Makran area to Bandar Abbas (now Iran). He 
could, however, do little to knit the areas under his military control 
into a unified state? This task was accomplished by the sixth Khan of 
Kalat, Nasir Khan, who ascended the throne in 1741. His most notable 
achievement was the creation of a unified Baluch army of 25,000 men 
and 1,000 camels and a sort of a centralised bureaucratic 
administrative structure. This comprised a wazir (prime minister) 
and two legislative councils, consisting of a lower chamber chosen by 
the tribes and an upper chamber of elders who served in an advisory 
capacity.8 
Nasir Khan continued to pay tributes to the Persian emperor, Nadir 
Khan, till 1747 and after his death to Ahmed Shah Durrani till 1758.9 
Thereafter, although remaining an ally of Afghanistan, Kalat enjoyed 
a sovereign status till the arrival of the British. For most Baluch, 
Nasir Khan's achievements remain an all important symbol of. a 
unified Baluch identity and his sense of justice, wisdom, personal 
integrity and dutifulness immortalised him in the annals of _Baluch 
6 Mohammad Khan Baluch, op. cit., pp. 77-78. 
7ttarrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 16. 
8Ibid.,p.16. 
9Yu.V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1971), 
p.151. 
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history. His tomb at Kalat is still visited by many Baluch as a reminder 
of their glorious past.10 
Baluch under the British. 
The coming of the British was a turning point in the history of the 
Baluch, who fought against them for more than forty years before 
Kalat was subdued in 1876. Baluchistan acquired a new significance for 
the British, because, as a key area flanking Afghanistan, it could act as 
a buffer state between the Indian empire and Russia. The British 
divided the Baluch area into seven parts in order to control the tribal 
areas. One quarter of the land was given to Persia in the far west in 
1871; a portion was given to Afghanistan in the north in 1894; and in 
British India, the Baluch areas were divided into a centrally 
administered enclave (known as British Baluchistan), the Kalat 
confederacy, and three smaller puppet principalities.11 The British 
obtained formal rights to station troops in return for subsidies to 
sardars who were granted autonomy over their respective tribes. The 
sardari system continues to determine the social and political 
structure of the Baluch tribes to the present day. 
Social and political structure of Baluch tribes 
The sardari system forms the basis of the tribal organisation in 
Baluchistan and the North Western Frontier Province. The British 
chose sardars to exercise absolute autonomy over the tribes and 
function as intermediaries between them and the British 
l°Mohammad Khan Baluch, op. cit., p. 87. 
llttarrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow op. cit., p. 19. 
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government.12 The Baluch are made up of -seventeen major tribal 
·groups and some four hundred sub-groupings. All the major tribal 
groups are headed by a sardar who exercise considerable authority 
over their tribesman. A tribe or tuman was further divided into clans 
called phara and sub clans (phalli). While the tribe was headed by a 
tumandar or a sardar, the clan was under a muquaddam, below 
whom were the waderas, and takkrees. Some of the important Baluch 
and Brahui tribes in Baluchistan include the Marris, Bugtis, Legharis, 
Magassi, Mengals, Bizenjo, Kambrani, Raisanis, Rind, Gichki, Buledi, 
and the Bander tribes.13 
A sardar was responsible for the protection of his tribesman in return 
for their unquestioned loyalty towards him. He also settled disputes, 
gave jobs to members of his tribe and, broadly, controlled their social 
and political lives by performing all executive, legislative and judicial 
functions. This patronage extended by the sardar established political 
clientship ties between him and his tribesmen on the one hand, and 
between the smaller and bigger leaders in the tribal hierarchy, on the 
otherl4 making for the virtual dominance of the sardar and his 
section leaders (muquaddams, waderas, takkrees) over the rest of the 
tribe. This was in direct contrast to the Pushtun tribes, which were 
organised along kinship ties rather than political hierarchies allowing 
for a more egalitarian structure, at least in principle, than the 
Baluch.15 
12 See Philip C. Salzman, "Continuity and Change in Baluchi Tribal leadership," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 4, 1973, pp. 428-39. 
13For details, see Inayatullah Baluch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, op. cit., 
ffi· 46-49. 
Fredrick Barth, "Ethnic Processes on the Pathan-Baluch Boundary," in Fredrick 
Barth (ed.), Features of Person and Society in Swat, Collected Essays on Pathans, vol. 
2 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 99. 
lSRobert Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pathans , op. cit., p. 7. 
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The sardars were placed under the overall supervision of a political 
agent who was the final arbiter of all internal disputes between the 
sardars and their subsidiary agents and kept a watchful eye over the 
sardar .16 Thus while the stature of the sardar grew within the tribal 
community; his authority outside it was circumscribed considerably by 
the British. 
This perpetuated an insular form of tribal consciousness which 
inhibited political and social integration on a larger scale. Backward 
forms of social organisation were maintained deliberately to reinforce 
the domination of the Baluch elite, who feared that such _a 
development could cut into their own power base.17 Since the pattern 
of land ownership was weighted in favour of sardars and jagirdars, 
who imposed arbitrary taxes on the tenants and labourers (there was 
no uniform system of taxation), most of the tenants and labourers 
remained below subsistence level while the agricultural surplus was 
being appropriated by the sardars and their intermediaries.18 
According to one analysis, 
the sardar is a mere parasite whose use of the surplus is antagonistic to the 
process which produces the surplus. He is thus incapable of propelling the next 
phase of development, namely the bourgeois phase, precisely because his 
activities generate not a progress in agriculture and hence a larger surplus, but 
stagnation and consequently narrowing margins of surpluses.19 
Even though the formal abolition of the sardari system in May 1976, 
stood to deprive the sardars of their privy purses and compensation 
16Afjaz Ahmed, "The National Question in Baluchistan," in Feroz Ahmed (ed.), Foc;us 
on Baluchistan and Pushtun Question (Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1975), p. 21. 
Also see Khalid bin Sayeed, Pakistan - Nature and Direction of Change (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 114. 
17yu V. Gankovsky, Peoples of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 152. 
18 Aijaz Ahmed, "The National Question," op. cit., p. 33. 
19fuid., P• 37. I 
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and restored the lands from the sardars to the tribes, the sardars 
retained their de facto control over the tribes because as tribal chiefs 
and feudal lords, they still owned a lot of land. The sardari system is 
so deeply rooted in the political and social psyche of the Baluch that 
despite the decline in their power, the sardars continue to be respected 
within their tribes even to this day. 
Social organisation 
The Baluch follow a patriarchal form of society where political rights 
in the tribe and inheritance of tribal estates are transmitted through 
the male progeny. The social conduct of most Baluch revolves around 
the Baluch Mayar (code of honour) which constitutes an important 
part of the Baluch psyche and serves as a valuable guide to their life. It 
is also a symbol of the Baluch national identity, bringing it into direct 
confrontation with the government who refuse to accept it as a law. 
The essence of the Baluch Mayar lies in the values of Laj (shame); 
Ghairat (self respect); Izzat (honour); Nang and Namus which means 
revenge.20 In their religious orientation, the Baluch are basically 
secular. The society is made up of a Sunni Muslim majority, minority 
groups of Hindus, Zoroastrians, Jews, Ismailies and Khojas, and a 
religious sect of Zikhris,21 who are centred mostly along the Makran 
20Inayatullah Baluch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, op. cit., p. 80. According 
to the Baluch Mayar, any crime (hun) which is committed against an -individual, 
including murder, has to be avenged by the individual or his family and clan. Other 
important pillars of the Baluch Mayar are Bahut (refuge) which makes it obligatory 
for every Baluch to protect the life of any person seeking refuge with him; the concept 
of Mehmani or hospitality which has to be extended by all Baluch at all costs, 
regardless of the expenses incurred; and Siahkari which fixes death as the 
punishment for an adulterer (Kala) and adulteress (Kali), who are denied the status 
of a bahut. For details see Emma Duncan, Breaking the Curfew - A Political Journey 
Through Pakistan (London:Viking Penguin, 1989), p. 143. 
21 The Zikhris derive their name from the central feature of their ritual - Zikr or 
repetitive chants of the name of God. For details see Stephen Pastner, "Feuding With 
The Spirit among the Zikri Baluch: The Saint as a Champion of the Despised," in 
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coast and make up 10-20 percent of the Baluch population. The 
Zikhris revere Prophet Muhammad who is considered the last and 
greatest prophet by Sunni Muslims, but believe that he is superseded 
by another messiah, Nur Pak, who will return at the apocalypse (akhir 
zaman) or last days to restore what Zikhris believe is true Islam, 
which has been perverted by Sunnis or Namazis (people of prayer).22 
Unlike the Pushtun society, which is steeped in the traditional ethos 
of Islam,23 the Baluch are not bound by the formal trappings of 
religion. The secular temperament of the Baluch allows a relatively 
peaceful coexistence of the various religious communities in 
Baluchistan. According to one estimate, 10,000 Hindus settled mainly 
in Loralai, Chaman, Sinjari, Hamai and Quetta over the centuries 
have been accepted into the Baluch tribal system and have their own 
subsections such as the Marhata Bugtis or Marhata Marris. 
Language and literature 
Language has played an important role in defining the nationalist 
identity of the Baluch. The main language of the Baluch, Baluchi, is 
believed to have originated between 200BC and AD 700 and is 
classified as a branch of the Iranian group of the indo-European 
Akbar Ahmed and David Hart (eds), Islam in Tribal Societies from the Atlas to the 
Indus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984). 
22The Zikris differ from the Muslims by making a pilgrimage to Koh-e-Murad - a 
mountain situated a few-miles from Turbat city in Mekran, instead of taking a Haj to 
Mecca, and also deny other pillars of Islam (Namaz, Roza and Zakat). 
23 Akbar Ahmed, "Religious Presence and Symbolism in Pukhtun Society" in Akbar 
Ahmed and David Hart (eds), Islam in Tribal Societies from the Atlas to the Indus, 
op. cit., p. 313. 
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family.24 Comprising as many as six dialects, it is spoken mainly in 
Baluchistan by almost one-third of the population.25 The second 
major language spoken by the Baluch is Brahui. It contains Dravidian 
syntactical and lexical elements and is almost indistinguishable from 
Baluchi, with only 25 percent of words of Dravidian origin. Since its 
literature is not well-developed, it remains a variant of the Baluchi 
language, though its script is different from Baluchi. 
Baluchi was used in an oral form in earlier times, since Persian was 
the official written language; it was only in the 19th century that 
Baluchi was introduced as a written language. By the late 19th century, 
Nastaliq (Persian script) and Naskh (Arabic script) were adopted to 
develop the language further. Nastaliq is an elaborate calligraphic 
script not accepted by most Baluch writers who have advocated the 
use of Roman letters to help in the standardisation of the Baluch 
language.26 
Most of the Baluch literature has survived in a crude form by word of 
mouth from one generation to another. It is mainly in the form of 
poetry and prose. Baluch poetry is simple and direct in expression and 
consists mostly of romantic ballads, love songs, heroic or war ballads, 
24Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, Political Autobiography of 
Khan-E-Azam, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975) 
~· 213. 
Six dialects spoken are Eastern Hill, Rakshani, Sarawani, Kachhi, Lotuni and 
Coastal; the chief ones being the Eastern dialect spoken from Karachi northwards to 
Dera Ismail Khan and the Suleiman mountains and including the Marri Bugti areas, 
and the Western dialect spoken between Karachi and Kirman (Iran). The Eastern 
dialect has a heavy admixture of Sindhi, Seraiki and Pushtu words and is spoken by 
the Baluch of Sindh, Derajat in Punjab and NWFP in Pakistan, while the Western 
dialect has borrowed generously from Persian, Arabic and the Turkish language. Also 
see Inayatullah Baluch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, op. cit., p. 213. 
26selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., pp. 186-87. 
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religious poetry, short poems and modern national poetry.27 The 
prose is mostly in the form of folk tales or modern literature. 
Neither Baluchi nor Brahui bears any affinity with the languages of 
the Indian subcontinent; and this distinctiveness has contributed 
immensely to the growth of national consciousness among the 
Baluch and to their demand for self-determination. In the post-
partition period, especially after the 1960s and 1970s, when the Baluch 
were involved in serious conflicts with the Pakistani state, the 
nationalist movement found its strongest expression in literature and 
journalism. . Baluch .. leaders ~who fought against the federal 
governments became literary heroes. For example, Nauroz Khan, a 
leader of the Zehri tribe, who fought against the Pakistani army in 
October 1958, was given the status of a national hero when, after 
agreeing to a truce, he was imprisoned for defying federal authority. 
One of the major grievances of the Baluch intelligentsia has been that 
Baluchi has not been given official patronage and Urdu has been 
imposed on them.28 However, even though the government has 
pursued a confrontationist policy towards the Baluch, it has allowed 
some concessions on the literary front. A Baluchi Academy was 
established in 1961 in Quetta to promote the language. Important 
Baluch publications included monthly journals like Oman, the first in 
the Baluchi language established in 1951; Ulus, Nokeen Daur, Taptan, 
27For details see Syed Abdul Quddus, The Tribal Baluchistan (Lahore: Ferozsons, 
1990), pp. 70-71. 
281n 1993 there were only five Baluchi newspapers or periodicals and four in Brahui 
as compared to 76 newspapers and periodicals in Urdu. See Tariq Rahman, "The 
Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan," Journal of South Asian and 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, no. :;,, Spring 1996, p. 86. 
121 
122 
Chagird, and Aasap.29 Another source of literary output has been the expatriate 
Baluch community which brought out journals like Shwaz (Quest), printed in 
Baluchi, Persian, and English; and Mayar and Bahut from Norway and Sweden 
respectively. 30 
Demographic composition 
The Baluch make up only a smaU percentage of Pakistan's overall population. 31 
The census figures of 1981 do not give an estimate of the Baluch as such but give 
a breakdown of the population of Pakistan on the basis of the languages spoken in 
the country. On the basis of the linguistic data, (if one assumes the Baluch to 
comprise the Baluchi and Brahui speakers), they account for 4.2 percent of the 
entire population. Punjabi is the most widely spoken language (48.17 percent); 
followed by speakers of Pushtu (13.15 percent); Sindhi (11 77 percent); Seraiki32 
(9.~4 percent); Urdu (7.6 percent) and other languages (5 24 percent.) See Table 
3 1-
29 Abbas .falbani, "The Baluch Rella\ssance '' The Herald (Karachi), December 1992, p. 60. 
30Ibid., p 60. 
31 The population figures for Balnch vary r.onsi.derahly because of discrepancies between official 
estimates and nationalist claims ir1 Pakistar. for details see Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan'.'> 
Shadow, oµ. cit., p. 178. 
32The Seraiki speakers are centre~ in Bahawalpu;:, Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan oft.be Punjab 
state and have a mixed Punjabi and Sindhi cultural heritage. 
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Table 3.1 Percentage of Household by Language Spoken and Rural/Urban Areas, 
198l33 
Area Urdu Punjabi Pushtu Sindhi Baluchi Brahui Hindko Seraiiki Others 
All 7.60 48.17 13.15 11.77 3.02 1.21 2.43 9.84 2.81 
areas 
Rural 1.33 47.52 15.05 13.77 3.50 1.49 2.77 11 97 2.60 
Urban 24.40 49.92 8.04 6.43 1.74 0.45 1.53 4.12 3.37 
The Baluch in Baluchistan; socio-economic development 
Baluchistan, which is the traditional homeland of most Baluch and Brahuis, is the 
most backward province of Pakistan. It occupies an area of approximately 
1,34,000 square miles, which is 40 percent of Pakistan's land area.34 However, its 
arid landscape of rugged mountains and deserts, extreme weather conditions, 
sparse vegetation and scanty rainfall makes it one of the most thinly populated 
regions in the world. The total population of the Baluchistan province at the time 
of the 1981 census was 4.305 million: a mere 5.14 percent of the population of 
Pakistan. 
A companson with other provinces reveals that it is the poorest and most 
underdeveloped province of Pakistan, despite occupying a vast 
33The 1981 Census Report of Pakistan (lslamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistical 
Division, Govt. of Pakistan, 1984), p 1%. 
34AiJaz Ahmed, "The National Question in Baluchist<in.'' in Feroz At~med (ed), op. cit., p. 6. 
land area, with significant natural resources and a huge potential for 
development. Baluchistan has huge reserves of oil, gas, minerals, 
fisheries etc which have not been exploited to the full. It is the largest 
supplier of coal and accounted for 930,850 tonnes (more than 50 
percent) of the 1,854,514 tonnes produced in the country in 1982-83. 
Similarly of the total natural gas produced in the country Baluchistan 
produces more than 75 percent.35 
Socio-economic growth indicators such as literacy, health facilities, 
civic, amenities, industrial infrastructure and per capita income point 
to its extremely backward status. In 1990, the literacy rate of 
Baluchistan was just 11 percent as against 36 percent for Punjab, 33 
percent for Sindh and 19 percent for North Western Frontier Province 
(NWFP).36 The per capita income of the province in 1976 stood at Rs 
541 with the NWFP, Sindh and the Punjab's per capita incomes being 
Rs. 602, Rs. 788 and Rs. 797 respectively. (See Table 3.2). 
35Figures taken from Fifty Years of Pakistan in Statistics, Vol(1982-97) Federal 
Bureau of Statistics (Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 1997), p. 141. 
36see Nasir Tabil, "Education in Pakistan-Past dilemmas and Future Prospects," in 
Henry Korson (ed.), Contemporary Problems of Pakistan (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993),p. 84. 
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Table 3.2 Distribution of economic power between the provinces in 
Pakistan37 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchista Total 
n 
Population 37.5 14.0 10.8 2.4 64.7 
1972 
(million) 
% of total 58.0 21.6 16.7 3.7 100.0 
GDP 1972 29.9 11.2 6.5 1.3 48.9 
(Rs billion) 
% of total 61.1 22.9 13.3 2.7 100.0 
Per capita 797.0 788.0 602.0 541.0 756.0 
income(Rs) 
Food grain 7.8 2.4 1.2 0.2 11.6 
output 
(million 
tons) 
% of total 67.2 20.7 10.3 1.7 100.00 
Value of 3.8 1.5 0.3 0.2 5.8 
industrial 
output 
(Rs billion) 
% of total 65.5 25.9 5.2 3.4 100.00 
37Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-77 (New York: St Martin's Press, 
1980), Table 5.1, p. 44. 
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Similarly life expectancy in rural Baluchistan was only 42 years as 
against a national average of 60.38 The number of hospitals, 
dispensaries, maternity and child welfare centres is far less than other 
provinces. In 1983 there were only 37 hospitals in Baluchistan as 
opposed to 239 in Punjab; 206 in Sindh; and 144 in N.W.F.P. As shown 
in table 3.3, the number remained low even for subsequent years. 
Table 3.3 Province-wise distribution of hospitals, maternity and child 
welfare centres, and dispensaries.39 
Province Hospitals Maternity & Dispensaries 
Child Welfare 
Centres 
1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 
Punjab 239 246 467 449 1156 1138 
Sindh 210 217 138 146 1394 1459 
N.W.F.P 145 149 129 130 559 541 
Baluchistan 39 40 53 53 277 277 
Besides the lack of medical facilities in the province, electricity is 
available to less than 10 percent of the people and only two cities have 
piped water. There are fewer than 10,000 telephone connections in the 
entire province, and Quetta accounts for more than half of these 
connections. 40 
38Robert G.Wirsing, "South Asia: The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan," in Robert 
G.Wirsing (ed.), Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives (New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 18. 
39Figures taken from Fifty Years of Pakistan in Statistics Vol. (1982-97) Federal 
Bureau of Statistics (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1997), pp. 320-21. 
40 Aabha Dixit, "Ethno-National Feelings Increase in Baluchistan," Strategic 
Analysis, Vol.14, no.11, Feb 1992, p. j_273. 
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There is hardly any infrastructure to support industry and other employment-
generating projects. In fact, the entire system is affected by a vicious circle. There 
is almost no private sector because of the lack of investment and there is no 
investment because of the absence of a basic infrastructure to promote industry. 
Until 1975, there were no more than eight industrial enterprises in Baluchistan, of 
which six were located in Quetta.41 
Most Baluch practice a mix of nomadic pastoralism and settled agriculture to earn 
a living. But agricultural production is so low that it cannot sustain even two-
thirds of the population. The Baluch percentage of national food grain output in 
1972 was a mere 1.7 percent as against 67.2 percent for Punjab, 20.7 percent for 
Sindh and 10.3 percent for NWFP.42 
The neglect and underdevelopment of Baluchistan can be explained by a number 
of factors which have worked together to arrest the processes of change and 
development in the province. Although some Baluch leaders remained 
sympathetic to the federal government and cooperated with them, majority of the 
Baluch remained isolated from the centre. The Baluch feel that Baluchistan has 
been turned into a virtual colony by the federal governments in which the centre 
has been enjoying the lion's share of profits from the state's resources without 
diverting any of the benefits to the province itself for the upliftment of the people. 
They also blame the backwardness of their province on the tardiness of the 
federal government in harnessing the natural resources of Baluchistan. 
41Aijaz Ahmed,"Baluchistan's Agrarian Question," in Feroz Ahmed (ed.), Focus on the Baluch 
and Pushtoon Question, op. cit., p. 44. 
42Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, op. cit., p. 44. 
According to Selig Harrison, the delay in completing projects can be 
attributed to the inaccessibility of the mountainous regions and the 
disproportionately high cost of extracting and transporting minerals 
located there. However, he believes that there is little doubt that 
Baluchistan gets much less favourable shares of certain revenues such 
as gas and petroleum royalties, than other provinces in Pakistan.43 
The Sui gas fields in Baluchistan provide more than 75 percent of 
Pakistan's total gas production. The gas provides energy for running 
30 percent of the industries in the country and saves an estimated $275 
million per year in foreign exchange. Yet royalties to the Baluchistan 
state treasury from Sui gas production totalled only $1.23 million in 
1979-80.44 Even Sindh had a rate of 22 square feet fixed as royalty in 
comparison to 5 per square feet of royalty earmarked for the Baluch.45 
In fact, the Sui gas supply to Quetta started only as late as 1980.46 
The Baluch claim that the majority of the developmental projects get 
stalled or delayed because the federal government does not actually 
desire the development of Baluchistan. In the past, an important 
mineral development, the Saindak Integrated Mineral Project, wound 
up because of reduced budgetary allocations. While the government 
maintained that the Saindak project was being reviewed to reascertain 
its economic viability, the Baluch were of the view that it should be 
seen not merely as a commercial enterprise but as a means to generate 
employment in the mining industry.47 
43selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 168. 
44fuid., p. 162. 
45Muslim, 23 October 1992. 
46pakistan Opinion Trends and Analyses (POT) (Pakistan Series), Vol.13, Part.147, 5 
August 1985, p. 2862. 
47pQT (Pakistan series), Vol.12, Part 16, 23 January 1984, pp. 252-54. 
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Historically Pushtun, Sindhi, and Punjabi merchants have 
maintained control over the commercial life in Quetta, the only 
urbanised part of Baluchistan. The A yub regime parcelled out land in 
the fertile tracts of the Pat Feeder area to Punjabi military and civil 
bureaucrats. The area, which was part of the Kalat State Union, was · 
upgraded and given the status of a district in 1965. Under Z.A Bhutto, 
all the land in the Pat feeder subdivision was treated as state land. 
Some 30 ,000 acres were re~erved for defence personnel; and the 
remainder was to be divided between those who were in continuous 
possession of the land since 1953; tenants in cultivating position; and 
landless peasants.48 However, possessi9n ~f the land by g9Ve1'!1ffi~nt. __ _ 
servants and influential landlords has worked to the detriment of the 
actual owners and tenants. The Baluch feel that the government 
servants of other provinces should not be allowed to acquire land in 
the area. 
Adding to the Baluch frustration is the fact that of the 21 established 
and registered units in Baluchistan practically all are owned by non-
Baluch. In fact, barring a few projects like Pat feeder, RCD highway 
and the setting up of industrial units at Hub Chowki, no major project 
has been launched by the centre. But even the setting up of industry at 
Hub Chowki, a non-Baluch ·area, 14 miles from Karachi, is seen as a 
ploy by the government to exploit the province's resources under the 
guise of industrialising it. Most of the industries set up by the public 
sector, like the Lasbella textile mill and the Bolan textile mills, folded 
up for want of infrastructure and because of financial constraints. 
48poy (Pakistan series), Vol. 6, Part 187, 23 August 1978, p. 1827. 
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Baluch feelings of mistrust and relative deprivation have been one of 
the most significant factors in mobilising their socio-economic 
demands for a separate homeland. Jabal, the official organ of one of 
the political parties, the Baluch People's Liberation Front (BPLF), 
stated that 
In Islamabad's calculations, Baluchistan is a vast estate for plunder, an arid 
desert floating on oils and minerals. A large part of their political strategy is 
dictated by the desire to extract this treasure for the benefit of the Pakistan 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie ~d foreign imperialist interests.49 
Efforts by the federal government to create a modem infrastructure, 
improve the means of communication and develop the province 
have not had the desired effect on the Baluch. They feel that instead of 
promoting development, the Pakistani federal authorities have 
pursued socio-economic and cultural policies to strengthen their own 
political base. The construction of roads was viewed as an extension 
the federal administrative machinery to exercise control over the 
Baluch, penetrate their guerrilla strongholds and open their province 
' 
to outsiders for purposes of trade, settlement and exploitation of their 
resources.SO The opening up of the central mountainous region of 
Jhalawan and Sarawan through the RCD highway connecting Karachi 
with Zahidan, capital of Iraninan Baluchistan via Quetta; the 
construction of roads such as the Zhob-Waziristan, Loralai-Dera Ghazi 
Khan road, and Sui-Kashmore road, which served as inter-provincial 
link roads, was viewed with much skepticism. It was believed that the 
construction of these roads hardly helped to generate resources or 
help in the industrialisation of Baluchistan.SI During Bhutto's 
governance, the guerrillas of Baluchistan held up the construction of 
49Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 171. 
SOpQT (Pakistan series),Vol.12, Part 16, 23 January, 1984, pp. 252-54. 
SlpQT (Pakistan series),Vol.12, Part 16, 23 January, 1984, pp. 252 
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36 miles of oil-related road building for nearly five years in defiance of 
the government's policy to enter Baluchistan.52 
Low levels of socio-economic development in Baluchistan have been 
compounded by the perceived deprivation of the Baluch vis-a-vis 
other ethnic groups in Pakistan, in particular the Punjabi ruling elites 
at the centre and the Pushtuns at the provincial level. The share of 
Baluch in the structures of Pakistani power-sharing and decision-
making has remained minimal in both the political and economic 
spheres at the provincial and central levels. Their growing alienation 
from the national mainstream is a function of their lack of 
participation in the civil-military complex. 
Baluch representation at the political level 
The Baluch attribute their poor representation in the federal and 
provincial services to a deliberate policy on the part of the 
government to keep them out of the key administrative positions. 
According to one study, from 1947 to 1977, of the 179 persons who 
were named to central cabinets in Pakistan, only four (2.2 percent) 
were Baluch tribesmen from Baluchistan and only one of them was 
named prior to the 1980s.53 Similarly of the civil employees in 
Baluchistan in 1972, only about 2,000 (5 percent) were Baluch and they 
usually occupied the lower positions in the state bureaucracy.54 In the 
defence forces, they were as poorly represented as in the bureaucracy. 
S2selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 173. 
S3shaheen Mozaffar "The Politics of Cabinet Formation in Pakistan: A study of 
Recruitment to the Central Cabinets, 1947-1977," (Ph.D dissertation, Miami 
University, Ohio, 1980). Cited in Robert G.Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pathans, op. 
cit., p. 9. 
54Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive, The Death of a State (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1983), p. 117. 
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The ethnic group composition of the Pakistan military corps in the 
1970s was approximately: 70 percent Punjabi, 15 percent Pushtun, 10 
percent Muhajir and 5 percent Baluch and Sindhi.SS In the provincial 
services in 1979, of a total of 830 higher civil service posts, only 181 
were held by the Baluch and almost all of them were minor posts.56 
Baluchistan has also lacked representation at important policy making 
levels in organisations like Pakistan International Airlines, Pakistan 
Atomic Energy Commission, State Banks and other institutions.S7 
The poor representation of the Baluch can be explained in some part 
by the quota system. The federal quota system was introduced on 31 
August 1973 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for a period of twenty years to give 
a proportionately balanced representation to all the four provinces on 
the basis of their relative population strength. However, because of 
their small numbers, the share of the Baluch in the province-wise 
distribution of quotas is quite meagre.SS The regional distribution of 
quotas from 1973 to 1983, for Grades 16 to 22 of Pakistan's bureaucracy, 
showed that the quota earmarked for Baluchistan was only 3.5 percent 
while the actual strength was down to a lower figure of 3.1 percent. 
(See table 3.4). Second, notwithstanding their paltry share, they are 
compelled to share it ~ith the non-Baluch settlers in Baluchistan who 
can contest their share under the domicile clause.S9 
SS Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State (Kent: Dawson and Sons, 1979), 
Table 14, p. 129. 
S6urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nationbuilding in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1989), p. 180. 
S7Tariq Ali, op. cit., p. 177. 
S8The quota system was introduced in 1949 to redress the imbalance between the two 
wings of Pakistan, and after the dissolution of the one-unit scheme, to ameliorate 
inequalities between"more developed" and "less developed" regions. 
59under the domicile clause, the domicile of each candidate determines his/her 
candidacy for the quota to be administered by the Federal Public Service Commission 
through its examination system. In Baluchistan, a bona fide non-local resident of the 
province was to be treated as local if (a) he was residing continuously in Baluchistan 
before 1947 or (b) if he had acquired Pakistani citizenship under the Pakistani 
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Table 3.4 (Officer Grades 16-22 in Pakistan's federal bureaucracy}, 1973-
83.60 
Region Quota Actual Strength 
Punjab 50.0 55.8 
NWFP 11.5 11.6 
Urban Sindh 7.6 20.2 
Rural Sindh 11.4 5.1 
Baluchistan 3.5 3.1 
FATA & N. Areas 4.0 3.4 
Azad Kashmir 2.0 0.9 
The Baluch argue that their population has grown since 1972, and 
have been demanding an increase in their quota from 3.5 percent to 
5.25 percent.61 There has, however, been no change in their status. 
Baluch-Pushtun relations 
As mentioned earlier, the Baluch sense of ethno-nationalism has 
worked at two levels; at the federal level they harbour resentment 
against the Punjabis while at the provincial level they are in fierce 
competition with the Pushtuns. 
Citizenship Act, 1951 and has been residing continuously anywhere in the province 
since 14 October1955 or (c) has been residing continuously in the province 12 years prior 
to the making of the application for being treated as a local. See The New Times 
(Rawalpindi), 13 September 1974. 
60!ftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, 
Ideology and Ethnicity (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), Table 3. 2, p. 67. 
61pQT, (Pakistan Series),Vol. 12, Part 3, 10 August 1884, p. 2590. 
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Baluchistan represents a cultural mosaic of different ethnic groups 
such as Baluch and Brahuis, Pushtuns, Sindhis, Punjabis, and 
Hazaras. In the wake of the Afghan crisis in the early 1980s, the 
demographic configuration of Baluchistan underwent a tremendous 
change with the continuing flow of Afghan refugees (Pushtuns and 
Hazaras) into the province. This tilted the demographic balance of the 
province in favour of the Pushtuns. Added to this, the continuous 
dispersion of the Baluch to Iran, Persian Gulf, East Africa and to other 
provinces of Pakistan, diluted their presence further. In terms of the 
percentage of the respective population of the provinces, the number 
\ 
of people who were abroad for the last ten years was as follows: 
N.W.F.P had the highest percentage (5.3) followed by Baluchistan (1.8) 
and approximately (1.60) each for Punjab and Sindh. (See Table 3.5) 
According to the last census (1981), of the total migrant population in 
Baluchistan (2.7 percent of the country's total), 44.3 percent moved 
within the province, 36.7 percent were from other provinces and 10.7 
percent were from other countries.62 
62The 1981 Census Report of Pakistan (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, 
Statistical Division, Government of Pakistan, 1984), p. 34. 
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Table 3.5 Number of People Gone Abroad During Last Ten Years-Pakistan and 
Provinces: 198163 
Emigrants Total NWFP Punjab Sindh Baluchistan Islamabad 
Number 1,708, 608 591,405 735,285 300,354 77,126 4,438 
Rate% 2.03 5.35 1.55 1.58 1.78 1.30 
Prior to 1970, the Baluch and the Pushtuns fought courageously against the one 
unit but following the Afghanistan crisis the tensions became more apparent. The 
number of Afghan refugees totalled 1. 8 million in 198164 and 2. 86 million in 
1984. 65 This influx has not only disturbed the balance of the local population but 
generated fears among the Baluch of being turned into a minority in their 
homeland. 
The small population size of the Baluch in their own province has made it difficult 
for them to achieve even their rightful share of resources in their province. Both 
the Pushtuns and the Baluch inhabit clearly demarcated areas in Baluchistan. 66 
The Pushtuns are concentrated in a belt stretching from Zhob, near the border 
with NWFP, to Quetta and have a majority in Zhob, Loralai, Pishin and Quetta. 
Similarly, the Baluch are concentrated in Sibi, Chagai, Kharan 
63The 1981 Census Report of Pakistan (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistical 
Division, Government of Pakistan, 1984), p. 38. 
64Marvin G. Weinbaum," Impact and Legacy of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan" in Korson (ed.), 
op. cit., p. 127. 
65The Herald, March 1992, p. 56. 
66Baluchistan was formed in 1970 by the merger of the administrative divisions of Quetta and 
Kalat. It comprises the following districts - Quetta Pishin (the smallest yet most developed); 
Sibi; Chagai; Kharan; Loralai; Zhob; Mekran; Lasbella; Kachi; and Kalat ( the largest and most 
populous district). 
and Makran where they comprise 73 percent; 77 percent; 70 percent 
and 98 percent of Baluchi speaking people respectively·67 
The existence of such a large Pushtun population in Baluchistan has 
brought the Baluch in direct conflict with Pushtuns over a number of 
issues such as employment, land, business, and control and use of 
grazing fields. It is believed that nearly 80 percent of all government 
jobs go to non-Baluch. The Baluch have a very small middle class 
which has only recently ventured into business in Baluchistan. But in 
the case of the Pushtuns, the booming smuggling and arms trade has 
made the Pushtun middle class more prosperous than the Baluch. In 
fact most business sectors like construction and transport are mainly 
in the hands of the Pushtuns, who also provide labour for the ship-
breaking industry in Gadani.68 Besides these, the Pushtun and Baluch 
also compete for the ownership of coal mines.69 All these factors have 
alienated the Baluch from the Pushtuns in Baluchistan. 
The shortage of basic amenities such as water, power, and roads has 
set both the communities clamouring for a larger share of resources 
for themselves. For example, the Baluch claim that 80 percent of the 
provincial budget is awarded to the Pushtun areas which are more 
advanced.70 The Pushtuns, meanwhile, allege that the Pushtun areas 
have been discriminated against by successive govemments.71 They 
also claim that the districts and divisions in Baluchistan have also 
been carved out in favour of the Baluch. On the cultural front, the 
67ttafeez Malik, "The Afghan Crisis and its Impact on Pakistan," Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3, Spring 1982, p. 43. 
68Shahid Kardar, The Political Economy of Pakistan (Lahore:Progressive Publishers, 
1987), p. 9. 
69The Herald, March 1992, p. 62. 
70Ibid., p. 62 
71 Ibid., p. 62. 
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Pushtun tribes have been complaining against the imposition of 
Baluchi or Brahui on Pushtun primary school children while Urdu 
remains the medium of instruction in Quetta and Sibi.72 They say that 
the provincial decision to impart primary education in the Pushtu 
language has not been implemented as yet. 
Though there are many divisions within the closed tribal structures of 
the Baluch, in terms of class contradictions, religious differences, 
linguistic variations, population dispersion and low levels of socio-
economic development, the Baluch are very proud of their distinct 
identity, underpinned by the strength of their community bonds and 
tribal affiliations. It is their sense of identity that has sustained their 
desire for national self- determination, and has been a constant source 
of friction between them and the federal government. 
While there is no doubt that there is a valid basis for the Baluch' s 
charges of neglect and discrimination which they make against the 
federal authorities, the Baluch, for their part, have not been able to 
break away from their tribal ways and have at times shown resistance 
to government efforts to integrate them in to the national 
mainstream. This has put the two on a collision course. Baluch 
disenchantment with the federal government has increased over the 
years because of the government's apathy to their demands for greater 
participation and speedy development of the province. On the other 
hand, strategies of the government may to some extent have failed to 
placate the Baluch because socio-economic development was not 
72Federal Government Civil Servant's Census Report, January 1983, (Islamabad: 
Government of Pakistan, 1984), cited in Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements in 
Pakistan, Domestic and Internationa! Factors (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 
1988), p. 174. 
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followed by a proper power-sharing arrangement. These socio-
economic factors have in large measure contributed to the rise of 
ethnic consciousness among the Baluch. 
The Sikhs in Punjab 
The Sikhs, constituting 1.7 percent of the population of India, form a 
small minority group in the country. (See Table 3.6). Most of the 
Indian Sikhs (80 percent) are concentrated in the small state of Punjab, 
situated on the North-western border of India. A prosperous 
community, they are well-represented in Indian business, the army 
and the bureaucracy, far greater than the ratio of their population. 
Acording to one estimate, by the beginning of 1980s, an overall 8 
percent of central government employees were Sikhs.73 Punjab's 
success in agricultural production by the coming of the green 
revolution was phenomenal, and its per capita income (U.S. $650) one 
of the highest in the country. 
73lshtiaq Ahmed, State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia (London: 
Pinter Publications, 1998), p. 125. 
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Table 3.6 Religious Groups in India, 1991.74 
Religion Number (million) Percent 
Hindus 699 83.8 
Muslims 90 11.2 
Christians 18 2.2 
Sikhs 14 1.7 
Buddhists 6 0.7 
Jains 4 0.5 
But this did not prevent the beginnings of insurgency in the state. 
Despite its prosperity, the Sikh quest for a separate identity has 
revolved around two important symbols: language and religion. 
These have been used to emphasise their distinctiveness in relation to 
Hindi-speaking groups and Hindu regions such as the neighbouring 
state of Haryana. They have also been used to press for more 
economic and political privileges from the central government. 
The period prior to the partition of the subcontinent constitutes an 
important chapter in the history of the Sikhs. It provides the basis for 
understanding the rise and growth of Sikh identity, and its 
politicisation and subsequent disillusionment with the Indian state in 
the post-partition period. The history of the Sikhs before 
independence can be broadly divided into three periods. Between 1469 
and 1708, the community was formed and led by a succession of ten 
living spiritual leaders who established its central doctrines and 
74Ramesh Thakur, The Government and Politics of India (London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd, 1995), Table 1.2, p. 6. 
139 
institutions. The second stage (1708-1849), was the heroic age of Sikh 
history during which the Sikhs struggled against governors sent from 
Delhi and the Afghan invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah 
Abdali. · Eventually they emerged supreme and established a powerful 
kingdom of their own in Punjab. The third stage (1840 -1947) marks 
the period of British rule and the beginning of the Sikh demand for a 
separate homeland. The religious component, however, remains an 
important starting point for any discussion on the socio-economic 
basis of Sikh identity. 
First phase: The rise of Sikhism 
Various theories have been advanced to explain the rise of Sikhism. 
Some scholars see it as a synthesis of Hinduism and Islam while 
others see it as a reform movement within the fold of Hinduism. 
According to Cynthia Keppley, 
The early panth (Sikh community) can most accurately be seen as a sect arising 
from within the Hindu fold: egalitarian in ideology, mystical in orientation 
and guided by a mediator - guru - between the divine and the human.75 
Yet others see it as "not some supposed syncretism of Hinduism and 
Islam, but a new faith transcending both which was destined to define 
itself as distinct from the Hindu world from which it had emerged."76 
7Scynthia Keppley Mahmood, "Sikh Rebellion and the Hindu Concept of Order," 
Asian Survey, Vol. 29, no. 3, March 1989, p. 327. Also see Khushwant Singh, History of 
the Sikhs, vol. l, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 17; Gokul Chand 
Narang, Transformation of Sikhism (Lahore: New Book Society, 1946), pp. 38, 346, 
356. 
76Christopher Shackle, The Sikhs, The Minority Rights Group Report no 65 (London: 
Minority Rights Group, 1984), p. 3. 
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The word "Sikh" is derived from the Sanskrit word Shishya meaning 
disciple or learner. Guru Nanak{l469-1539), the founder of the 
religion, was a social and religious reformer who rejected the idolatry 
of Hinduism, challenged the caste-based Brahmanical traditions, and 
preached the equality of all men.77 Nanak was succeeded by a line of 
nine gurus who propagated his gospel78 until the death of the last 
guru, Gobind Singh, in 1708. 
The execution of the fifth guru, Guru Arjun (1581-1606), by the 
Mughal emperor, Jahangir, marked a turning point in the history of 
Sikhism. A peaceful community until then, the Sikhs were now 
engaged in a policy of armed confrontation with the Mughals and by 
the time of the next guru, Guru Hargobind (1606-1644), an element of 
militancy had crept into the order. Guru Hargobind symbolised this 
combative mood by the construction of the Akal Takht, seat of 
militant temporal authority. He donned two swords, one representing 
the spiritual authority of the guru (piri) and the other a newly 
assumed temporal authority (miri).79 The militarisation of the Sikhs 
was formally established by the last living guru, Guru Gobind Singh 
(1675-1708) thus completing the transformation of the Sikhs from 
771t may be mentioned here that caste solidarity has never been particularly strong in 
Punjab. Most communities, such as the Jats, Khatris and Aroras, would eat with one 
another and even intermarry. Punjab is made up of the following social classes: the 
Jats are the landowning class who form the backbone of the agricultural community in 
Punjab; Aroras and Khatris are the middlemen, shopkeepers and businessmen; there is 
an artisan class; and Mazhabis, or scheduled castes, who comprise a large proportion 
of labourers in agriculture and industry. 
78God, according to Nanak, was both truth and reality, the only one, omnipotent and 
omniscient. He was formless (Nirankar) and revealed himself through his creation. 
According to Nanak, liberation could be achieved only by inward meditation to this 
Akal Purakh or the timeless being. The six different aspects of a single all-embracing 
concept propounded by Nanak were: sabad (word); nam (name); guru (divine 
preceptor); hukam (divine order); sach (truth) and nadar (grace). For details see 
W.H. McLeod, Guru Nanak and the Sikh Religion (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), p. 190. 
79w.H. McLeod, The Sikhs: History, Religion, and Society (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989), p. 4. 
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peaceful to militant. Guru Gobind Singh instituted the Khalsa, 
"company of the pure," by baptising five disciples (Panj Pyare) into 
this newly established order.BO After his death, supreme spiritual 
authority was vested in the scriptures. 
Second phase - 1708-1849 
The next phase witnessed a rapid decline in the central authority of 
the Mughal Empire. The rise of Ranjit Singh (1780-1839) channelled 
the energies of the Sikhs to establish a unified kingdom of Punjab. His 
empire extended from Afghan territories to the west and Kashmir to 
the north and reached as far as Tibet. A gifted ruler and administrator, 
Ranjit Singh fought with great courage and determination to 
maintain his independence from the British.Bl The glory of Ranjit 
Singh has since been revived and reappropriated as part of the distinct 
cultural heritage and identity of the Sikhs. 
Third Phase - 1840-1947 
Sikhism, with its ritualistic simplicity and pragmatism, had attracted 
large numbers of low-caste Hindus. Its emphasis on equality, and the 
absence of caste distinction or priestly hierarchy, was seen by many as 
a way of breaking the shackles of a highly oppressive caste system and 
BO All those who joined the Khalsa were to keep the title of Singh or Lion and observe 
five symbols which would help distinguish a Sikh from other religious communities. 
These constitute the five K's, namely; Kaccha (shorts), Kanga (comb), Kesh (long 
hair), Kirpan (sword) and Kada (silver bangle). Not all Sikhs accepted the baptism, 
but it was henceforth the bearded and turbanned members of the new order who were 
regarded as guardians of the community's orthodoxy. 
Bl For more on Ranjit Singh see Bikramajit Hasrat, Life and Times of Ranjit Singh, A 
Saga of Benevolent Despotism (Punjab:1977); J. D. Cunningham, A History of the 
Sikhs: From the Origin of the Nation to the Battles of the Sutlej (Delhi: S. Chand 
and Co., 1955). 
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creating social mobility in their new-found environment. However, 
during the time of Ranjit Singh and after, there was a sharp fall in the 
number of those practising the outward observances of Sikhism. 
Ranjit Singh was tolerant of all religions and the easy-going influence 
of traditional Hindu customs was particularly widespread among the 
Sikhs during his time. It looked as if the Sikhs would soon disappear 
as a group distinct from Hindus. Till the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, most khalsa. Sikhs observed both Hindu traditions and 
rituals, and Sikh practices.82 
According to Harbans Singh, such was the state of the Sikh religion in 
1849, that 
it was losing its characteristic vigour and its votaries were relapsing into 
beliefs and dogmas from which their new faith had extricated them. 
AbsorK:tion into ceremonial Hinduism seemed the course inevitably set for 
them. 3 
The rise of Hindu organisations such as the Arya Samaj created more 
insecurities among the Sikhs. The founder of Arya Samaj, Dayanand 
Saraswati (1824-1883), was against idol worship and the caste system, 
and the Sikh orthodoxy feared that his monotheism and 
egalitarianism would appeal to the Sahajdharis, those who believed 
in the teachings of the gurus without keeping the outward 
appearances, and win them away from the panth. At another level, 
threat to Sikhism came in the form of the proselytising activities of 
the Christian missionaries.84 This gave rise to new anxieties in the 
82Rajeev A. Kapur, Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith (London: Allen andUnwin, 
1986), p. 7. 
83ttarbans Singh, Heritage of Sikhs (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p. 129. 
84Tue number of Christians in Punjab rose from 3,796 in 1881to19,54Tin 1891 and to 
315,831 in 1921. Among the converts were not just low caste Hindus but some well-to-do 
Sikhs from aristocratic families like Kanwar Hamam Singh, the heir to the Sikh 
princely state of Kapurthala. 
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minds of the Sikh leaders. Threatened by the Hindus, Muslims and 
Christians, the Sikhs tried to reform and organise their religious and 
social institutions so as to remain distinct from other groups. 
Two reform ·movements, the Nirankari and the Namdhari, aimed at 
purging the Sikh religion from ritualistic practices.BS They replaced 
the Brahmanical rituals practised by Sikhs with ceremonies based on 
the Adi Granth (the sacred scripture of the Sikhs compiled by Guru 
Arjan in 1603-4). They also laid the foundation for the establishment 
in 1873 of yet another society, the Singh Sabha, which sought to 
restore Sikhism to its pure form. The main objectives of the Sabha 
were to arouse the love of religion among the Sikhs and to propagate 
the words of the guru through books and periodicals published in 
Punjabi.86 
The reformers also demanded control of the management of the Sikh 
shrines by the Sikh reformers. The Sikh shrines or gurudwaras were 
in the charge of Mahants or high priests of temples, who were 
indulging in "non Sikh" customs in performing rituals and installing 
images of Hindu gods and goddesses in gurudwara premises.87 This 
had angered the radical elements in the Sikh order and some of these 
85Nirankaris believed in the nirankaar or formless nature of the divine being and 
preached the reform of various social ceremonies and practices performed at death, 
birth and marriage. The Namdhari movement, founded by Baba Balak Singh (1799-
1862) and later his successor Ram Singh, also emphasised the purification of certain 
Sikh practices that had crept into the panth. The followers were to lead austere lives 
and repeat the name or nam of God in prayer (hence namdhari). For details see Surjit 
Kaur Jolly, Sikh Revivalist Movements: The Nirankari and Namdhari Movements in 
Punjab in the 19th Century (New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing House, 1988), pp. 74-80. 
85Ibid., pp. 82-90. Also see Sarfraz Hussain Khwaja, Sikhs of the Punjab 1900-1915: A 
Study of Confrontation and Political Mobilisation (Ann Arbor: Michigan University 
Microfilms, 1980), pp. 27-30. 
86Gerald N. Barrier, The Sikhs and their Literature; A Guide to Tracts, Books and 
Periodicals (Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1970), pp. xxiv-xxv. 
87R.R. Sahni, Struggle for Reform in Sikh Shrines (Amritsar, Sikh Ithihas Research 
Board, n.d), pp. 5-9. 
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activists formed a self constituted Shrimomi Gurudwara 
Prabandhakh Committee (SGPC) on 15 November 1920 for the 
management of the Sikh shrines. 
The more militant organised a semi-military corps of volunteers 
known as the Akali Dal (army of immortals) which was to raise and 
train men for action in taking over the gurudwaras from recalcitrant 
. 
mahants. The SGPC became a sort of parliament for the Sikhs; the Dal, 
its army; and the income from the gurudwaras _was used for its 
sustenance. The passing of the Sikh Gurudwara Act of 1925 placed the 
responsibility for the management and control of all Sikh shrines in 
the hands of the Sikhs. The act continues to be operative and gives 
Sikhs a tremendous advantage with regard to control of their places of 
worship. 
Relations with the British and demand for a separate homeland. 
The Sikhs had proved their loyalty to the British in the early years of 
British rule in Punjab, but it was clearly on the wane after 1919. The 
Rowlatt Act, which gave the British sweeping powers to incarcerate 
people without trial to maintain internal order, and the Jallianwala 
bagh massacre on 12 April 1919 turned the Sikhs against the British. 
Their anger deepened when instead of the much-promised 33 percent 
representation that they expected as reward for their services in the 
army, they were given, under the Government of India Act 1919, only 
15 out of a total of 93 seats in the Punjab legislative council.88 The 
Ramsay McDonald award of April 1932 which established separate 
electorates for all minorities, also deprived the Sikhs of their rightful 
88for details see Sarfaraz Khwaja, op. cit., p. 204. 
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representation based on their percentage,89 in the United Provinces 
and Sindh where they were found in sizeable numbers. 
The resolution passed by the Muslim League for a separate Muslim 
state comprising the predominantly Muslim areas of India, including 
Punjab, was a final blow for the Sikhs. A division of Punjab along 
Hindu-Muslim lines meant that the Sikh community could be split 
into two and their numbers reduced further. Sikh leaders insisted 
upon the creation of a Sikh state if Pakistan was conceded. The idea of 
Azad or independent Punjab was conceived to secure greater political 
leverage for the Sikh community; separate the Muslim-majority 
districts from the Punjab; and form a new province in which the 
maximum number of Sikhs could coexist and no single religious 
community would command a majority.90 
Azad Punjab, however, could not be realised because of a number of 
reasons. First, the events were poised in favour of the Muslim League. 
In the general elections of 1945-46, the Muslim League held complete 
sway over the Muslim masses.91 The League contested the polls on 
the issue of Pakistan and won all the seats in the Central Legislature, 
and apart from the North Western Frontier Province, it gained the 
support of 90 percent of the Muslim populace in all other provinces. 
89They managed just 33 out of 175 seats in the Punjab assembly while the Muslims, 
who secured 86 seats in the state legislature were assured of a majority in the state .. 
For details see Khushwant Singh, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 232. 
90Punjab prior to partition in 1947 was predominantly Muslim in the western districts 
and Hindu in the eastern district, and even though the Sikhs were concentrated in the 
central districts , they were not in a majority. 
91 See Khushwant Singh, op. cit., p. 256. 
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Second, as perceived by the British, 
The way the Sikh spokesmen worded their demand for a Sikh state not as 
something inherently desirable but simply a point in an argument against 
Pakistan robbed the suggestion of any chance of serious consideration.92 
Third, the small numbers of the Sikhs (they made up 5,500,000 as 
compared to 90,000,000 Muslims at that time) and the fact that they 
were not concentrated in any area which could be carved out into a 
separate state93 made the demand untenable. The reality of the 
situation made the Sikhs give up their opposition to the scheme, 
albeit reluctantly. For want of a better solution, the Sikhs agreed to the 
partition of Punjab. But while the Muslims got Pakistan, the Sikhs 
were left with no choice but to remain with the Indian state.94 
Political Developments zn the post-partition period 
Punjabi suba 
The memories of partition have remained entrenched in the Sikh 
psyche. The division of the country brought profound changes in the 
socio-economic lives of the Sikhs. In independent India the Sikhs 
found themselves in a difficult economic situation. The Sikh farmers 
from West Pakistan lost much land in the resettlement schemes 
while their Eastern counterparts were affected adversely by the 
introduction of a ceiling limit of 30 acres. There were delays in 
granting loans for rehabilitating the Sikh refugees, and the Sikh 
92 Khushwant Singh, op. cit.,p. 259. 
93Ibid., See footnote 10, p. 262. 
94For details on developments from 1940-47 see Christine Effenberg, Political Status 
of Sikhs during the Indian National Movement, 1935-1947 (New Delhi: Archives, 
1989), pp. 117-65. 
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monopoly over the transport sector came under threat because of the 
government's policy to nationalise it. At another level, the abolition 
of separate electorates, and the revival of Sanskrit and Hindi, made 
the Sikhs uneasy about their identity. 
This did not in any way diminish the desire of the Sikhs to press for 
their own homeland. The pattern of migration created Sikh 
concentrations in certain districts of East Punjab. In 1948, the Sikh 
states of the Punjab, Malerkotla and Nalagarh were merged to form 
the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU), with Sikhs as a 
majority. This gave them their first chance of establishing their own 
homeland. However, the concentration of the Sikh population and 
Akali proclivities induced the government to abolish the PEPSU in 
1956 and merge it into East Punjab. 
According to Khushwant Singh, 
Economic and political sanctions could no longer be invoked; the only hope lay 
in having a province or a state where they could insist on the teaching of the 
Punjabi language, Sikh scriptures and history and thus mould the minds of the 
younger generation to cherish the Khalsa tradition.95 
The demand for a Punjabi suba originated in the context of the 
aforementioned factors. It was not conceded in the first instance 
because the government felt that it was prompted by communal 
rather than linguistic considerations. However, the creation of the 
. state of Andhra Pradesh for the Telegu speaking people in 1953, and of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960, prompted similar demands in 
Punjab. Leaders like Sant Fateh Singh asked for a separate state based 
on linguistic grounds. 
95Khushwant Singh, op. cit., p. 294. 
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The government of India conceded the demand in 1966 and split 
Punjab to form modem Punjab and Haryana.96 In the new Punjab, the 
Sikhs formed nearly 60 percent of the population, and Punjabi was 
declared the official language. But the situation remained complicated 
because a large number of Hindus continued to reside in Punjab and 
showed little enthusiasm for Punjabi. The retention of Chandigarh as 
a union territory, and a joint capital of both Punjab and Haryana, 
opened the. possibility of future conflict. The creation of the Punjabi 
suba did not completely satisfy the demands of the Sikhs. 
Rise of religious fundamentalism in Punjab 
The political demands got enmeshed with religion by the end of the 
1970s laying the basis of militancy in Punjab. The rise of Sikh 
fundamentalism can be traced back to 1978 when Sant Jamail Singh 
Bhindranwale (1947-1984) assumed the role of a religious preacher 
and leader in the Sikh community. Bhindrawale directed his anger at 
the central government and started advocating ways of propogating 
his brand of Sikhism. He wanted to purge it of some of the 
malpractices that had crept into the order over the years and organised 
killer squads in each village to eliminate the enemies of the Sikh 
jaith. His messages were carried out through Gurudwaras, Sikh 
educational institutions and various religious congregations. 
96 Different theories have been advanced to explain how the Punjabi Suba was 
ultimately conceded. Some say that the Sikhs' threat of non-cooperation during the 
war with Pakistan in 1965 compelled the then prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, 
to ultimately give in to their demand. Others believe that it was the change in tactics 
and in leadership that made the Punjabi Suba a reality. Sant Fateh Singh, who took 
the reins from Master Tara Singh, introduced a note of secularism in Akali politics and 
demanded a Punjabi suba defined as one which comprises an area where "Punjabi 
language is spoken regardless of the fact whether the Sikhs .are in a majority or 
minority." See Mohinder Singh, The Akali Struggle, A Retrospect (New Delhi: 
Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1988), p. 165. 
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The Akalis whose main ideology stemmed from being true 
representatives of the Sikh community, came under immense 
pressure from Bhindrawale. As the central government failed to reach 
a political settlement with the Akali party on issues such as the capital 
territory of Punjab and the distribution of river waters, the stature of 
Bhindrawale went from strength to strength; violence increased in 
the state with attacks on policemen and political figures becoming the 
order of the day. When violence took on a communal colour, 
presidents rule was imposed in the state with a massive deployment 
of the Indian army. Bhindranwale and his followers took refuge in 
the Golden Temple and the army was called upon to remove the 
militants from the holy shrine in an operation called the Operation 
Blue Star on 1 June 1984 killing 5,000 civilians and upto 700 military 
officers. 
The destruction of the Akal Takht sent shock waves through the Sikh 
community in India and outside. It was the ultimate sacrilege that any 
government could have committed against a minority community. 
On 31 October, 1984 the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, 
was killed by her own Sikh bodyguards and a few days later riots broke 
out in parts of northern India targetting the Sikh population at large. 
Political mismanagement by parties at the centre and in Punjab, inept 
handling of the law and order situation, and active support from 
foreign sources resulted in a reign of terror in Punjab which reached 
its peak between 1985 and 1990. According to the White Paper, 
between 1982 up to June 3, 1984, there were over 1200 violent 
incidents in which 410 persons were killed and more than 1180 
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injured.97 According to another source, between 1981 and 1989, 5,521 
people were killed by terrorists, but what is alarming is that in just 
two years (1990 and 1991), the death toll went up to more than 6, 000 
people.98 
But suffice to add that these events instilled a sense of discrimination 
amongst the Sikhs vis-a-vis the Indian state. The fact that the Punjabi 
suba was the last linguistic state to be conceded in India, and that 
demands of the Sikhs were considered communal, and hence a threat 
to the secular foundations of the Indian state did little to allay their 
fears. The unresolved issues of Chandigarh and the river waters, and 
the Sikh perception that the government of India was following a 
deliberate policy to dilute the presence of the Sikhs in the army from 
20 to 2.5 percent, in keeping with the proportion of the Sikh 
population in the country was viewed with further disillusionment. 
The attack on the Golden Temple was the proverbial last straw on the 
camel's back which proved to be a turning point in the demand for a 
separate Sikh state. The rise of separatism and militancy, and the 
strategies of the state in dealing with it will be explained in the 
subsequent chapter. 
Punjab: economic dimensions 
Though more political in content, the Khalistan movement was an 
indirect outcome of economic factors. The political factors, as 
discussed above, laid the basis for the crystallisation of Sikh identity 
97White Paper on the Punjab Agitation, op. cit., p. 32. For a description of the main 
incidents of violence in Punjab during 1981-1984, see Annexure 7 of the White Paper, 
~fi· 110-62. 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Agenda: National Integration Council Meeting 31 
December 1991(New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1991) Annexure 1. 
151 
but the economic factors were instrumental in contributing to 
separatist sentiments among the Sikhs. As mentioned earlier, 80 
percent of the Sikhs reside in Punjab, which is the fourth smallest 
state in India and accounts for nearly 2.5 percent of its population.99 
It is also India's most prosperous state. In 1985-86, per capita income in 
the state was Rs 1,600 compared to an all-India average of Rs 779 at 
1970-71 prices.too Similarly, although 72 percent of its people live in 
rural areas, Punjab's percentage of rural people living below the 
poverty line is the lowest among all Indian states and it has the 
highest average life expectancy. A classic example of rapidly growing 
agriculture, Punjab is the bread basket of India, producing one-fourth 
of the total wheat in the country, and is a major producer of other 
cereals such as maize, rice and bajra; pulses; and important cash crops 
such as cotton, sugarcane and groundnuts. 
The green revolution 
A framework for Punjab's economic growth was created as far back as 
the 19th century when British government officials reformed land 
institutions and the revenue system in Punjab and sought to increase 
production by introducing an extensive irrigation system and 
colonising crown wastelands. However, with the partition of India in 
1947, Punjab was divided into two segments - the eastern part 
99 According to the 1981 census, Punjab had a population of 16.7 million out of India's 
684 million people. Cited in Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening to India, Punjab, Ethnic 
Conflict and the Test for Federalism (New York: Holmesand Meir Publishers, 1994), p. 
27. 
lOOCited in Sucha Singh Gill, "Development Crisis in Agriculture and Its Political 
Implications-An Enquiry into the Punjab Problem" in Paul Wallace and Surendra 
Chopra (eds), Political Dynamics and Crisis in Punjab (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev 
University, 1988). 
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remained in India while the western part went to Pakistan. A series of 
acts introduced in the early 1950s101 helped in the abolition of 
intermediaries, and conferred full proprietary rights on occupancy 
tenants. As a result, the area cultivated by owners increased from 51.4 
percent of the total in 1947 to 66.4 percent in 1957 and so;s9 percent in 
1969-70.102 This restructuring of the rural base paved the way for the 
green revolution, creating an agricultural society that had the capacity 
to adopt improved agricultural techniques and production 
technology .103 
From 1952 to 1965, a period that might appropriately be called the 
transition or take-off stage, Punjab's agricultural output grew at an 
annual rate of more than 5.5 percent.104 It recorded the highest growth 
rate of total crop output among the Indian states over the period 1952-
53 to 1964-65. The average annual growth of crop output in Punjab 
during this period was 1.6 times the all-India growth rate and 4.5 
times the growth rate in Assam, India's lowest ranking state. Its rate of 
growth even compared favourably with the fast developing 
economies of Mexico, Taiwan and Brazil. Of greater significance was 
the fact that despite its small size and the fact that it accounted for only 
3 percent of the net sown area and 3.5 percent of the total cropped area 
in India, Punjab was producing nearly 28 percent of the total wheat, 6 
101These were the East Punjab Utilisation of Land Act,1949; The Punjab Occupancy 
Tenants Act,1952; The Punjab Abolition of Ala-malkiyat and Talukdari Rights Act; 
The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act,1953; Patiala and East Punjab States Union 
Abolition of Biswedari Ordinance, and The PEPSU Tenancy and Agricultural Lands 
Act,1955. 
102Randhawa, op. cit., p. 47. 
103For details on land reforms, see Pritam Singh, Punjab Economy - The Emerging 
Pattern (New Delhi: Enkay Publishers, 1995), pp. 124-59. 
104Richard H. Day and Inderjit Singh, Economic Development as an Adaptive 
process, The Green Revolution in Indian Punjab (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), p. 9. 
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percent of the total cereals, and over 5 percent of the total output of 
food grains in 1965.105 
Rapid advances in the agricultural sector were made possible due to a 
variety of factors. Some of these included increase in the area under 
cultivation; improved seeds and use of fertilisers; growth and 
improvement of the physical infrastructure; institutions of credit, 
banking and marketing; and price policy and prices. 
The proportion of net sown area to total area available for cultivation 
went up from 75 percent in 1960-61 to 84 percent in 1988-89. Fallow 
land was 313,000 hectares in 1960-61 but came down to 51,000 hectares 
in 1988-89.106 Increase in the area under cultivation corresponded 
with bringing more land under irrigation through wells, which 
accounted for 80 percent of the rise in net irrigated area between 1960 
and 1979,107 and later by tube wells.108 Reclamation of alkaline and 
saline areas also increased agricultural output. For example, the 
output of rice increased about 23 times, that of wheat 6.10 times, and 
food grains almost 5.5 times from 1965-66 to 1989-90.109 
The green revolution was based on procuring high yielding varieties 
(HYV) of seed developed in Mexico and the Philippines in the 1960s 
and then applying them in Punjab. Sweeping technological changes 
105ruchard H. Day and Inderjit Singh, op. cit., p. 9. 
106 Ibid., p. 67. 
107 Anya McGuirk and Yair Mundlak, "Incentives and Constraints in the 
Transformation of Punjab Agriculture," Research Report 87, International Food Policy 
Research Institute, 1991. p. 31. 
108sy 1981-82, the number of tubewells had increased to 610,000 accounting for well 
over 90 percent of the total area irrigated by wells. For details see J.R Westley, 
Agriculture and Equitable Growth: The Case of Punjab-Haryana, Special Studies in 
Agricultural Science and Policy (Colorado, 1986). Also see Randhawa, op. cit., pp. 
105-10. 
109p · s· h ·t 77 ntam mg , op. c1 ., p. . 
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helped in the creation of new HYV of wheat which greatly increased 
the wheat and rice production of Punjab. Bodies like the Punjab State 
Seed Corporation and the Seed Certification Authority were set up for 
the production and supply of improved seeds. 
The one advantage that Punjab had over other states was that the 
infrastructure required for the green revolution was already there in 
. the late 1960s. During the first phase from 1950-51 to 1965-66, basic 
institutional and economic infrastructure was created through large 
amounts of public investment in consolidation of land holdings, 
irrigation, and power development. This phase laid the foundation 
for the modernisation of agriculture in Punjab. During the second 
phase, (1968-69), a vast programme of village roads was launched, 
enabling the farmers to carry their produce to the markets and fetch a 
competitive price for it. From 1965-66 to 1979-80, power generation in 
Punjab increased by 328 percent and by about the same amount in 
India. During the same period, per capita consumption increased by 
241 percent in Punjab compared to about 138 percent in India.no 
Since the technology introduced by the green revolution was capital-
intensive, it was important that capital was readily available to the 
farmer. This was achieved with the help of credit societies, land 
mortgage banks, other co-operative institutions, and nationalised 
banks which provided short-term credit facilities for the purchase of 
fertilisers. Not only did the credit facilities help provide fertilisers and 
other infrastructural prerequisites for the green revolution, they were 
a boon for small and marginal farmers who could now turn to 
1 lOG.K Chadha, The State and Rural Economic Transformation: A Study of Punjab, 
1950-85 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1986), p. 75. 
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institutional sources of finance without falling into the clutches of the 
money lender. 
Finally the establishment of the Agricultural Prices Commission in 
1960 helped set procurement prices at a level remunerative to farmers 
to promote greater reliance on domestic rather than imported 
supplies of food grain for the public distribution system.Ill This called 
for a greater reliance on Punjab, and its contribution of food grains. 
During 1980-81, government procurement accounted for 64 percent of 
Punjab's wheat production and 45 percent of its rice production.112 
The policy was significant in that it provided a guaranteed market for 
Punjabi food grain and an incentive for increased production. 
Socio-economic effects of the green revolution 
The technological breakthrough achieved by the green revolution and 
the rapid advancements in agriculture left ari indelible imprint on the 
socio-economic fabric of Punjabi society. Agricultural growth induced 
growth in the economy at large, with industry growing at an average 
annual rate of 6.25 percent over 1960-79, and, more strikingly, at a 16 
percent rate during the last five years of the 1970s. Similarly, the 
average annual growth of the tertiary sector (services) during these 
two decades was 4.7 percent but between 1975 and 1979 the sector grew 
at a spe'ctacular 36 percent a year.113 
111 The key instrument in the agricultural pricing in India is the price at which the 
government procures food grains for the public distribution system. This includes 
restrictions on. grain movement between various regions, government procurement in 
surplus districts, distribution and rationing in urban areas and administrative control 
over traders. 
112<:ited in Anya Mc Guirk and Yair Mundlak, op. cit., p. 39. 
113fuid., p. 15. 
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There have, however, been many debates on whether the fruits of the green 
revolution were distributed equally among all sections of the society. Although 
the main reason for Punjab's prosperity lay in the opportunities that arose from 
the green revolution, by about 1974, the green revolution had begun to peter out. 
Production of wheat fell from 5. 6 million metric tonnes in 1972 to 5 .4 million in 
1973, 5.2 million in 1974, and 5.3 million in 1975.114 By 1977-78 returns on 
wheat cultivation had fallen to less than 2 percent of investment. 
According to one vtew, as the ecological, political and cultural costs of the 
revolution became more manifest, it was clear that the revolution has generated 
more conflict than reduced it. It also had visible impact on the 
materials/ecological systems which in turn tended to create new potential sources 
of conflict. 115 
On the economic front, the gams were shortlived because of their unequal 
distribution among the various sections of society and the different regions in 
Punjab. 116 Class inequalities have always existed in Punjab. By the 1970s, for 
example, an estimated 23 percent of landholding families (each holding at least 4 
hectares) owned two-thirds of the cultivated land. 117 But these disparities were 
further accentuated by the coming of the green revolution. The position of the 
agricultural labourers had become even more vulnerable. With the plateauing of 
the green revolution there was a growing pauperisation of marginal and poor 
peasants, who could neither reap 
114 Manohar Singh Gill, "The Development of Punjab Agriculture 1977-80", Asian Sun1ey, 
Vol. 23, no. 7, July 1983, p. 832. 
115 For useful discussion on this subject, see Vandana Shiva, The Violence of the Green 
Revolution, Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics (London: Zed Books,1991). 
116Inter-district variations in crop yields were dependent on many factors such as irrigation. 
fertiliser use, availability of power. etc. For details see Pritam Singh, op. cit., pp. 85-89. 
117Dalip Singh, Pvnamics of Punjab Politics (New Delhi: Macmillan India ltd., 1981), p. 59. 
the benefits of the land nor find employment in the industrial 
sector.118 With capital intensive agriculture, landless workers rose 
from 17.3 percent in 1961 to 32.1 percent in 1971; it was about 40 
percent in 1984.119. The green revolution strategy was successful 
initially because the government had provided subsidies and support 
prices to help the farmers. However, this could not continue 
indefinitely and with the rising cost of fertilisers and pesticides, the 
small farmers were the worst hit, accumulating huge losses and debts. 
Even the big landlords, who could avail themselves of credit facilities 
at cheap rates, started to feel the pinch with the increase in the prices 
of inputs, and shortages of electricity and water. 
Lack of co-ordination at the administrative level also disrupted 
agricultural development of the state. According to Vandana Shiva, 
the inevitability of the green revolution was built on neglecting other, 
more ecologically sound avenues for increasing land production, such 
as improving mixed cropping patterns, using indigenous seeds, and 
efficient use of land resources. The intensive irrigation needed by the 
HYV led to problems of water-logging and salinity which in turn led 
to crop failures.120 Thus while increase in productivity was the main 
objective of the green revolution, the productivity could not be 
sustained for long because the new varieties had generated a new 
ecological vulnerability by reducing genetic diversity and affecting the 
soil and water systems. 
118Gopal Singh, "Socio Economic Bases of the Punjab Crisis," Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 19, no. 1, 7 January 1984, pp. 42-43. 
119Tuid., pp. 42-43. 
120Vandana Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution, Third World Agriculture, 
Ecology and Politics ' o r 0 '- ~ t · J . , pp. 83-89. 
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At the social level, the rise of prosperity in Punjab was accompanied 
by growing unemployment. With so much emphasis on agriculture, 
the industrial infrastructure of the state remained relatively under-
developed save for some small-scale industries such as woollen 
textiles and hosiery financed largely by the remittances of overseas 
Sikhs. In the sixth Five Year Plan (1980-5), the central authorities 
allotted Rs. 240 billion for investment to heavy industry but only RS. 
100 million (0.04 percent) was to be spent in Punjab.121 Many Punjabi 
youths were forced to go elsewhere to seek employment and, in tum, 
Punjab attracted semi-skilled and unskilled labour from states like 
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. 122 
At the political level, the green revolution tended to lead to the 
politicisation of the farmers against the Indian state. The status 
conferred by the green revolution on Punjab, as the breadbasket of 
India became a cause for discontent, when the benefits started fading. 
The backlash from the Sikh peasantry at the perceived failure of their 
hopes while other parts of the country appeared to benefit from their 
efforts was quite violent. Jat farmers resented the centre's 
procurement of their wheat crop at below market prices. The 
redistribution of wheat from surplus areas to deficit areas of the 
country at subsidised prices did not meet their approval. 
As mentioned earlier, Punjab has one of the highest per capita 
incomes in the country. By the early 1970s, it was meeting over 90 
percent of its total expenditure and its share of central assistance had 
121See Pramod Kumar et al., Punjab Crisis: Context and Trends (Chandigarh: Centre 
for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1984), pp. 55-61. 
122for more on migrant labour see R.Ballard, "The Context and Consequences of 
Migration: Jullunder and Mirpur Compared," New Community , Autumn-Winter, 1983, 
pp. 117-36. 
159 
dropped considerably. Between the first and sixth five year plans, that 
is from the early 1950s to the mid 1970s, central assistance had dropped 
from 86.5 percent to 15.3 percent.123 Declining dependence on the 
central resource transfers coupled with the high rates of growth in 
state domestic product raised the expectations of the people of Punjab 
who felt that they were not getting enough in return for their 
contribution for feeding the rest of the country. 
Mismanagement of the unprecedented prosperity during the years of 
the green revolution, both by authorities and by those who benefited 
from it, fragmentation of land, absence of industrial development, 
and large number of educated unemployed aggravated the situation 
further. This economic and political crisis began to take communal 
overtones when the Akali Dal, the main party of the Jat Sikhs or the 
farmers, started couching its economic and social demands in the 
name of religion. 
According to Joyce Pettigrew, the rise and fall of the guerrilla 
movement in Punjab is a result of the changes that took place in the 
dominant Jat community in Punjab: not only was their economic 
viability threatened by the coming of the Green Revolution but the 
traditions of the Sikhs were also being undermined.124 The Green 
revolution, which promised to bring prosperity to the the farmers led 
instead to an unequal distribution of wealth. The erosion of Sikh 
values and the attack on the Golden Temple added to the woes of the 
small and medium-scale farmers, who turned against the state with a 
123 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, op.cit., p. 171. 
124Joyce. M Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab - Unheard Voices of State and 
Guerrilla Violence (London: Zed books, 1995), p. 55. 
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vengeance. Most of them were willing recruits for militant 
organisations. 
Conspicuous consumption created by the short-term prosperity of the 
revolution, led to other social problems. Drug addiction, akoholism 
and violence became common and religion became a means of 
rectifying the deteriorating moral climate. 
It is important to note, however, that as pointed out by Dipankar 
Gupta, the economic factors worked, only as a boundary condition.125 
Even though economic grievances were emphasised time and again 
to point to discrimination at the hands of the centre, they only gained 
credence once the secessionist demand became more viable. This 
explains why the tapering off of the green revolution in the mid 1970s 
was not followed by militancy or demands for separatism, which 
became a feature of Punjab's politics only at the beginning of the 
1980s. 
Conclusion 
While juxtaposing two movements of groups as different as the Sikhs 
and the Baluch, it is clear that two very different sets of circumstances 
can produce similar feelings of frustration and disenchantment vis-a 
vis the state. The Baluch is a classic case of how under development 
and relative deprivation created grounds for insurgency and 
separatism in Pakistan. Being the smallest minority in Pakistan, the 
Baluch have shown a remarkable resilience in preserving their 
125Dipankar Gupta, The Context of Ethnicity: Sikh Identity in a Comparative 
Perspective (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 70. 
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identity against attempts by federal regimes to incorporate them into 
the national mainstream or interfere in their socio-cultural lives. 
Their desire for self-determination, spurred by feelings of relative 
deprivation and fear of being made an internal colony of Pakistan, has 
been a constant source of friction between them and the federal 
government. 
In contrast, the Sikhs in Punjab are one of the most prosperous 
communities in India, but even their relative wealth and prosperity 
could not contain their sense of growing alienation from the rest of 
the country. The green revolution brought its own unintended effects 
of widening class disparities, unequal distribution of wealth, rising 
unemployment; and breaking of traditional ties, which had a 
profound impact on Punjab. Political stalemate on the resolution of 
the status of Chandigarh, and the distribution of river waters instilled 
a sense of discrimination amongst the Sikhs. The Sikhs believed that 
they joined India in the hope that their separate political status would 
be recognised by the Indian government but instead had to fight to 
preserve their identity. They found some succour in their religion, 
which was used by both the state and central elites to advance their 
own agendas, inspiring demands for a separate state of Khalistan 
among some sections of the people. 
Subsequently, the Baluch and Sikh movements, both products of 
differing socio-economic milieux, gradually escalated into secessionist 
movements creating their own dynamics which threatened the 
integrity of India and Pakistan. The process of nation building and 
ethnic conflicts has to be studied at two levels: as a manifestation of 
social and economic crisis within the respective countries; and in 
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terms of the role of the state in dealing with such a crisis. The 
response of the respective states to the socio-economic grievances of 
the Baluch and the Sikhs, and the political repercussions of these 
responses will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
STRATEGIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS IN PAKISTAN 
AND INDIA IN DEALING WITH THE BALUCH AND THE PUNJAB 
CRISES 
This chapter examines the state in South Asia, with special reference to India 
and Pakistan. More specifically, the focus is on government strategies to contain 
ethnic conflict and how policies of nation-building affect minority communities. 
Both India and Pakistan have instituted policies to address the grievances of 
minority. ethnic groups, but when faced with the threat of secession by the 
groups in question, they have not hesitated to use a mix of coercive and 
conciliatory tactics to contain them. The study focuses, in particular, on the 
response of the state to the Baluch tribes in Pakistan and the Sikhs in India. 
It is a fact that as long as the state extends its coercive arm and employs 
pressure tactics to keep rising tensions in check, and defends such actions as 
part of national integration, ethnic groups find it difficult to realise the ultimate 
goal of secession. Both India and Pakistan face a similar dilemma with regard to 
their ethnic communities. Both have used a variety of strategies to manage 
ethnic tensions, ranging from conciliation to the use of brute force. Despite 
subtle shifts, the governments of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ( 1971-77) and his 
successor Zia ul Haq (1977-88) both evinced a hard-line attitude towards the 
Baluch tribes. In the Indian case, the period under study (1978-92) witnessed 
the use of clever techniques combined with the deployment of the army, 
paramilitary troops and police to assist the Indian government to wipe out 
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militancy in the Punjab. The argument proposed here is that the use of a clever 
mix of conciliation and organised force, where necessary, by the respective 
states was one of the major factor responsible for the decline of the Khalistan 
and Baluch movements. 
The Indian state: centre-state relations 
As noted in Chapter 2, the framework for the new independent Indian state was 
laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India (194 7-64). A 
consensus was achieved on ethnic issues by drawing the boundaries of the states 
on a linguistic basis. The constitution of India recognises the various linguistic 
groups and their right to preserve their language, script and culture, and 
administer educational institutions of their choice. 1 In matters of religion, 
despite its overwhelming Hindu majority (82 percent of the total population), 
India is a secular state with equal rights for all religious communities. But the 
traumatic experience of partition in 194 7 and the fear of further divisions made 
the constitution makers proponents of a strong centre. 
1The State Reorganisation Commission was appointed in 1953 and in 1956. Fourteen states 
and six Union Territories were formed in accordance with the languages spoken in the 
regions. By 1988 the number had grown to 25, with six union territories. 
According to Bhawani Singh, 
what the Indian constitution makers did was to ensure a convenient division of 
administrative labour between the centre and the units and not an equitable 
sharing of responsibility between them. In the final upshot, the system as it 
emerged, made the units of federation totally dependent upon and subservient to 
an omnipotent centre.2 
Several provisions in the constitution favour the centre over the 
state. Some of these include the authority of the centre to legislate 
over subjects in the Union, State and Concurrent ·lists3, alter 
boundaries of existing states and create new ones, appoint governors 
in the states and proclaim a state of emergency under articles 352, 356 
and 360 which includes the right to suspend or dismiss elected state 
legislatures.4 There have been 91 such dismissals under Article 356 
since the time of the promulgation of the constitution on 26 January 
1950.s The centre also exercises control over all economic resources of 
the country including investments, the granting of licenses and 
location of all major public industries. The states are dependent on 
the centre for grants-in-aid, loans, development outlays and their 
shares from the other forms of revenue.6 
2see Bhawani Singh, "Federalism and State Autonomy in India: The Paradigm and 
the Paradox," in Verinder Grover (ed.), Political System and Constitution of India, 
Federal System, Centre-State Relations and State Autonomy, Vol. 4 (New Delhi: 
Deep and Deep Publications, 1997) p. 310. 
3under the constitution, government power is set out in three separate lists: Union, 
State and Concurrent. The centre is sovereign in the Union list of subjects; in the case of 
the concurrent list, which it shares with the state, it can override the state laws; and 
as for the state list, which is largely the domain of the states, the centre can take 
over state subjects even in normal times and for any period if the Lok Sabha approves 
of it by a two-thirds majority. 
4Tue constitution of India has provided for three different kinds of emergencies. An 
emergency can be declared due to war, external aggression and armed rebellion; failure 
of constitutional machinery in the states; and financial distress. 
5For details see K. Ranga Rao and Ravi Teja, " Article 356 and Presidents rule in the 
States," in Verinder Grover (ed.), op. cit., pp. 318-31. 
6New Delhi's revenue comes from the Corporate tax; its surcharge on income tax 
(shared between th~ state and the centre) and special excise duties, made some states 
argue that while their joint annual expenditure equals that of the centre, New Delhi 
keeps about 75 percent of the total national revenue. For details see Salamat Ali, 
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Predictably, the centre has been confronted with the problem of states 
wanting dilution in its powers and more autonomy for themselves. 
Industrialisation under the Nehruvian model helped strengthen the 
national economy but at the cost of intensifying regional inequalities. 
However, the ethnic movements in the 1950s and 1960s were 
concerned with the realignment of state boundaries along linguistic 
lines. They were not directed against the centre because the centre 
itself was not seen as being dominated by one particular group 
enjoying state power. Subsequently ethnic politics in India came to 
revolve around the demands of the underprivileged, backward or 
religious minority groups who were fighting for . positive action in 
' their favour: more quotas in employment and better access to 
education opportunities. 
The Indian government have taken steps to address many of these 
demands. On the language question, the government has refrained 
from adopting Hindi as the national language and has settled for 
multilingual pluralism. The Official Languages (Amendment Bill) 
passed in December 1967 specified that English would remain an 
official means of communication for the country, in parliament, and 
between the central government and those states which had a non-
Hindi state language. Thus a two language policy was formulated for 
official business, and a three language formula was adopted for 
secondary education as well as the government public service 
examinations. 7 
"States Seek Larger Share of Tax Income, Row over Revenue," Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 144, no. 14, 6 April 1989, p. 20. 
7The three language formula in secondary education meant that students would be 
taught at least three languages, the regional language and their mother if it was not 
the regional language; Hindi or, in Hindi-speaking areas, another Indian language; 
and English or any other modem European language. See Jyotindra Das Gupta, 
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Similarly the quota system has been devised to give better access to 
minority groups and the economically and socially backward 
communities.8 Scheduled castes and tribes (who make up one-fifth of 
India's population) are allocated up to 22 percent of all places in 
educational institutions and universities; 22 percent of the posts in 
public employment; and 119 of the 543 seats in Parliament. The other 
backward castes are assured of another 27 percent reservation. 9 
However, some of these concessions have failed to provide solutions 
in recent years.10 Reservations extended to communities other than 
scheduled castes and tribes, under the Mandal commission, unleashed 
a violent protest from among the upper classes in India in 1989. At 
another level, the central government has also found it difficult to 
reach a settlement when claims of one community have affected 
another. For example, the Assamese demand that illegal Bengali-
speaking Muslim migrants from Bangladesh be expelled from the 
state could not be accepted because of opposition from the 
government of West Bengal. This has made the issue of centre-state 
relations particularly sensitive and has kept tensions alive between 
the centre and the states. 
Language Conflict and National Development: Group Politics and National Language 
Policy in India (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 259. 
Bfor a discussion on affirmative policies in India see Partha Ghosh, " Positive 
Discrimination in India - A Political Analysis," Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. 15, no. 2, 
July 1997, pp. 135-69. 
9Kanti Bajpai, "Diversity, Democracy, and Devolution in India," in Michael Brown 
and Sum.it Ganguly (eds), Government Policies and Etlmic Relations in Asia and the 
Pacific (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997), p. 53. 
lOJnough the government remains committed to the quota system, those who have 
benefitted from reservations have tended to be a small elite within the scheduled 
caste and tribe communities, and the social stigma attached to the lower castes 
continues. 
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. The state of Pakistan: centre-state relations 
Pakistan has followed a distinctly different course. In terms of political 
parties and organisations, the Muslim League could hardly be 
compared with the Congress Party in India.11 It had no grassroots 
backing and depended largely on the landlords for votes. The failure 
of political parties to strike firm roots in Pakistan led to the forging of 
-
close links between the army, the landlord class and the bureaucracy. 
Pakistan has been under army rule for 25 of the 50 years of its 
existence and the army continues to exercise considerable power in 
the decision making of the country, albeit from behind the scenes.12 
The first coup staged by the army under the leadership of General 
Ayub Khan (1958-69) in October 1958, was followed by the military 
rule of Yahya Khan (1969-71) and that of General Zia ul Haq (1977-88). 
During these periods political activities were greatly restricted. In the 
event, as noted by Ayesha Jalal, 
Although Pakistan followed the Indian pattern of borrowing heavily from the 
1935 act, including the distribution of powers between the centre and the 
provinces, the unitary aspects in its federal configuration were much starker in 
practice.13 
The brief interlude between Y ah ya Khan and General Zia signalled a 
brief return of democracy. Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India 
and the subsequent loss of its East wing, as the independent state of 
Bangladesh, dealt a big a blow to the prestige of the army. Its declining 
popularity was instrumental in reviving party politics. In 1971, 
11 For details on party politics prior to 1958 see M. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in 
Pakistan, 1947-58 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural 
Research, 1976). 
12This is notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan has been a functioning democracy 
since December 1988 when Benazir Bhutto was elected prime minister. 
13Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia - A Comparative 
and Historical Perspective (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 184. 
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Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the first head of a democratically elected 
government. However, Bhutto's high-handed policies led to his 
downfall. His actions, including the five-year-long guerrilla war in 
Baluchistan and the alleged rigging of the 1977 general elections, 
contributed to his demise and brought in the rule of Zia ul Haq~ Zia's 
death in 1988 marked the end of military rule in Pakistan. The 
country has since then functioned as a democracy under the 
leaderships of Benazir Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990 and 
November 1993 -1996); and Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993 and from 1996 to 
the present day). 
The issues that engaged Pakistan in the post independence years 
centred on two things: the role of Islam and centre-state relations. 
Though Islam provided the basis for the formation of the new state, 
the leaders, including Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the father of the 
nation, could not decide on whether to make it secular or theocratic.14 
This ambiguity lent itself to a dangerous mix of religion and politics 
in subsequent years. The definition of a Pakistani identity - other than 
its Islamic basis - remained unclear, and both Muslim and Pakistani 
identities were used interchangeably in the discourse on national 
identity. Islam has been used as a tool by political parties to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people.IS It has not, however, helped 
14Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan, 
1947-1948 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), pp. 8-9. For a contradictory position, 
on a Pakistani identity see Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad ( ed.), Speeches and Writings of Mr 
Jinnah, vol. 2 (Lahore: Ashraf, 1960). 
15For example, Bhutto declared the Ahmediyyas heretics to win the support of the 
ulema and other religious forces. Under Zia ul Haq (1977-88) several pieces of 
legislation were enacted to make Pakistan an Islamic country. Some of these included 
the zakat (tax levied on the Muslims to help the poor); ushr (tax on agricultural 
produce); punishments to deal with offences like drinking, theft and adultery; 
Islamisation of the judicial system by the establishment of quasi-courts and an 
advisory council called the Majlis-e-Shura, which could be consulted on state matters. 
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Pakistan to evolve a coherent national identity, but has rather 
sharpened ethnic polarization in the country. 
With regard to the distribution of powers between the centre and the 
provinces, the centre kept most of the powers for itself. The three 
constitutions reflected a recognition of the federal principle but 
changes were made to incorporate the wishes of different rulers. The 
first constitution, promulgated in 1956, nine years after the country's 
formation in 1947, established an Islamic, federal parliamentary 
democracy, but did little to provide political stability.16 
The constitution of 1962 under Ayub Khan advocated a presidential 
form of government in which the provincial authorities were 
reduced to becoming mere "creatures of the centre." It gave the centre 
the power to legislate in the provincial sphere in the national interest 
and governors were subject to direction by the president.17 In fact, it 
was the centralising policies of Ayub Khan that contributed to the 
tensions between the East and West wings18 and ultimately to the 
breaking away of the East wing from Pakistan. As has been discussed 
in Chapter 2, the East wing was clamouring for more autonomy 
because of a lack of representation in the higher echelons of the 
bureaucracy and the army, the imposition of Urdu, and economic 
discrimination by the federal government. The reluctance of the 
military regime under Yahya Khan to relinquish power to the Awami 
party, which had emerged as the single largest party, resulted in a civil 
16For details on the 1956 constitution see Kamal Afzar, Pakistan - Political and 
Constitutional Dilemmas (Karachi: Pakistan Law House, 1987), p. 45. 
17For details see ibid., pp. 67-76. 
l81n 1956, Pakistan was brought under the one-unit scheme, to check the imbalance 
between a more populous Eastern Pakistan and the rest of the country. All four 
provinces in Western Pakistan were amalgamated to form one-unit. 
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war which led to the secession of East Pakistan to form the new state 
of Bangladesh in 1971. 
The third constitution was promulgated in 1973 under the civilian 
leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Unlike the ·other two it contained 
several provisions for the ethno-linguistic communities,19but these 
did little to improve their bargaining position with the centre because 
the lc~tter still exercised overriding powers over the provinces. 20 A 
similar policy was followed by General Zia to tighten the hold of the 
central government. He introduced the famous 8th amendment, 
which gave the president arbitrary powers to dismiss an elected 
government.21 While this process was reversed by the present 
government of Nawaz Sharif in 1997, the centre still retains 
enormous powers with respect to the provinces.22 
19 Prominent among these were the rights of groups to preserve and promote a distinct 
language and culture (Article 28); discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and 
provincial prejudices (Article 33); commit the state to eradicate economic and social 
inequality among regions (Article 37); and acknowledge the right of provincial 
assemblies to adopt measures for the teaching, promotion, and use of a provincial 
language in addition to Urdu (Article 251). See Government of Pakistan, Ministry of 
Law and Parliamentary Affairs, The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
(Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1977). 
20Bhutto withdrew constitutional guarantees from the civil servants to make them 
more accountable to the civil bureaucracy, reorganised the armed forces to reduce the 
influence of more powerful groups in the army, and introduced constitutional 
amendmepts which sought to limit the power of the courts. The latter ensured that 
during an emergency, the fundamental rights remained suspended; furthermore, it 
gave the government the right to dissolve political parties whose activities it 
considered detrimental to its interests. These measures had the hidden objective of 
tightening the grip of federal agencies over the provinces. For example, the 
Constitution provided that a motion expressing want of confidence in the prime 
minister must also name his successor. It could be moved during the budget session and 
once a motion like this was defeated, a subsequent one could not be tabled for the next 
six months. 
21 For the text of the 8th amendment see Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Pakistan - A Political 
Study, Appendix-D (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1995), pp. 310-21. 
22The 8th amendment was used by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to dismiss prime 
minister, Benazir Bhutto, on 6 August 1990 on grounds of corruption and inability to 
control the deteriorating situation in Sindh. He used it again in April 1993 to dismiss 
the government of Nawaz Sharif. For details see Samina Yasmeen, "Democracy in 
Pakistan: The Third Dismissal," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, no. 6, June 1994, pp. 572-88. 
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Unlike in India, where no one region or ethnic group exercises 
complete dominance over other states or communities, the centre-
state relations in Pakistan stem from the asymmetrical nature of the 
federal structure, which gives the Punjabis overwhelming power over 
other groups such as the Sindhis, Pushtuns and Baluch. Punjabi 
dominance is often viewed as control of the centre over the 
provinces. After the loss of Bengal in 1971 Punjabis constituted nearly 
60 percent of the population of Pakistan and supplied 70 percent of 
military personnel. A quota system of recruitment to the services, 
based on regional affiliation, has failed to give adequate 
representation to other groups. Disaffection ensuing from such 
differences has. often taken the shape of ethnic conflicts, which, when 
pushed, become secessionist in character. 
The Baluch 
The Baluch movement was one such example which came close on 
the heels of the formation of Bangladesh, and threatened the integrity 
of the Pakistani state. The federal government in· Pakistan has 
employed various strategies to keep the Baluch in check. From brute 
force to devious manoeuvring to conciliatory gestures, the rulers 
have used different means to push their political agenda since the 
formation of Pakistan in 1947. Similar policies continued under 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul Haq. Bhutto started out by letting the 
people of Baluchistan have a government of their own. But his 
insatiable quest for power and his overwhelming desire to control his 
opponents led to the dismissal of the democratically elected 
government of Baluchistan in 1973, leading to a five-year-long civil 
war in the province. 
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Zia followed a more cautious approach. He realised that the Baluch 
could never wage a full-fledged war against the state, given the 
inherent factionalism among the various leaders of the tribes, and he 
adopted a more conciliatory approach. However, despite the 
variations and shifts in strategy, the governments of both Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto and Zia ul Haq succeeded in overpowering the Baluch, leading 
to the ultimate decline of the movement by the beginning of the 
1980s. The might of the Pakistani state proved to be far too great for 
the Baluch to resist and the government was able to crush the 
possibility of a rebellion in the coming years. Ironically enough, the 
democratic regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto used more force to keep the 
Baluch in check than the military dictatorship of Zia ul Haq. This 
section discusses the policies of each of the rulers and studies their 
subsequent impact on the Baluch cause. 
Relations of the Baluch with the federal government (1947-71) 
Relations between the Baluch and the Pakistani state have been 
strained since 1947. In the following year, resistance by the Khan of 
Kalat to incorporation in Pakistan was met with military takeover by 
Pakistan's forces.23 The Baluch have ever since been involved in 
some sort of confrontation with the federal government. A fierce 
battle was waged by the Baluch against the one-unit scheme, which 
sought to establish parity between the East and West wings of Pakistan 
by the merger of the provinces of West Pakistan into one-unit. 
23For details on the accession of Baluchistan to Pakistan see Janmahmad, Essays on 
Baluch National Struggle in Pakistan - Emergence Dimensions Repercussions (Quetta: 
Gosha -e-Adab, 1989), pp. 173-96. 
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In 1959, there was a campaign of repression against the Baluch. 
Several hundred armed men, led by the eighty-year-old Nauroz Khan, 
took to the arid hills and fought back. The incident started with the 
arrest of Ahmad Yar Khan, the ex-ruler of Kalat state, in 1958; Khan 
was divested of all distinctions, privileges and annuities conferred 
upon him by the Pakistan government for allegedly organising a force 
of 80,000 men against the Pakistani state.24 Agitation against his arrest 
sparked a series of protests in other parts of Baluchistan, intensifying 
army operations. By July 1963, guerrilla camps had been set up in the 
Jhalawan and Marri areas to impart training to the insurgents. The 
hostilities continued for almost a year without much respite on either 
side. Realising the futility of its actions, the Ayub Khan regime offered 
to negotiate and offered amnesty to Baluch leaders, who were released 
on the mercy appeal of the sardars of the Kalat and Quetta division.25 
But some, like Nauroz Khan's son and six others, were arrested and 
hanged, provoking more discontent and anger among the Baluch 
against the federal government. 26 
The resignation of President Ayub Khan on 25 March 1969 and the 
coming of General Yahya Khan as the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator on 31March1969, was followed by more unrest. Yahya 
Khan dissolved the one-unit scheme and revived the four former 
provinces of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North Western 
Frontier Province. The Baluch wanted to revert to the arrangement 
24According to Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, the drama of his arrest was staged "simply 
because President Sikander Mirza wanted to put the country under martial rule in 
order to keep himself in power by avoiding the general elections. Baluchistan was 
chosen as the starting point of the nefarious action which was designed to be applied 
to the whole of Pakistan later." Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, 
Political Autobiography of Khan-E-Azam, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch (Karachi: 
Royal Book Company, 1975), p. 191. 
25Pakistan Times (Lahore), 28 January 1967. 
26Tariq Ali, op. cit., p. 116. 
175 
which existed prior to the one-unit scheme, in which the Baluchistan 
States Union and their leased areas worked as a separate 
administrative unit without being a part of the Quetta division. This 
was, however, not acceptable to Yahya Khan.27 
The Baluch under Bhutto (1971-77) 
Bhutto held a lot of hope and promise for Pakistan when he took over 
as president on 20 December 1971. As noted earlier, the 1973 
constitution was a harbinger of federalism and an advance over its 
predecessors in that it was. more sensitive to the needs of ethnic 
minorities. But Bhutto pursued both developmental and centralising 
strategies as part of his carrot and stick policy to deal with the Baluch. 
When the full-scale tribal insurrection broke out in 1973-74, Bhutto 
used the stick and wasted the advantage he had gained by opting for a 
military solution instead of engaging in tactful negotiations. He 
followed this with the carrot by lavish funding to develop the 
province. 
Centralising policies 
The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was in control of Punjab and Sindh, 
but had very little support in either NWFP or Baluchistan.28 
Following the 1970-71 elections, the National Awami Party (NAP) and 
the Jamiat-ul-Islam (JUI), formed a democratically elected 
27For details on the proposed Baluchistan States Union see Mir Ahmed Yar Khan 
Baluch, op. cit., pp. 198-202. 
28Jn the general elections of 1970, the PPP had won only one seat in the national 
assembly from NWFP, where it polled less than 15 percent of the popular vote and 
none at all from Baluchistan where its share of votes was a mere two percent. It has 
also performed poorly in the provincial assemblies, having captured only four out of 
40 seats in the NWFP and none of the twenty seats in Baluchistan. 
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government in Baluchistan after winning 11 out of 20 provincial 
assembly seats in the province. Bhutto wanted to appoint one of his 
supporters, Ghaus Baksh Raisani, as the governor of Baluchistan. But 
coming under immense pressure from the NAP and the JUI, a 
tripartite agreement was signed between the three parties (NAP, JUI 
and PPP) on 6 March 1972.29 It was agreed that the NAP and the JUI 
would form their own governments in the two provinces and 
consequently, Mir Baksh Bizenjo and Arb ab. Sikandar became the 
governors Baluchistan and NWFP respectively. 
The White Paper on Baluchistan ruled that the appointment of the 
Governors of Baluchistan and NWFP on the recommendation NAP, 
which was not the ruling party in the federal government (it had won 
6 out of 139 seats in the national assembly), was the first instance of its 
kind in a parliamentary democracy. The paper asserted that this 
departure from convention was made possible by the Pakistan 
People's Party (PPP) in the interests of consolidating national unity.30 
It was clear that the appointments were conceded more as a favour 
than as a matter of right to the Baluchistan government. 
It was thus not surprising when, soon after the formation of the 
government, disagreements between the centre and the provincial 
government arose on a number of issues. The federal government 
alleged that the NAP witheld cooperation from the centre and their 
leaders indulged in agitational activity on several fronts. These 
included restrictions on the activities of the federal Pakistan Coast 
29for details on the Tripartite agreement see Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (New 
Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), pp. 10-14. 
30White Paper on Baluchistan (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, October 1974), 
p. 11. For the distribution of seats in the 1970 elections see White Paper on 
Baluchistan, p. 14 . 
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Guards to some select areas of Baluchistan for which they had to seek 
permission from the provincial government in Las ·Bela; the 
increased smuggling of arms, food grains and livestock across the 
border (also blamed on the provincial government); attacks on the 
new settlers in the Pat Feeder area; and the ouster of the Baluchistan 
Reserve Force from the province.31 Bhutto began to fear the rising 
popularity of the NAP in the province which could undermine his 
authority. 
The NAP-JUI coalition had ruled for less than a year when it was 
dismissed by Z.A. Bhutto in February 1973 on grounds of lawlessness 
and failure to comply with central government directives. Governor 
Bizenjo and Chief Minister Ataullah Mengal were removed and 
replaced by Nawab Akbar Bugti and Jam Ghulam Quadir respectively. 
The dismissal was precipitated by the discovery of arms in the Iraqi 
embassy in Islamabad. It was believed that they were to be used by the 
NAP in an insurrection. In early April 1973, less than six weeks after 
the ouster of the provincial government, Baluch guerrillas began to 
ambush army convoys. 
To the Baluch, the dismissal of their elected government and the 
arrest of their leaders was reason enough to launch another war 
against the state. The federal government responded by arresting 
Bizenjo, Mengal and Marri and stationing the army in the province.32 
The army was brought in to quell the disturbances and restore 
normalcy in the province. The government also sought to create an 
infrastructure which would break the resistance of the tribal sardars; 
31 For details see White Paper on Baluchistan, pp. 15-19. 
32For details see Dawn (Karachi), 21 July 1976. 
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road building was undertaken on a large scale to weaken the 
strongholds of the Baluch tribes. Determined to keep the army in the 
province, the government sought to justify its presence, stating that 
in the initial stages, the Army's operational activities were confined to 
intensive patrolling, picquetting, show of force and taking retaliatory actions 
against hostiles who fired at its posts and pickets ...... the army's presence in the 
Jhalawan area, and its demonstrated capability of reaching inaccessible hide 
outs .... contributed substantially towards the restoration of law and order and 
instilling confidence among the law abiding tribesmen.33 
The situation, however, showed little sign of improvement. By July 
1974, the Baluch guerrillas had blocked the main roads linking 
Baluchistan with surrounding provinces, disrupted rail links, and had 
even begun to obstruct oil drilling and survey operations. For the next 
two years, Baluchistan was a battlefield, where a sophisticated army 
was 'pitched against a guerrilla force. As the tension and hostilities 
increased, the army launched Operation Chamalang on 3 September 
1974. This dealt a heavy blow to the Baluchi guerrillas. Some 15,000 
Marris were cornered; these included families who had gone to the 
valley to graze their cattle as well as the Pararis or guerrillas who 
fought against the federal forces.34 According to Selig Harrison, "the 
Pararis were never able to regain their military initiative in the three 
ensuing years of savage but increasingly uncoordinated fighting."35 
The White Paper maintained that the operation in the province was a 
conciliatory campaign designed to make Baluchistan an equal partner 
in Pakistan's national enterprise.36 The government would still not 
33White Paper on Baluchistan, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 
34The state had at its disposal F-86, Mirage fighter planes and Huey Cobras. 
35 Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, Soviet Temptations and the Emergence 
of Baluch Nationalism (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1981), pp. 38-39. 
36White Paper on Baluchistan, op. cit., p. 44. 
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acknowledge the gravity of the situation, and when 5,000 Marri tribal 
leaders surrendered to the army, it declared on 15 October 1974 that 
organised resistance to legal authority in Baluchistan which more 
precisely meant insurgency against the state had come to an end."37 
However, the civil war continued and there was little sign of 
abatement, much less a return to peace in the province. 
The guerrillas derived their strength from two major organisations 
that had sprung up to advance the Baluch cause. These provided both 
material and moral support to the warring tribes. The Baluch Peoples 
Liberation Front (BPLF) was based on a mix of Baluch nationalist 
sentiments and Marxist thought. Led by Mir Hazar Ramkhani, it 
attracted several intellectuals of non-Baluch origin from affluent 
backgrounds and stood for the liberation of all the oppressed 
minorities in Pakistan. The Baluch Students Organisation (BSO), was 
started in 1967 to fight against the one-unit scheme; it grew rapidly 
and boasted more than 25,000 Baluch members between 1967 and 1981. 
It served as an important source of guerrilla recruits during the 
insurgency. 38 
The government's strategy of countering Baluch resistance with the 
use of force did not help to control the situation. Disorder and 
violence continued to paralyse the provincial administration, with 
frequent dismissals of govemment.39 Baluchistan was placed directly 
under federal rule. Though after six months, on 30 June 1976, the 
37White Paper on Baluchistan, op. cit., p. 28. 
3Bfor details on the structure of the organisations see Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's 
Shadow, op. cit., pp. 72-87. 
39for example, in May 1974 Governor Akbar Bugti was replaced with Ahmed Yar 
Khan and in December 1975 Chief Minister Jaam Quadir's government was dismissed 
amidst reports of rifts between him and the governor, and accusations of failure of the 
provincial government to utilise funds allotted to it by the federal government. 
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president's rule reverted to governor's rule, this still fell short of the 
requirements of provincial autonomy as laid down in the 
constitution. Political activities were suspended. This was followed by 
a ban on the NAP; ninety members of the party stood accused of 
treason and fifty arrested in what came to be knoWn as the Hyderabad 
Conspiracy Case. 
Bhutto's .policies of forcing the Baluch into abject submission through 
the use of force had clearly made the problem worse. His modus 
operandi of choosing and dismissing governors and replacing them 
with people whose credentials were equally suspect reflected little 
more than his personal quest for power. The White Paper brought out 
by Zia accused Bhutto of nepotism and electoral malpractice.40 It was 
alleged that the government had offered the release of the Baluch 
triumvirate, Bizenjo, Chief Minister Mengal, and Khair Bux Marri, 
who were arrested in August 1973, in exchange for a political 
settlement. The prime minister had supposedly held out an assurance 
that NAP leader Sardar Khair Baksh Marri would be released if he 
promised to give up his policy of opposing development work in the 
Marri areas.41 Bhutto was flouting all democratic norms in his 
reluctance to hand power to the Baluch leaders. 
Developmental strategies of Bhutto 
The centralising tendencies of the Bhutto government, described 
above, were accompanied by some measure of appeasement in the 
40White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime,Vol. 3, Annex 1 (Islamabad: 
Government of Pakistan, 1979), pp. Al-A2. 
41 Islamic Republic of Pakistan An Amnesty International Report Including the 
Findings of a Mission to Pakistan 23 April-12 May 1976 (London: Amnesty 
International Publications, 1977), p. 41. 
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form of developmental activity on a scale almost unprecedented in 
the history of Pakistan. These were the carrots that Bhutto offered to 
the Baluch. During the first three five-year plans, development 
outlays to the province were a mere Rs 25 million,42 with 
government investment never exceeding Rs 30 million in any year 
during the entire decade preceding 1970.43 
Under Bhutto, economic aid accelerated dramatically in the 1970s. 
The late prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, increased the budgetary 
allocation to the province. The government believed that lack of 
physical infrastructure, such as water, power and roads, was the 
principal obstacle to development and that little progress could be 
achieved in agriculture and industry unless appropriate utilities were 
available. Vast amounts of money were invested in building roads; 
opening schools, colleges and technical institutions; extending credit 
and banking facilities; electrification; harnessing groundwater 
resources; and installing tubewells for irrigation. Plans were drawn up 
for industrial development to process ferro chrome, rice, paper, and 
cement.44 
The White Paper brought out by Bhutto clearly stated: 
The increased allocation of federal funds to Baluchistan is indicative not only 
of the federal governments' concern for the province but of its anxiety to remove 
the disparity between Baluchistan and the other provinces as fast as national 
resources and Baluchistan's absorptive capacity will pennit.45 
42The Sixth Five Year Plan, 1983-88, p. 187. Cited in Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and 
Authoritarianism, op. cit., p. 191. 
43The exchange rate on 11 February 1999 was Rs. 51.29 to a US dollar. 
44For details see, White Paper on Baluchistan, op. cit., pp. 30-38. 
45Ibid., op. cit., p. 33. 
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During the Bhutto period (1971-77), federal funds for Baluchistan rose 
from Rs. 120 million in 1972-73, to Rs. 210 million in 1974. In addition 
expenditure through federal agencies was Rs. 150 million annually.46 
As compared to the federal expenditures, the revenues of the 
province amounted to only ·Rs. 88 million, which increased by 
another Rs. 138 million in 1974-75 as a result of the central 
government transffering the funds collected through royalties and 
excise duties on Sui gas to the province.47 
The National Finance Commission recommended a share of 3.9 
percent of national tax allocations for Baluchistan as compared to 57.9 
percent for Punjab,16.6 percent for NWFP and 21.6 percent for Sindh 
on the basis of their population figures. But in addition to this, 
another $ 5 million were paid to Baluchi~tan by the federal 
government as subvention on account of its underdeveloped state in 
1975-76; followed by another $19 million in the subsequent year in 
subventions over and above its population entitlement, as well as 
picking up a provincial budgetary deficit of$ 11.9 million.48 
The Bhutto regime also pursued vigorous development policies in 
Baluchistan with a view to creating a modern infrastucture, 
improving the means of communication, and helping in the spread 
o_f education, development of health facilities, etc. For example, in 
1949 there were only 186 primary schools, 23 secondary schools, and 60 
adult education centres in the entire province, serving only 18, 500 
students. By 1978, there were 2,848 educational institutions of all types 
46White Paper on Baluchistan, op. cit., p. 33. 
47Khalid B. Sayed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 134. 
48selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 169. 
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in Baluchistan, with 1.6 million students. These included 2,372 
primary schools, 426 secondary schools, 19 junior colleges, 9 colleges, 5 
technical colleges, and Baluchistan University.49 Similarly, in the 
health sector hospitals like Sandeman Provincial Hospital (Quetta), 
Fatima Jinnah Sanatorium( Quetta) and Civil Hospital (Turbat) were 
expanded and upgraded. 
Besides this, massive programmes for village electrification; 
development of water resources through installation of tube wells, 
irrigation facilities were also launched to improve the socio-economic 
conditions in the province.so New roads such as the Shahrah-i-
Maiwand linking Sibi with Maiwand; RCD highway connecting 
Karachi and Quetta were constructed to open up the province and 
link it with Punjab, Sindh and NWFP. 
In addition to putting large amounts of money into the province, the 
Bhutto government undertook many relief operations to resettle 
Marri families who had given up arms and had come down from the 
mountains. In 1974, nearly Rs 50,000 were being set aside to enable 
Marri tribesmen to lead a settled life. They were provided with 
fertilisers, tractors and bulldozers to help carry out regular farming.51 
On the social front, the government carried out a major reform by 
abolishing the sardari system in April 1976. This provided a much-
needed shot in the arm for the government as it sought to curtail the 
power of the sardars in the province and also contain the tribes, who 
were still hiding in the mountains in support of their sardars. Firm in 
49selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 167. 
50White Paper on Baluchistan, op. cit., pp. 33-36 .. 
51 Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), 17 October 1974. 
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its mission to modernise the province, the. White Paper on 
Baluchistan stated: 
There is no escaping the compulsions of modernity. As the tribal mould begins to 
break, the people's mental horizons broaden and mass communications become a 
need. The Government is responsive to this basic requirement for ending 
Baluchistan's insularity.S2 
The Baluch, however, thought otherwise. Leaders like Khair Bux 
Marri felt that the government wanted to modernise the Baluch, but 
in their own way. Most of the roads built in Baluchistan, he declared, 
were 
not for our benefit but to make·it easier for the military to control us and for the 
Punjabis to rob us. The issue is not whether to develop, but whether to develop 
with or without autonomy.S3 
But despite such contradictory assertions the authors of the document 
defended their actions on the basis that 
the path of least resistance is not open to a government which has accepted the 
obligation of fighting primitivism and poverty and disease. Whatever the 
strain, the Government of Pakistan could not but actively collaborate in 
Baluchistan's efforts and respond to Baluchistan's need, to end its 
backwardness.S4 
Causes of federal intervention 
The official line taken by the Pakistan government was that federal 
intervention was necessary to stimulate socio-economic advancement 
and create better conditions for the functioning of representative 
institutions in Baluchistan.SS 
S2White Paper on Baluchistan, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
S3Jnterview with Khair Bux Marri. Cited in Selig Harrison, op. cit., p. 47. 
S4 White Paper on Baluchistan , op. cit., p. 39. 
SSoawn (Karachi), 4 January 1976. 
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On closer examination this seems a little far-fetched. In the normal 
course of events, the suspension of democratic rights is considered an 
extreme step, taken when the administrative machinery breaks down, 
or a ruling party or coalition loses its majority. If indeed the purpose 
of federal intervention was to alleviate economic conditions, then a 
similar operation should have been carried out in the NWFP, whose 
per capita income in 1969-70 was even lower than that of Baluchistan 
(Rs. 254 as against Rs. 355 in Baluchistan). Moreover, given 
Baluchistan's history, the gap between Baluchistan and the other 
provinces was so wide that it would have taken at least a few decades 
for it to come up to the level of other provinces. Intervention by the 
federal government would at best only bring about an improvement. 
Further, the process of development would have to involve the 
people of Baluchistan and their representatives. The fear of 
exploitation was deeply embedded in the Baluch minds. While the 
Bhutto government spent a lot of money to improve the socio-
economic conditions of the Baluch, not much was done to increase 
their participation in the political process. (See Chapter 3). 
It is clear that notwithstanding the developmental programmes and 
infusion of resources into the province, Bhutto's centralising policies 
and reluctance to share power with the NAP led to the civil war in 
Baluchistan. He became absorbed in the relentless pursuit of power 
and used coercive measures to the extreme. .The expenditure on 
federal security force increased by 296 percent, from Rs. 36.4 million 
during 1973-74 to Rs. 107.7 million for 1976-77; and expenditure on 
civil armed forces rose from Rs. 192.5 million during 1974-75 to Rs. 
388.2 million for 1976-7756. Once the insurgency acquired graver 
56Khalid B. Sayed, Politics in Pakistan, op. cit., p. 107-8. 
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proportions the federal government found it difficult to extricate itself 
from the prevailing situation in the province. 
Baluchistan under Zia 
The carrot and stick policy of Bhutto continued under General Zia ul 
Haq, though the carrot was used more than the stick. Zia realised quite 
early on that the Baluch question needed to be handled with a greater 
deal of care and sensitivity, so as to not provoke another war in the 
province. Zia worked on the Baluch with calculated ease and even 
ordered the army units to maintain a low profile. He viewed Bhutto's 
policies as needlessly provocative and was careful to avoid hurting 
Baluch pride. 
One of the first gestures Zia made towards the Baluch was to release 
6,000 of their prisoners who were said to have been tortured in the 
Kohlu and Loralai prisons. Mengal, Bizenjo and Marri were released 
from prison in 1977. The following year General Zia disbanded the 
Hyderabad tribunal; this was regarded by an office bearer of the 
defunct NAP as the "elimination of one of the wrong doings of 
Bhuttoism in Baluchistan."57 In addition, a general amnesty was 
declared for Baluchistan on 1 January 1978 for all those who left their 
homes during the insurrection.SB According to one report, Rs. 5 
million was sanctioned for the rehabilitation of those affected in the 
1973-77 insurgency. 59 
57oawn, 2 January 1978. 
58 Public Opinion Trends and Analyses (POD, Pakistan series, Vol. 6, part 15, 21 
January 1978, p. 225. 
59phadnis, op. cit., p. 189. 
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However, talks between the Baluch leaders and General Zia were 
discontinued in 1978 when the triumvirate protested against the 
appointment of Punjabi bureaucrats to serve in Baluchistan. The 
Baluch leaders insisted on the replacement of Raja Ahmed Khan, the 
chief secretary in the Baluchistan state government, who was a 
Punjabi, but Zia refused to heed their request. He tried to reach a 
compromise by bringing in Lt. Gen. Rahimuddin Khan, a non-
Punjabi military intellectual, as provincial governor in place of his 
Punjabi predecessor, Lt. Gen. Ghulam Mohammad, but this did not 
win over the Baluch.60 
In 1979, Ataullah Mengal went on record to say that Zia's regime had 
failed to deliver what it set out to. He claimed that those members of 
the Marri tribe who had returned following the amnesty were arrested 
and kept in interrogation camps; arrest warrants and cases were still 
not withdrawn; and the militia was still patrolling the area.61 It was 
clear that if the Zia regime had been generous in allocating funds for 
the development of the province, it appeared to have been equally 
firm in using coercion as and when it was needed. The decision of the 
military regime to hang Abdul Hamid Baluch for attempting to 
murder a recruiting officer for the Sultan of Oman created bitterness 
amongst the Baluch, especially since the Baluchistan High Court had 
already ruled that Hamid Baluch was not responsible for the alleged 
killing.62 
60selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 153. 
61Dawn, 2 July 1979. 
62Lawrence Lifshultz, "Pakistan: A Fundamental Debate," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Vol. 111, 13 March 1981, pp. 21-22. 
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On substantive issues of autonomy, the military dictatorship of Zia 
was as unresponsive as the democratie government of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto. According to Zia, while Baluchistan was important, the 
Baluch problem was greatly exaggerated by foreign observers.63 
Expressing little or no sympathy for the concept of a multinational 
Pakistan, he did not want to make any amendments to the 1973 
constitution, which gave the centre enormous powers to intervene 
and dismiss an elected state legislature. This suited Zia's game plan 
and the circumstances that brought him to power: Zia seized power 
from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 5 July 1977 but did not have the mandate 
of the people to rule the country. Despite promises of elections, he 
postponed them indefinitely, placed a ban on political activities, and 
limited the freedom of the press. 
, 
General Zia's martial law regime made it difficult for political parties 
to operate. With Bhutto's removal and Zia's apparently conciliatory 
policies, the Baluch movement came under stress from intra-group 
and inter-group cleavages, and a clash of various personalities, 
ideologies, strategies and goals. The differences among the Pushtun 
and Baluch leaders also became more apparent, with the Baluch 
seeing the Pushtun leadership as more accommodative towards the 
centre. This led to a split in the party, and the formation of a separate 
party, the Pakistan National Party (PNP), successor of the disbanded 
NAP.64 The new party was led by Bizenjo, who espoused greater 
63Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 150. 
64The breakup within the ranks of the NAP occurred between the NAP Baluch 
leaders and their counterparts in the NWFP during the 1973-77 insurgency. Bizenjo, 
the leader of the Baluch NAP, was propagating the idea of "separate nationalities": 
he argued that each of the minorities constituted a separate nationality whereas 
Wall Khan, leader of the Pushtuns, wanted a more moderate approach. Amidst these 
differences, the NAP split and its Baluch wing constituted the National Democratic 
Party. 
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provincial autonomy within an overall Pakistani framework. 
However, within six months of its formation it was outlawed. Most 
Baluch leaders belonging to the PNP were forced to remain silent or 
operate from underground. 
The BPLF which, by 1980, had started talking about "Greater 
Baluchistan," including all Baluch in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
received a severe setback due to unsettled conditions in Afghanistan, 
which had provided sanctuary to a number of guerrillas. Its leadership 
had also begun to falter by 1981, amidst differences between those who 
favoured an Independent Baluchistan, like Khair Bux Marri and Mir 
Hazar, the leader of the front during the insurgency, and its non-
Baluch members, who favoured a nationalist struggle for the whole of 
Pakistan. Many leaders of the Baluch Students Organisation were 
rounded up and arrested while Marri and Mengal went into political 
exile in Europe in 1979 and started seeking support for an 
independent Baluchistan from outside. 
General Zia by this time had also begun to patronise other leaders 
from among the Baluch and Pushtuns, with whom he could establish 
a better working relationship. An example of this was Doda Khan 
Zarakzai, a member of the Muslim League who had co-operated with 
successive federal governments and commanded as much support as 
Mengal in the tribal community. Zia also cultivated such influential 
Pushtuns, as the landowning Jogezai family to counter the influence 
of sardars opposed to his policies. 65 Others influential tribal leaders 
such as Prince Moinuddin Baluch (younger brother of the Khan of 
Kalat) and Zafrullah Khan Jamali served at the cabinet level. Many 
6Sselig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit, p. 153. 
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such as Mir Nabi Baksh Zehri, the marble king and other mining 
entrpreneurs belonging to the J amali and Raisani tribes extended 
support to the centre in lieu of rich economic dividends.66 By 1980, 
most members of the Mengal and Bizenjo tribes had returned to their 
homes and the Zia government had withdrawn most of the cases 
against the tribesmen. 
With regard to economic development, Zia pursued vigorous 
development policies towards the province. According to General Zia, 
economic underdevelopment was the crux of the entire political issue 
and with development, 80 percent of the problem would be solved. 67 
By 1978-79, special subventions to the province amounted to $ 24.8 
million and the annual budgetary deficit covered by Islamabad was in 
the range of $28.2 million.68 
Like his predecessors, General Zia accorded the highest priority to 
building infrastructure, especially roads, telephones, electricity, and to 
means of communication. Under the Special Developmental plan, 
(1982-88) Rs. 20 billion was set aside for education, industrialisation, 
communication and rural development projects.69 
Besides the Annual. Development Programme financed by the federal 
government, a special plan was prepared by the provincial 
government at a cost of Rs. 19,39,320 million with a foreign exchange 
component of Rs. 4,657 million which was provided by friendly 
countries and international financial institutions. The Kuwait fund, 
66Urmila Phadnis, op. cit., p. 189. 
67Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements in Pakistan, Domestic and International 
Factors (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988), p. 179. 
6Bselig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit, p. 169. 
69fuid., p. 179. 
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for example, made a commitment to provide electricity to villages; 
and small irrigation schemes and water supply to Quetta and 
Gadani.70 Flourite, stone and glass industries were set up in Kalat, 
Sirl<i and Quetta respectively in 1978 under General Zia.71 
Within three years of General Zia's corning to power, 265 villages had 
been electrified in Baluchistan. Important roads built during Zia's 
time included the the Loralai-Dera Ghazi Khan Road and the 160-mile 
Orrnara-Liara Road providing the shortest route between Karachi and 
the coastal towns of Baluchistan.72 
From 1977 to 1984/85, a record Rs. 4,000 million had been injected into 
Baluchistan. Among the major projects completed in this time were 
the extension of Sui gas to Quetta; completion of the RCD highway; 
the New Quetta airport, airstrips at Pasni and Turbat, a TV complex in 
Quetta, radio stations at Khuzdar and Turbat, and the completion of 
the Bolan Medical College.73 
While the Baluch complained of the lack of development in their 
province and the exploitative nature of Islamabad, the federal 
government believed that the Baluch, who constituted a mere 4 
percent of the population, were already receiving funds out of 
proportion to their population. 
70poy (Pakistan series), Vol. 9, part 191, 22 September 1981, p. 2207. 
71pQT (Pakistan series), Vol. 6, part 23, 30 January 1978, p. 319. 
72poy (Pakistan series), Vol. 13, part 244, 15 November 1985, p. 2021. 
73pQT (Pakistan series), Vol. 7, part 232, 7 December 1984, pp. 3752- 53. 
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According to Selig Harrison, 
In the eyes of Pakistani and Iranian leaders, Baluch demands for regional 
autonomy constitute, at best, a thinly disguised form of blackmail designed to 
extort a disproportionate share of the benefits of economic progress or, at worst, 
1 
a prelude to eventual secession.74 
With large flows of money into the province, the lack of any visible 
improvement was attributed not to lack of effort on the part of the 
federal government but to massive misappropriation of funds at the 
provincial level.75 According to one report, the Baluchistan 
government was receiving more than Rs 700 million annually as 
development expenditure in 1979 but funds were not managed in a 
judicious manner. Revenue in the. form of grant-in-aid from the 
federal government rose from Rs 12. 6 million in 1971-72 to Rs 717. 2 
million in 1978-79.76 
The process of accommodation was slow but the federal government 
achieved its goal of quelling the Baluch rebellion. Some tribal chiefs 
maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the Zia regime: overtly, 
they opposed his rule, but in practice, they availed themselves of the 
opportunities offered by the co-optive policies of the regime. With the 
passage of time, the leaders ·were bought or mollified by the 
government, rendering the Baluch cause a non-issue by the early 
1980s. They accepted the compensatory money offered by Zia for the 
losses suffered by the tribes during the military action under Bhutto 
and also accepted the amnesty offered by Zia to the tribesmen and 
their families returning from Afghanistan. 
74Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p.149. 
75Interview with Mubashir Hassan, Minister of Finance, Planning and Development 
in the Bhutto government from 1971 to 1974, New Delhi, 4 September 1996. 
76 Government of Pakistan 10 years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1972-82 (Karachi: 
Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1983), p. 254. 
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According to Selig Harrison, "when there is repression everyone 
rallies together to fight against it; but when there is no repression one 
becomes more vulnerable to blandishments offered to divide and 
rule."77 Moreover, it was much easier to co-opt the Baluch because of 
their small numbers, modest levels of socio-economic development, 
and fractured leadership.78 Given the low-levels of mobilisation, 
participation was restricted to certain tribes, robbing the movement of 
its popular character. 
According to Hasan Askari Rizvi, 
Once the phase of idealism was over, the movement could never regain its 
strength. Disillusionment with external powers such as the Soviet Union made 
the leaders realise that the option of independence was not viable. The 
emphasis shifted more towards Baluch rights and less towards a Baluch 
state.79 
To conclude, it may be said that the strategies of the state which were a 
mix of coercion and economic concessions, were an important factor 
in determining the course of the Baluch movement. The reluctance of 
the Baluch to shed their tribal inhibitions and adapt to the growing 
pressures of modern day living, their extremely small numbers -
which limited their political, social and economic participation in the 
feder~l structure - and the absence of a coherent and well-organised 
political leadership and middle class also contributed to the decline of 
the movement. But their significance lies in the fact that they 
771nterview with Selig Harrison, Research analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Washington DC, on 27th May 1996. 
78Ifthikar Malik, a noted scholar, puts the theory of a "trans elites regional 
alliance" to explain the co-optation of some Baluch by the centre. He opined that this 
class was self-perpetuating and hence leaders like Mengal, Bizenjo and Marri were 
easily cajoled. Interview with Iftikar Malik at Oxford, 3 July 1996. 
791nterview with Hasan Askari Rizvi, South Asia Institute, Columbia University, 
New York, 31 May 1996. 
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in the fact that they simplified the task of the federal agencies in 
overcoming the Baluch resistance. 
The Indian state and the sikhs 
The Khalistan movement was a result of many factors, but what 
precipitated the conflict were political issues, more specifically the 
struggle between the Congress party and the. Akalis to capture power 
in Punjab.BO This section deals with the strategies of the federal 
governments in dealing with the Punjab crisis. However, in order to 
do so it is necessary to examine the nature of inter-party conflict in 
Punjab. More specifically it will look at the Akali Dal, the regional 
par.ty representing the interests of the Sikhs, and the Congress Party 
both at the state and the national level. The main political demands of 
the Sikhs have revolved around Chandigarh, the disputed capital of 
Punjab and Haryana, and the distribition of river waters. The delay in 
granting concessions on these issues, has been one of the major factors 
facilitating the rise of Sikh religious leaders like Bhindranwale. 
Party politics in Punjab 
The Akali Dal and the Congress have been the two major political 
forces in Punjab and have alternately shared power in the state. The 
dilemma for the Akali party has been that despite being a strong 
80This view has been shared by a number of scholars. Paul Brass treats the changing 
political conditions as the causal factor but concedes that changes in the socio-
economic context provided additional stimulas and a recruiting basis for terrorist 
violence anong the Sikh youth in Punjab. See Paul Brass, 'The Punjab Crisis and the 
Unity of India," in Atul Kohli (ed.), India's Democracy, An Analysis of Changing 
State Society Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 169-213. Also 
see Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent, India's Growing Crisis of Governability 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 353. 
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advocate of the Sikh culture and religion, it has never enjoyed the full 
support of the Sikhs. Its narrow support base comprises the Jat Sikhs 
and segments of the urban Sikh population. Its rival, the Congress 
party, has been more effective in state politics, relying on Hindus, 
scheduled castes, and segments of the non-scheduled caste rural Sikh 
population.Bl 
The Akali party has never been able to form a government on its 
own. Between 1967 and 1972, and again from 1977 to 1980, several 
Akali-Jan Sangh coalition governments were formed in Punjab but 
they did not offer a stable alternative to the Congress.82 In the 1972 
state elections, the Akalis could secure only 27.6 percent of the vote 
compared to Congress's 42.8 percent. The party was beset with 
problems and remained splintered right through the 1980s. The lack 
of a leader who could command respect from the Akalis and the Sikh 
masses alike weakened the movement considerably and prompted 
some of its leaders to join hands with the militants. Other veteran 
leaders like Prakash Singh Badal adopted a stronger anti-centre 
posture. 
Consequently the Akali Dal split into many factions and squandered 
the advantage of being a unified voice for the Sikh community. A 
Blan the average percentage of votes polled for different parties in the six Punjab 
legislative assembly elections between 1967 and 1985, the Congress led with 39.4 
percent; the Akali Dal (Sant Longowal) had 29 percent, the Jan 
Sangh/Janata/Bhartiya Janata party (BJP), 8.4 percent, the Communist Party of 
India (CPI), 5.7 percent, the Communist Party (Marxist) (CPM), 3.3 percent, other 
parties, 3.6 percent, and independents, 10.8 percent. See Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and 
Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), Table 6. 
2, p. 226. 
82In 1967, it formed a government with all parties except the Congress, which had 48 
out of 104 seats. The Congress manipulation of dissident Akali factions resulted in the 
fall of the Gumam Singh ministry within eight months. Another Akali coalition 
government with the Jan Sangh lasted from February 1969 to March 1971 but fell when 
controversy over Punjab's official lar,guage resulted in an Akali-Jan Sangh split. 
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three-way split developed betwen Tohra, who became the SGPC chief, 
Jagdev Singh Talwandi, who became president of the Akali Dal, and 
Prakash Singh Badal, who assumed charge of the ministerial wing. In 
1980, the Badal group joined hands with Tohra to support the 
moderate leader, Harchand Singh Longowal, to remove Talwandi ·as 
the leader of the Akali party. Talwandi proceeded to form his own 
rival Akali party. 
At the same time, attempts by the Congres government at the centre 
to undercut the Akali Dal weakened its position further. It is widely 
believed that Bhindranwale was a creation of Giani Zail Singh, former 
president of India and trusted aide of Mrs Gandhi, who propped him 
up as an altem11tive to the Akali party. In fact, according to Atul Kohli, 
The repeated failure of the Akalis to wrest power from Congress had left open a 
political space for those who argued that increased militancy was the only 
means for protecting Sikh interests. Bhindrawale stepped into that space. 83 
The emergence of the Dal Khalsa, one of several militant 
organisations started under Zail Singh's patronage, signalled the rise 
of extremist politics in the state.84 In fact, in the 1978-79 SGPC 
elections, the Congress government supported the extremists, 
including Bhindranwale's nominees. 85 
Mrs Gandhi's unprecedented centralisation of power and 
authoritarian style, marked an entirely different relationship between 
the centre and the states. The imposition of president's rule in Punjab 
83 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent, op. cit., p. 361. 
84 Fact admitted by S.S. Bamala, former chief minister of Punjab and leader of the 
Akali Dal, in an interview with the author in New Delhi on 30 May 1998. 
85Rajni Kothari and Girl Deshingkar, "Punjab: The Long View" in Abida Samaiuddin 
(ed.), The Punjab Crisis (Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1985), pp. 622-26. 
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in 1980 started a process of progressive disenfranchisement of the 
mainstream of the population. President's rule was imposed to topple 
state governments unfavourable to the policies of the central 
government. This effectively deprived the moderate Akali leaders of a 
political voice in Punjab. 
It was thus not surprising that the Akalis, whose main ideology 
stemmed from being the true representatives of the Sikh community, 
came under immense pressure from Bhindranwale, who, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3, began to ·attract the Sikh masses with his 
extreme rhetoric on Sikhism. Political machinations thus commenced 
in which both the Akali party and the Congress started giving their 
tacit support to Bhindranwale for fear of a Sikh backlash. 
The moderate Akali wing was concerned about losing out to 
Bhindrawale or other militant leaders. On 31 July 1981, the Akalis 
took out a large jatha (procession) at Amritsar to project themselves 
as the only ones fighting for the Sikh cause. They made emotional 
demands, such as renaming the express train to Amritsar "the Golden 
Temple Express"; banning the sale of tobacco, liquor and meat in the 
vicinity of the Golden Temple, and bestowing the status of "holy city" 
on Amritsar. 
Both the Congress and the Akalis were confused on how to handle 
Bhindranwale. Action against him could endanger the Sikh votes, 
and yet no action could alienate the Hindus. Such equivocation was 
reflected on a number of occasions, such as Bhindranwale's arrest on 
20 September 1981 for the alleged murder of Lala Jagat Narain, editor 
of the local newspaper, Punjab Kesari, and his unconditional release 
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the following month; the relocation of his headquarters from Chowk 
Mehta near Amritsar to Nanak Niwas right in the Golden Temple 
complex (which also housed the headquarters of Longowal, president 
of the Akali Dal, and the SGPC chief, Gurcharan Singh Tohra); and 
the murder of the DIG Punjab Police, A.S. Atwal in April 1983. It also 
gave terrorism a much needed stimulas. 
The Anandpur Sahib Resolution 
The Akali demands, initially quite straightforward, developed 
communal overtones when the Congress government at the centre 
ethnicised the issue and raised the bogey of Sikh separatism to alarm 
Hindu voters. Concerned with their declining popularity, lack of 
solidarity in the rank and file of the party, and the machinations of 
the Congress to oust them from power, the Akali brought out the 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1978.86 It addressed the economic 
concerns of the Punjab along with the religious and ethnic demands 
of the Sikhs. 
The resolution was actually not secessionist in content; but it 
demanded more autonomy for Punjab and protection of the cultural 
and religious rights of the Sikhs. At least three versions exist, each 
associated with particular factions of the Akali Dal. The Talwandi 
version, for example, is more extremist in that it asserts that the Sikhs 
are a historically recognised nation oppressed by the majority of 
India.87 The resolution forms the basis of the Akali Dal's socio-
86 For the full text of the Anand Pur Sahib Resolution see Gurmit Singh, History of 
Sikh Struggles Vol. 2, Appendix 22, (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1991), pp. 258-
67. 
87Maya Chadda, Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), p. 127. 
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economic agenda. All the demands were directed at the central 
government. 
According to Jugdeep S. Chima, 
the mobilisation of large segments of society by the Akali Dal, the political 
frustration of Akali elites and the religious symbolism of Bhindrawale was 
channelled toward the central government, whose political and economic 
centralising tendencies and highly interventionist policies were seen as 
primary sources of Punjab's political, economic and religious problems.88 
The economic demands included an increase in land ceilings for 
Sikhs in the Terai region of Uttar Pradesh; implementation of an 
economic program based on "dignity of labour"; "ameliorating the lot 
of the weaker sections ... and the urban poor" through employment 
and a restructured tax system; parity between the prices of agricultural 
produce and industrial raw materials; expansion of medium size 
industries leading to rapid industrialisation, and elimination of the 
"exploitation of the producers of cash crops ... at the hands of traders 
mostly Hindus." 
On the cultural front it asked for the regular recitation of Gurubani on 
. government broadcast facilities, the instruction of Sikhism in schools, 
and the enactment of the All India Gurudwara Act which was meant 
to transfer control of all Sikh Gurudwaras and their funds throughout 
India to the Akali Dal. The earlier act gave control only over the 
Gurudwaras in Punjab. 
The resolution also demanded that Punjab be given full jurisdiction 
over its administration and law and that the central state be restricted 
88See Jugdeep S. Chima, "The Punjab Crisis, Governmental Centralisation and Akali-
Center Relations," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, no. 10, October 1994, p. 861. 
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to the management of foreign policy, defence, currency, and general 
communications. But the two issues that were still not resolved, and 
which continue to dominate the political agenda of the Akalis, are the 
transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab in lieu of the two Hindi speaking 
villages of Abohar and Fazilka in Punjab and Haryana, and the 
distribution of river waters in the state. 
These acquired added significance in view of the fact that 
While up to the creation of the Punjabi suba the Akali leaders were united in 
their demand ... creation of the Punjabi suba and their lust for power created 
serious differences. In addition to capturing the SGPc89 and its resources the 
Akalis now had another and much bigger source of strength and weakness, that 
is capturing power in the new state.90 
The Chandigarh issue 
The Chandigarh issue has been a bone of contention between the 
federal government and the states of Punjab and Haryana. After a 
hunger strike by the veteran Akali leader, Sant Fateh Singh, in 
January 1970, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced the transfer of 
Chandigarh to Punjab. According to the award, the actual transfer was 
to take place in or before January 1975. But as events unfolded, it 
became clear that the government had other pressing compulsions. It 
was not willing to make any decision that would be perceived as going 
against Haryana, as this could result in a loss of Hindu votes (Haryana 
is a predominantly Hindu state) and harm the electoral prospects of 
the Congress government at the centre. The late prime minister, 
Indira Gandhi declared in parliament that Chandigarh would go to 
89Shrimoni Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) is a body which controls all 
the Gurudwaras (Sikh Temples) in India. 
90Mohinder Singh, The Akali Struggle: A Retrospect (New Delhi: Atlantic Publisher 
and Distributors, 1988), p. 166. 
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Punjab provided Haryana was suitably compensated and got its share 
of Hindi-speaking areas in Punjab.91 From then on, any demand 
raised by Punjab made Haryana privy to the negotiation process. This 
made the resolution of the Chandigarh issue even more complicated 
because Abohar and Fazilka are situated in the heartland of Punjab 
and giving them to Haryana entails the construction of a corridor 
between the two states. As a result Chandigarh still retains its union 
territory status and continues to be the joint capital of Punjab and 
Haryana. 
The River water dispute 
On the question of river waters, the Sikhs' long-held grievance 
against the federal government has been that the water from the three 
rivers, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej flow through Punjab but an elaborate 
canal system diverts water to irrigate drier areas of other states like 
Haryana and Rajasthan. In the wake of the Punjab Reorganisation Act 
of 1966, the central government announced that Punjab would get 
only 23 percent of the water from its rivers while the rest would go to 
Rajasthan and Haryana. The constitution of India retained the 
principle of provincial autonomy on the subject of river waters while 
giving the central government the power to advise and adjudicate 
through legally-constituted river boards and tribunals on disputes 
involving co-riparian states.92 This caused considerable resentment 
91 White Paper on the Punjab Agitation (New Delhi: Government of India, 1984), p. 
15. 
92Article 246 (3), enjoined with entry 17 of list 11 of state subjects confers on the state 
legislatures the power to legislate with respect to their "waters": irrigation, canals, 
drainage, embankments, water storage and water power. Article 262 empowers the 
Union Parliament to make laws to adjudicate disputes or complaints with respect to 
the use, distribution or control of inter-state rivers and river valleys. See Ram 
Narayan Kumar, "Constitutional Perspective," Seminar, 398, October 1992, p. 22. 
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among the Akalis, who felt that the centre had no authority to allocate 
water from the rivers of a state which flowed only within its own 
territories to non-riparian states, like Rajasthan and Haryana.93 
In 1981, on the initiative of the central government, a tripartite 
agreement was signed by the chief ministers of Punjab, Haryana and 
Rajasthan according to which the available surplus of the three states 
was upgraded from 15.0 MAF to 16. 32 MAF and redistributed among 
them.94 The White paper brought out by the federal government gave 
different statistics but agreed that since later water flow series showed 
the availability of Ravi-Beas surplus waters to be 17-.17 MAF (against 
the earlier estimated availability of 15.85 MAF) the additional quantity 
of water could be shared between Punjab and Haryana.95 
It also said that 
In the final allocation made between the two states under the 1981 agreement, 
the share of Punjab was raised to 4.22 MAF and the share of Haryana was 
retained at 3.50 MAF. In addition, out of Rajasthan's share, until such time as 
Rajasthan was in a position to utilise its full share, Punjab was allowed to use 
water which was surplus to Rajasthan's requirements.96 
The Akalis, however, were not satisfied with the outcome and found 
the increase in their water share from 23 to 24 percent rather 
insignificant. After a series of discussions the matter was referred to a 
tribunal and still awaits a decision. 
93fuid., p. 22. 
945. Paul Dhillon, "River Waters of Punjab: Claims and Counter Oaims," The Sikh 
Review, Vol. 39, no.l, February 1991, p. 4. 
95White Paper on The Punjab Agitation, op. cit., p. 11. 
96fuid., p. 11. 
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The federal government and the Akali leaders met several times in 
1982 but failed to arrive at solutions to the river water dispute or the 
Chandigarh question. The centre's attitude was prompted by several 
factors. According to one source, "Mrs Gandhi's admirers would have 
it that she and her helpers were up against slippery desperate 
men ... who could never be relied upon to hold firm to a set of 
demands or an agreement."97 Another version stated this was largely 
due to the 
duplicity of the central government, Mrs Gandhi's unwillingness to delegate 
authority and the constant attempts to manipulate Punjab events either to serve 
Congress (I) electoral interests or Mrs Gandhi's international reputation.98 
Elections were undoubtedly an important factor in the the breakdown 
of talks between the centre and the Akali party. In fact, Mrs Gandhi's 
narrow political concerns imposed restrictions on how much the 
centre could concede to the Akalis, as any concession granted could 
potentially anger voters or influence politicians in the states of 
Haryana or Jammu and Kashmir. The results of the 1982-83 state 
elections showed a decline in Congress fortunes. The party suffered 
huge losses in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Jammu and Kashmir 
and did not want to annoy the Hindu voters by giving in to the 
demands of the Sikhs. The Hindi belt contributes as much as 41 
percent of the seats to the national parliament. 
97Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic Conflict and the Test for 
Federalism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1994), p. 153. 
98fuid., p. 154. 
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Strategies of the government in dealing with the Punjab crisis 
The Indian government followed policies of both conciliation and 
force to stem the tide of terrorist violence in the state. The assault on 
the Golden Temple in 1984 dealt a devastating blow to the Sikh 
psyche, especially as the attack damaged the Golden Temple and the 
adjoining Akal Takht (traditional seat of temporal power).99 
A chain of events, including the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 
October 1984, and massive rioting in Delhi and other parts of North 
India, with the Sikhs clearly targeted as victimslOO, and the delay in 
bringing the guilty to trial did little to assuage wounded Sikh pride. A 
report brought out by two local human rights organisations alleged 
that 
far from being spontaneous expressions of madness and of popular grief and anger 
at Mrs Gandhi's assassination as made out by the authorities, the riots were 
the outcome of a well organised plan marked by acts of both deliberate 
commission and omission by im~ortant politicians of the Congress and by 
authorities in the administration. 01 
The Sikhs had begun to feel alienated from the rest of the country. 
Conciliatory strategies: The Rajeev Longowal accord 
Realising the errors of past actions, the Congress government under 
the new prime minister, Rajeev Gandhi (1984-89), began on a 
conciliatory note, though it was determined to pursue a hard-line 
99for details on Operation Blue Star, see Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar, Mrs 
Gandhi's Last Battle (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), pp. 141-91. 
100 According to official estimates, over 2,000 Sikhs were killed and some 10,000 
rendered homeless in Delhi and its suburbs. See Times Of India (New Delhi}, 21 
November 1985. 
lOl"People's Union for Democratic Rights and People's Union for Civil Liberties 
"Who are the Guilty?" Report of a Joint Enquiry into the Causes and Impact of the 
Riots in Delhi from 31 October to 10 November, 1984 (Delhi: 1984), p. 1. 
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policy towards the militants.102 Having gained a huge electoral 
victory, Rajiv Gandhi was willing to make political concessions in 
Punjab. He realised that a solution to the Sikh problem was not 
possible without a settlement with the Akalis. The Akalis also realised 
that continued radicalisation of Sikh politics would have disastrous 
consequences for the Sikh community in India. Moving away from 
communal politics, Sant Longowal, reinstated head of the Akali Dal 
in 1985, launched a peace. offensive in the state. He reiterated the 
importance of Hindu-Sikh amity, condemned acts of violence by Sikh 
extremists, and repeatedly declared that the Akali Dal was not in 
favour of I<halistan.103 
This accommodative spirit was reflected in the Rajiv-Longowal 
accord, signed between Rajiv Gandhi and the moderate Akali leader 
Sant Longowal in 1985.104 Among other issues, the accord agreed to 
the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and the establishment of a 
commission to determine the territory that would in turn be 
transferred from Punjab to Haryana; the river water disputes were to 
be referred to an independent tribunal whose decision would be 
binding on both parties; and the portion on centre-state relations in 
the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was to be referred to an independent 
commission which was to make recommendations to the central 
government. 
102Tue assault on the Golden Temple was recognised as a big mistake on the part of 
the central government even by the Congress leaders. A similar opinion was expressed 
in interviews with Harkrishan Singh Brar, chief minister of Punjab, on 2 November 
1996; and Harcharan Singh Hero, acting president of the Punjab Pradesh Congress 
Committee on 6 November 1996. 
103Yog Raj Sharma, State Autonomy and National Integration: Identity Crisis of the 
Sikhs (Jammu: Vinod Publishers and Distributors, 1992), p. 105. 
104 Ibid., p. 111. 
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Despite stiff resistance from some extremist Akali factions and leaders 
like the former chief minister, Prakash Singh Badal and the leader of 
the SGPC, G.S. Tohra, the accord constituted the first step towards 
restoring normalcy in the state. It also laid the basis for Akali victory 
in the coming elections.105 However, the fact that the demand for 
Chandigarh was still linked to Abohar and Fazilka, made the whole 
exercise futile. The accord could not be successfully implemented. The 
centre appointed three commissions to examine the issue but could 
not work a satisfactory solution to suit both Haryana and Punjab.106 
According to Hamish Telford, 
the Punjab crisis should have ended at this point, but the failure of Rajeev 
Gandhi's government to implement the accord undermiited the legitimacy of the 
Bamala ministry and directly contributed to the revival of the militant 
movement which was soon suffering from acute factionalism.107 
Within weeks of the accord, Longowal was killed by extremist 
elements who thought he had sold out to the government. The 
successor government of S.S. Bamala, which came to power in 1985, 
tried unsuccessfully to negotiate with the centre and the extremist 
factions, and was ultimately dismissed on 11May1987. 
Political Impasse and use of force 
The Bamala government stood discredited in the eyes of the people 
for its failure to extract any concessions from the central government 
105The Akali Dal secured an overwhelming victory and an absolute majority in the 
Punjab legislature for the first time in its history. In addition they also won 7 out of 19 
seats from Punjab. For details see S. Mustafa, "How the Akalis Fashioned Their 
Victory," The Telegraph 29 September, 1985, p. 21. 
106For details on why the negotiations on Chandigarh and Abohar and Fazilka 
failed see Yog Raj Sharma, op. cit., pp. 117-123. Also see Atul Kohli, Democracy and 
Discontent, India's Growing Crisis of Governability, op. cit., pp. 364-77. 
107ttamish Telford, "The Political Economy of Punjab, Creating Space for Sikh 
Militancy", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 32, no. 11, November 1992, p. 985. 
207 
on the core issue of Chandigarh or settlement of the river water 
disputes. The dismissal of the Bamala ministry revived militancy in 
the state. No political solution seemed to be in sight. In the event, 
both the Congress and the Akali parties accused each other of aiding 
and abetting terrorism. Criticising the Akali patty, the White Paper 
brought out by the Government of India stated that 
Not only did the Akali Dal not disapprove the merciless killings of those who 
did no.t agree with the objectives and the methods of murder, arson and loot, it 
persistently refused to acknowledge the close connection between its agitational 
programme and the violence which was enveloping the state.108 
It added that despite their claims of Hindu-Sikh amity, the Akali Dal 
did not denounce the poisonous propaganda of communal fanatics. 
Misuse of the Golden Temple and other shrines for the accumulation 
of large quantities of arms and ammunition, shelter for criminals, and 
other insurgent activities was not even acknowledged by the Akali 
Dal.109 
The Congress, however, was not devoid of blame. According to Ved 
Marwah, additional commissioner of police, Delhi, "it's not the acts of 
terrorism, but the panic response of the Government of India that 
achieved for the terrorists their aim of destabilising the political 
system. "110 The Congress government at the centre adopted short-
sighted policies to cover its own tracks. The fact that the Barnala 
government was dismissed on the eve of the election to the Haryana 
assembly, and president's rule promulgated on 11 May 1987, was not 
lost on the Sikhs. The timing of the dismissal stirred doubts about the 
centre's intentions and its desire to placate the Hindus in Haryana. 
lOBWhite Paper on the Punjab Agitation, op. cit., p. 24. 
109Ibid., p. 24. 
llOved Marwah, Pathology of Terrorism in India (New Delhi: INDUS, 1995), p. 169. 
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Revival of force and terror tactics 
With no political solution in sight, the centre resorted to a series of 
military operations to curb militancy in the state. Operation 
Woodrose was launched between 1986 and 1987. The centre adopted a 
firm approach towards the militants. The situation was, however, 
deteriorating rapidly with a number of anti-social elements joining 
the militants. Even the moderate Akali leaders had renewed their 
parleys with the extremists and at the United Akali Dal (UAD) 
convention on 27 December 1987 a resolution put forward by the 
militants was forwarded unopposed by senior members of the UAD. 
In 1988, some militants regrouped again in the Golden Temple and 
the central government launched another operation, called Operation 
Black Thunder, to free the temple of the terrorists. 
Unlike Operation Blue Star, which was poorly planned and executed, 
Operation Black Thunder (9-18 May 1988), was carried out with 
precision and knowledge. The strategy was to pin down the militants 
in their hiding places inside the complex by accurate long distance 
sniper fire, and then step-by-step advance towards the temple by first 
occupying strategic places. According to one source, the whole 
operation was planned by the National Security Guard (NSG), though 
help was forthcoming from the army, the air force (who helped take 
aerial photographs of the temple), and the Punjab police (who were in 
charge of briefing the media).111 Every inch of the complex was 
mapped in order to gain entry into the temple without having to 
mount a frontal attack. 
lllVed Marwah, op. cit., p. 191. For a detailed account of the operation, see pp. 188-
205. 
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The degree of success of the operation is debatable, but the surrender 
of the militants resulted in a lack of public credibility for the terrorists 
as a whole. According to Ved Marwah, 
the operation was a success in that all the hard core militants holed up in the 
Golden Temple were captured or killed; no damage was done to the tem~le; and 
not a single devotee who happened to be inside the temple was harmed. 12 
However, the fact that Operation Black Thunder was not followed up 
with any concrete action by the government made one observer 
comment that "Localised successes like Operation Black Thunder 
could never become synchronised to political initiatives which may 
have resolved the situation."113 
Worsening situatfon 
Meanwhile, political initiatives under the V.P Singh and 
Chandrashekhar governments did little to change the Punjab 
situation. Talks between Chandrashekhar and Simranjit Singh Mann, 
a former police officer heading the United Akali Dal, held much 
promise but Mann's insistence on the right of self-determination of 
the Sikhs led to the rupture of the talks.114 The atmosphere was 
favourably inclined towards the militants after the general elections of 
1989 bought to power extremist leaders such as Simranjit Singh 
Mann, Attinder Pal Singh (leader of the Khalistan Liberation 
Organisation); and Bimal Khalsa (the widow of the assassin of Indira 
Gandhi). Emboldened by the election results, the militants issued 
112ved Marwah, op. cit., p. 198. 
113Manoj Joshi, "Combating Terrorism in Punjab, Indian Democracy in Crisis," Conflict 
Studies, no. 261, May 1993, p. 3. 
114For details see Dharam Singh Sahota Sikh Struggle for Autonomy (1940-92) 
(Gardhiwala: Guru Nanak Study Centre, 1993), pp. 166-67. 
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diktats demanding conformity with a new set of rules which forbade 
the consumption of alcohol, cigarettes, and meat at weddings; banned 
skirts and insisted that school uniforms be in particular colours of 
religious significance; and stressed the promotion of the Punjabi 
language.115 
The militants increased their activities, especially during the night, 
using more sophisticated devices, and anti tank and land mines._ By 
1988, RPG -7 rockets had replaced .455 pistols and AK-47s.116 The years 
1990 and 1991 were the worst in Punjab. The death toll during this 
period was more than 6,000, a figure which exceeded the death toll of 
5,521 during the whole period from 1981-89.117 Police officers and 
government officials were being made targets and random killings 
were on the rise.118 The terrorists had also extended their activities to 
the states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. 
To ease the situation, the army was called out again in December 1990 
under Operation Rakshak I to patrol the border areas of Ferozepur, 
Amritsar and Gurdaspur and assist the police and paramilitary in 
carrying out anti-terrorist operations. But police morale was low, and 
the numerous changes of government at the centre complicated the 
situation.119 By the end of 1991, the army withdrew from Punjab and 
115Harinder Baweja, "Living by the Gun," Seminar, 39, October 1992, p. 31. 
116M . J hi ·t 3 anoJ os , op. c1 , p. . 
117Tu·d 4 i ., P· . 
118 For statistics of killings in 1981-91, see Ved Marwah, "Cop-ping Out?"Seminar, 
398, October 1992, p. 33. 
119Three governors, namely N.K. Mukarji,Virendra Verma, and Retd. General 
Malhotra succeeded each other between December 1989 and the end of 1990, sending 
conflicting signals to the police forces. N.K Mukherjee, a soft line advocate, was 
critical of the hard-line policy of the state and declared that if Sikh extremists had 
become terrorists, the state had become counter-terrorist with little respect for law or 
human rights. For details, see Nirmal Mukarji, "Problem or Opportunity?"Seminar, 
398, October 1992, pp. 14-17. 
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police operations came to a virtual standstill. Extortion and 
kidnapping were rampant and there was a surge in trans-border 
movement. Recruitment to terrorist ranks went up and the entire 
state was running according to the demands of the militants. 
The extremists had seized the initiative from the police. The Akali 
parties had boycotted the elections and joined hands with other 
militant organisations under a newly formed Shrimoni Panthic 
Action Committee comprising Kartar Singh Narang of the Babbar 
Akali Dal, Prakash Singh Badal, Baba Joginder Singh, father of 
Bhindrawale, and Manjit Singh of the All India Sikh Student 
• Federation (AISSF). With the Akalis under their wing, the militants 
launched an offensive against the Congress government. They 
initiated a campaign of boycott and coercion to disrupt the functioning 
of the government. A directive issued to the Punjab bureaucracy by 
the militants warned officials not to implement government orders. 
No bureaucrat was to take part in implementing the Sutlej-Yamuna 
link canal project, which would provide Sutlej waters to Haryana; any 
officials who participated in national functions would have their legs 
chopped off. Finally, the circular demanded that all government 
transactions be carried out in Punjabi.120 Subsequently, various 
government officials like the state excise commissioner, union 
agricultural commission chief and All India radio engineer were 
killed to convey the message of the militants. 
120Frontline, 28 March-10 April 1992, p. 121. 
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Back to normalcy, role of the police 
The victory of the Congress party was the most important 
development in the Punjab situation and a decisive factor in central 
government calculations. When the elections of 1991 were cancelled 
and rescheduled for 1992, most parties boycotted them. Under the 
circumstances, the Congress secured a three-fourths majority with just 
9 percent of the votes. With this victory, it set about the task of 
containing militancy in a very determined manner. For this it was 
willing to employ the help of the police, army, and para-military 
forces. 
K.P.S. Gill, the police commissioner, known for his aggressive tactics, 
was put in charge of operations. Adopting a "bullet for a bullet" 
approach, Gill is reported to have stated: 
since the militants had written the rules of the game, it was only fitting that 
the police played them as well. You shoot at us we shoot at you. And then you 
have one option: surrender or die. He turned a deaf ear to the allegations of 
excesses saying that the police had its own system of checks and balances.121 
His strength lay in the novel strategies he employed to counter the 
militants. The strength of the Punjab police went up from 35,000 to 
60,000 during Gill's time. He gave discreet awards to deserving 
candidates from a secret, unaudited intelligence-gathering fund, 
which ran into hundreds of millions of rupees. Operation Night 
Dominance was yet another strategy he used to tackle his opponents: 
all the senior officers patrolled during the night operations, setting a 
rare precedent in the history of the police force. Some villagers, for 
example in Jullunder district, were also provided with arms to protect 
121Jndia Today, 1-15 April1993, p. 65. 
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themselves from militants.122 According to Gill, the central 
government was also providing funds to the police force. Rs. 85 crore 
was given to the force under the 1988-89 finance commission to 
procure more self-loading rifles.123 The combined effect of these 
measures was to instil confidence among the police force and the 
people at large. 
The role of the army 
The stern measures employed by Gill were supported by the army, 
which provided invaluable help to the Punjab police. After the 
debacle of Operation Blue Star, the army stayed away from the state 
from 1985 to 1990. In 1990, and under Operation Rakshak I, the role of 
the army was limited to border areas but in 1992 it came back under 
Rakshak II and provided almost 120,000 of its personnel for the 
operation. Its main tasks were: to assist in preventing trans-border 
movement of terrorists and arms; to aid civil authorities in anti-
terrorist operations: to create a sense of security among local people; 
and to create conditions for a free and fair election. The army was 
deployed in the rural areas and gained dominance by aggressive 
patrolling, especially during the night. It provided manpower for the 
police cordon and search operations, and, when required, firepower. It 
was involved in a major retraining program for the police and para-
military forces in operational tactics. The Punjab police was 
overhauled and two new commando battalions, equipped with AK-47 
rifles, were set up under the guidance of the army. 
122 Personal interview by the author with K.P. S. Gill in New Delhi, 28th May 1998. 
123Ibid. 
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According to the Police Chief, K.P .S. Gill, the police would not have 
been able to achieve what they did without the help of the army. "The 
army came in earlier too but this time our coordination was total. 
Now, we carried out the raids while the army formed the outer 
cordon. "124 Another important feature of the army-police partnership · 
was that the army was able to calm the prevailing feeling of fear 
which had begun to affect the police force. The common people were 
now coming forward to give information on the whereabouts of the 
militants. 
The turnaround 
The success of Gill brought in its wake complaints of brutal excesses 
and tortures, but militancy was effectively eliminated from the state. 
The policy of "shoot to kill" had been successful in eliminating the 
militants. 
The year 1992 was the watershed in the fight against the militants. 
According to Gill, "by September 1992 the strike rate was below 100; by 
December 1992 less than 50 and for 1993 as low as 8-lQ."125 The state' 
had gained a decisive advantage over them through the intervention 
of the army and the police. The militants began to lose courage and 
some began indulging in depredation and debauched activities. The 
turning point, according to Gill, came with the killing of Manochahal 
and Kauli, both notorious militants.126 According to another source, 
the major breakthrough came with the elimination of the Khalistan 
Liberation Force (KLF) chief, Gutjant Singh Budhsinghwala, Sukhdev 
124Jndia Today, 15 April 1993. 
1251nterview with K.P.S. Gill in New Delhi, 28 May 1998. 
126Jbid. 
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Singh Dasuwal, the legendary chief of the Babbar Khalsa, and 
Talwinder Singh Parmar, of the Babbar Khalsa International, who was 
behind the fund-raising operations of the Babbar Khalsa International 
and a link with the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence.127 
Why did the movement Jail:? 
Both the use of force and conciliatory strategies had a major bearing 
on the Punjab crisis. The Rajiv Longowal accord generated some hope 
amongst the Sikhs, coming as it were in the aftermath of the 
desecration of the Golden Temple. However, the death of the 
moderate leader Longowal, and the difficulties associated with the 
implementation of the accord, made force a more sought after 
alternative. Many factors were responsible for the failure of the 
Khalistan movement. First, the effective co-ordination of the police 
and army operations was a major factor in quelling militancy in the 
state. The combined might of the state proved too strong for the 
Khalistan movement to strike its roots in Indian soil. The militants, 
despite their organisation and Panthic committees, were hardly a 
match for the Indian state which had at its disposal 53,000 Punjab 
police officers, 28,000 home guards, 10,000 special police officers and 
70,000 paramilitary personnel at the time of the peak deployment in 
February 1992.128 
Second, excesses in the form of murder, rape, and extortion had 
disillusioned the common people who were turning away from the 
militants fighting in the name of Khalistan. The veneer of religion 
127frontline, 7-20 November 1992, pp. 26-27. 
128frontline, 29 February-13 March 1992, p. 125. 
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wore thinner and thinner between 1986 and 1989 when the terrorists 
began to target civilians irrespective of their faith or denomination. 
Moreover, an element of criminalisation had entered into the 
movement which many recruits were joining purely for the lure of 
money. According to Prakash Singh, 
The Sikh movement reached its crescendo during Bhindrawale's time but it 
began to taper off because terrorism became a co~ercial enterprise, an industry 
or a short cut to employment.129 
The people, tired of the disruption and the continuing violence, 
longed for peace and normalcy to return to the state. 
Third, the induction of the Congress government in 1992 played a 
vital role in transforming the situation in Punjab. The Congress 
government was committed to wiping out militancy from the state. 
Its installation opened the doors of communication between the 
Punjab state officials and the bureaucracy. Moreover, because it was 
the same party at the centre and the state, the task of coordination 
became simpler and more effective. 
129Jnterview with Prakash Singh, Inspector General of Police, Border Security Force 
Punjab (1987-91), in New Delhi on 1June1998. For elaboration of the same point see 
Gurpreet Singh, Terrorism - Punjab's Recurring Nightmare (New Delhi: Sehgal Book 
Distributors, 1996), pp. 63-74. 
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According to Manoj Joshi, 
Had any Akali Faction come to power ... it would have come under immediate 
and intense pressure, ideological or otherwise, to ease off the battle against the 
militants, release detainees, transfer police officials and so on. National 
Opposition groupings had also shown between 1990 and 1992 that they suffered 
from the illusion that they could negotiate with the militants without crushing 
terrorist violence.130 
Future of the movement 
Most people are of the view that militancy has been wiped out from 
the state and will not resurface in the near future.131 While it is 
difficult to make a definite statement, it does appear that the 
movement has petered out. A number of factors feed into a 
movement: organisation and leadership, external support, popular 
opinion, and the responses of the state and federal governments. To 
rebuild any of these would require considerable effort and energy. In 
the Khalistan case, the combined onslaught of the army and the police 
dealt a heavy blow to the movement, striking at its very base and its 
leadership and organisation capabilities. Nearly 6,000 terrorists died 
between 1981 and 1992 and around 20,000 were arrested. Moreover, 
with little support forthcoming from outside powers, and the 
distancing of the masses from the separatist cause, it will be difficult 
for the movement to regain its former stature. 
However, this is not to suggest that the grievances of the Sikhs have 
been appropriately addressed. Politically, prospects for Akali-centre 
co-operation depend on New Delhi's willingness to decentralise 
power and let state politics regain their efficacy. Economically, a 
13<lManoj Joshi ,"Combating Terrorism in Punjab," op. cit, p. 19. 
131 Interviews with K.P.S. Gill, S.S Bamala and other academics at the Centre for 
Rural and Industrial Research (CRRlD), Chandigarh. 
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prescriptive solution points to the need to decentralise and liberalise 
development planning and policy implementation to provide jobs for 
Punjab's educated unemployed, and investment opportunities for 
prosperous Punjabi farmers. 
Conclusion 
As argued earlier, the nature of the state in South Asia, which bestows 
enormous powers on the centre, makes the realisation of secessionist 
ambitions almost impossible. India and Pakistan have deployed a 
wide range of strategies to deal with their ethnic communities. To the 
extent that the demands and aspirations of the respective groups have 
been accommodated and contained through open, democratic and 
competitive processes, the ethnic threat has somewhat receded. 
However, when demands have become aggressive and degenerated 
into secessionist conflicts which challenge the integrity of the nation 
state, both states have moved away from appeasement to force and 
repression. 
This has been well illustrated in the case of the Baluch, where the 
five-year civil war against the Pakistani state (1973-77) was both a 
cause and result of the authoritarian and repressive measures of 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Under Zia ul Haq a more conciliatiory approach 
was adopted to deal with the Baluch. He placed more emphasis on the 
co-optation of the tribal sardars, and declared general amnesty for all 
the Baluch guerrillas involved in the 1973-77 insurgency, along with 
rehabilitation schemes to win their support. 
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In the case of the Sikhs a similar approach was followed. The initial 
sense of political security enabled Rajeev Gandhi to enter into an 
accord with the Akalis; the resumption of political dialogue received 
broad support but the failure to implement the provisions of the 
accord and to bring to trial those guilty of anti Sikh riots of 1984 made 
it difficult for the Akalis and the Congress to reach any sort of a 
political rapproachment. With no political solution in sight, and 
militancy on the rise, the government devised its own counter-
militant strategy to contain the dissident groups. 
The strategies pursued by the Indian state were more meticulously 
planned and executed than the Pakistani governments strategies vis-
a-vis the Baluch but in both cases these resulted in the decline of the 
movements. But there is no denying the fact that as long as the basic 
grievances remain, the antagonisms will persist. The use of force 
offers temporary respite but does little to tackle the issue of self-
determination or autonomy in the long run. This tussle between the 
centre and states will continue unless effective strategies are devised 
to') give more economic and political power to the federating units in 
both India and Pakistan. Having discussed the strategies of the state 
we will now examine the role of external intervention in the Baluch 
and the Sikhs quest for a separate state. 
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Chapter 5 
EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF THE BALUCH MOVEMENT IN 
PAKISTAN AND THE KHALISTAN MOVEMENT IN INDIA. 
Outside intervention is not unusual for states involved in ethnic 
conflicts. This is particularly in the case where secessionist 
movements seek recognition as a sovereign member of the 
community of states. Secession is difficult to achieve without outside 
support, since the might of the state is usually greater than that of the 
separatist groups. Intervention by an outside power can provide both 
moral and material help to warring groups. Challenges to the state can 
be sustained by foreign states, international organisations, or members 
of the ethnic group living overseas, either out of ethnic, cultural or 
religious solidarity or to serve self-interested political ends. External 
powers may mediate between conflicting groups, but more often 
intervention by a third power helps to perpetuate conflict. 
External support was an important factor in sustaining the separatist 
movements in both Punjab and Baluchistan. This chapter looks at 
how external intervention encouraged separatist ambitions but how, 
paradoxically, the failure of the external powers to meet the 
expectations of the ethnic groups also led to the decline of the 
movements. The main argument advanced here is that though an 
independent Khalistan or an independent or Greater Baluchistan may 
have been unlikely from the very outset, lack of timely support from 
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external powers made the realisation of these goals even more 
difficult. 
Foreign intervention may be defined as any action, military or non-
military, direct or indirect, taken by an actor in the international 
system (a state, group of states, international, or regional organisation) 
vis-a-vis the target state with the objective of changing its (the target 
state) policy outputs, extracting political concessions against its wilt 
and altering or reinforcing its political authority pattern.I In recent 
years, the end of the Cold War and concerns over human rights have 
made outside intervention more acceptable in international politics. 
In some ways, the Cold War worked as a deterrent to powers seeking 
to intervene in domestic conflicts and restrained much ethnic and 
separatist activism. During the Cold War period, the principle of self-
determination was reserved for colonial people fighting against 
foreign rule; but with the end of the Cold War came movements 
based on parochial ethnic identities which threatened to break away 
from the parent states. But though claims to self-determination have 
increased since the end of the Cold War they have not necessarily 
been created by it.2 The break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
have in some ways reopened the question of self-determination and 
brought it to the centre of domestic and international politics. 
Another factor which has been invoked to justify the involvement of 
other powers in ethnic conflicts or wars of secession is that of human 
lttasan Askari Rizvi, "External Intervention," Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 34, no. 2, 1981, 
~P· 64.' 
Kamal S. Shehadi, Ethnic Self-determination and the Break-up of States, Adelphi 
Paper 283, December 1993, p. 4. 
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rights violations and suffering caused by war. For example, the US-led 
intervention in Somalia in December 1992 sought to establish a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations. The United 
Nations, in particular, has played a significant role in this regard.3 In 
1992, the United Nations launched a major peace-keeping operation 
in former Yugoslavia to help in the peace negotiations between the 
Serbs, Croats and the Muslims. 
Causes of external intervention 
There is no denying the fact that while domestic factors trigger crises 
and create conditions for the rise and growth of separatism, external 
forces can sustain and prolong the life of irredentist movements. 
According to Ralph Premdas, "the typology of domestic ethnic 
conflicts which have become international emphasises the mode of 
linkage between the external and internal environment."4 Both 
external and internal factors interact with one another to provide an 
opportunity for external intervention. 
3For the UN role in peacekeeping see Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds), A 
Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s (Colorado: Westview Press, 
1995). 
4see Ralph R. Premdas, "The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: Some 
Theoretical Explorations," in K.M. de Silva and R.J. May (eds), Internationalization 
of Ethnic Conflict (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), pp. 12-14. 
224 
According to Donald Horowitz, 
whether and when a secessionist movement emerges is determined by domestic 
politics but whether it will achieve its aims is determined largely by 
international politics, by the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond 
the state.5 
International relations play a prominent role in explaining the 
outcome of secessionist moverments, including why so few succeed. 
The external allies provide the w~rring ethnic groups with both 
material and moral support in the form of finance, weaponry, 
training, and providing a safe haven for the insurgents. 
The involvement of external powers in the spread of ethnic conflicts 
is contingent on a variety of factors: the dispersal of members of the 
ethnic group to other countries; the geo-strategic location of the 
country; the ideological identification of any of the ethnic groups with 
a major international or regional power; the presence of international 
organisations with a responsibility for humanitarian concerns; and 
the organisational and communications capabilities of the 
adversaries.6 External interventions may be divided, accordingly, into 
protective, defensive, opportunistic and humanitarian interventions. 
Generally, ethnic sympathy for kith and kin is a compelling reason for 
a country to intervene on behalf of a group fighting for self-
determination in another country. India's support for the Tamils in 
the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is an indication of this. Interventions 
under this pretext are designed to offer security and assist common 
Soonald. L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985), p. 230. 
6Premdas, op. cit., p.16. Also see Stephan Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International 
Relations (England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, 1990), pp. 23-49. 
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ethnic groups found within the borders of other states. Ethnic 
nationalism finds a powerful expression both among followers at 
home and among those who reside outside; depending on the stimuli 
they receive from their homeland, the diasporic communities can be a 
pillar of support, both moral and material, to their counterparts in the 
home states. Thus Sikh communities in Britain and Canada support 
the struggle of the Sikhs in the Punjab. The diasporic groups can also 
influence public opinion in their home countries to focus 
international attention on the plight of their ethnic brethren 
involved in hostilities elsewhere. 
Sometimes actions are preventive, to check cross-border problems 
such as the movement of refugees, or to keep wars from spreading 
into another country's territories. For instance, Israel invaded 
Lebanon in 1982 to neutralise Palestinian forces operating from there. 
The involvement of India in the Sri Lankan crisis was noted earlier. 
Such interventions are deemed defensive interventions and are 
designed to contain or check the effects of war. 
Geo-strategic factors, political interests, and concerns about national 
security and regional stability are yet another set of factors prompting 
intervention by a third country. These can be broadly termed 
"opportunistic interventions". Guyana is a case in point; there the 
conflict between the ethnic Africans and the ethnic Indians was kept 
alive during the Cold War years by the United States and the Soviet 
Union to protect their respective spheres of influence. At times, the 
intervening power pursues a clear national interest, as in the case of 
Bangladesh in 1971, where India's interest was to weaken Pakistan, or 
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in Lebanon, where Syria had long term geo-strategic interests and 
stakes in regional stability. 
During the Cold War years, ideological affinity between an ethnic 
community and an international power also influenced alliance 
patterns between them. In a world divided between capitalist and 
socialist camps, with high military and security stakes, the ideological-
ethnic groups often turned to one of the superpowers for help. The 
response of super powers depended largely on strategic considerations. 
For example, the three main leaders of the Baluch national 
movement, Khair Bux Marri, Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bux 
Bizenjo, were deeply inflenced by Marxist ideology, and this affiliation 
drew them closer to the Soviet Union. 
Finally, humanitarian interventions have become more common in 
recent years, owing to increased global concerns about militancy, state 
repression and human rights abuses. Such interventions are aimed at 
relieving distress and restoring regional peace and security. The broad 
objectives of such interventions include, cessation of military 
hostilities, facilitation of political reconstruction(helping 
governments to establish themselves); economic recovery and 
development in areas that are torn by ethnic conflict; and issues such 
as rehabilitation of refugees, provision of food and other relief 
operations. Examples of such interventions include efforts made by 
leaders of Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela to 
bring peace in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua in the 1980s and 
-
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1990s. Peace-keeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations 
have also had some success in achieving humanitarian goals? 
Despite their moral justification, it may be pointed out that even 
humanitarian interventions are not entirely altruistic and could also 
arise out of a desire to contain war in neighbouring states lest it affects 
a country's own territory. Intervention in ethnic strife may succeed 
when the goals are geo-strategic .or when the objectives are to provide 
humanitarian assistance, though what does not succeed is a 
combination of the two, since the two require different operations 
requiring different levels of commitment, different military 
deployments, and different rules of engagement.8 
Consequences of external intervention 
Internationalisation of ethnic conflict can modify the outcomes of 
conflict but its impacts may be complex. First, there is a circularity 
involved in securing foreign support. According to Donald. L. 
Horowitz, a movement may require outside help to grow in strength, 
but no foreign state will risk committing itself to a movement that 
appears weak, and the very strength that attracts foreign support is 
hard to build without foreign support to begin with.9 
Second, partisan intervention by external states seldom translates into 
military intervention. Secession - a common goal of some ethnic 
movements - does not conform to the prevailing political and legal 
7Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," in 
Michael E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 198-200 
8Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, op. cit., p. 201. 
9Donald L. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 272. 
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norms that govern the international system and its membership. The 
inter-state system as it has evolved since the Second World War is 
essentially a conservative order which generally seeks to uphold the 
interests of its composite entities and recognised governments. The 
UN General Assembly resolution 1514 categorically denies the right to 
self-determination where it may bring about the "partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country."10 
The right to self-determination is regarded rather as guaranteeing, 
within a state, the protection of minorities and their right to 
democratic governance. It does not automatically entitle people to 
fight against a regime in pursuit of their political rights, or socio-
economic and cultural development. Thus those intervening tend to 
be restrained by the international norm of state sovereignty and non-
intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. At the same 
time, the duration and scope of the militant involvement, problems 
of recruitment, attrition, morale and motivation, and lack of funds 
and capability also act as deterrents. Reactions from the international 
community, domestic political compulsions (negative public opinion) 
and fear of negative economic side-effects may also play an inhibitory 
role.II 
Third, the extension of tangible military support, which in itself is 
usually inadequate and unreliable in the ultimate analysis (as in the 
case of Afghanistan's support for the Baluch secessionists), does not 
IOcited in Tarcisio Gazzini Padua, "Considerations on the Conflict in Chechnya," 
Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 17, nos. 3-6, October 1996, p. 95. 
11 For details see Rajat Ganguly, "The Consequences of Partisan Intervention in 
Secessionist Wars: Lessons from South Asia," Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 6, no. 1, 
1997, pp. 5-26. 
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necessarily translate into political-diplomatic support for separatist demands. 
Fourth, even if secessionists succeed in obtaining support, such support usually 
encourages the state from which they are attempting to secede to adopt more 
repressive measures, leading to an erosion of the movement. In this, the state is 
backed by the norms set by the international community. According to Weiner, 
a secessionist's attempt to obtain external military help brings upon the peoples 
the power of the state and an enormous amount of suffering since governments · 
usually respond to secessionist efforts by the repressive, and often brutal, use of 
armed power. 12 The external support for the Kashmir crisis has met fierce 
resistance from Indian authorities, leading them to take stronger measures to 
contain the Kashmiri militancy. 
Fifth, intervention may invite counter-intervention by another power which is an 
ally of the state. For example Egypt's intervention in Yemen in 1967 was 
followed by a counter-intervention by Saudi Arabia leading to many years of 
civil war. 
Finally, external support may, more often than not, lead to more 
violence and turn political conflicts into violent conflicts as third 
party support gives the weaker side the· power to challenge the 
12Myron Weiner, "Peoples and States in a New Ethnic Order," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 
13,n~ 2, 1992,~ 326. 
230 
stronger )3 It may also have negative effects on the prospects of 
political settlement between the warring parties. This was evident 
when India backed Bangladesh against West Pakistan in the 1971 war 
supplying guerrillas with arms and ammunition. Similarly when 
Serbia supported rebel Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia in the late 1980s, it 
helped create local Serb armies which made political compromise 
more difficult, and fighting more intense. 
However, internationalisation of conflicts can at times have positive 
consequences. Heightened media attention may have a moderating 
effect on both parties, as neither wants its image to suffer in the eyes of 
other countries or international organisations. Another outcome, 
though less frequent, is conciliation; but that occurs only when the 
intervening parties are powerful enough to impose a solution or are 
seen as neutral actors without any bias. For example, Russia, Iran and 
the United Nations brokered a successful settlement in Tajikistan in 
1997. When large regional or global powers get involved in a domestic 
ethnic dispute, the original issues may well be superseded by the 
interests of the external contenders, because external forces seldom 
enter the fray for altruistic purposes. 
In the light of the above discussion, the following examines the role 
of external powers in the Baluch and the Khalistan movements and 
seeks to explain how external intervention affected the course of the 
respective movements during the years under study. 
13 Alicia Levine, "Political Accomodation and the Prevention of Secessionist 
Violence," in Michael E. Brown (ed), International Dimensions of Internal Conflict 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 328-29. 
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The Baluch 
The Baluch, whose numerical strength is highest in Baluchistan, are 
flanked by Afghanistan to their northwest, and Iran to their west. The 
province covers some 562 miles of the Persian Gulf's Makran coast, 
which includes the Strait of Hormuz. Given its strategic location, the 
area has always held a special significance for South Asia, Central Asia 
and the Persian Gulf. The United States, the Soviet Union, 
Afghanistan, and to a lesser degree, Iran, Iraq and India have all been 
involved in the Baluch crisis in one way or another. This section 
discusses the role of each of these countries and examines how their 
interplay, in isolation or in tandem, influenced the Baluch insurgency 
in 1973. 
The role of Afghanistan in the Baluch crisis 
The Baluch imbroglio was a product of two historical developments 
which had a profound impact on the subsequent unfolding of events. 
These were the drawing of the international borders which divided 
the Baluch community between three countries: Iran, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 
1979 which not only changed the gee-political complexion of the 
country but left an indelible impression on the future of Baluchistan. 
The British, in a blatant display of divide-and-rule policy, drew the 
imperial boundaries of the subcontinent with a calculated disregard of 
ethnic and cultural identities. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Baluchistan 
was divided between Persia, Afghanistan, and British India, where 
the Baluch were divided between a directly administered colonial 
area, British Baluchistan, and the principality of Kalat. The imposition 
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of these boundaries created new states, but it did little to solve the 
dilemma of diasporic groups spread across Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Iran, and the tangle of irredentist issues that followed. The Durand 
Line, the boundary drawn between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1893, 
·has always been a bone of contention between the two countries, 
affecting both the Baluch and the Pushtun groups on either side of the 
border. 
Afghanistan, for its own reasons, has never accepted the Durand line 
as an international boundary. It has maintained that it was imposed 
in 1893 at a moment of political disarray and was only a temporary 
boundary to delineate zones of influence for the maintenance of law 
and order.14 The boundary remains contested. According to one view, 
Irredentism is too deeply imbedded in Afghan minds for them to ever forget it; 
and though practical reasons may make the Afghan government shelve the 
question for a while, or the irredentism may lie dormant so long as 
Afghanistan's south-eastern neighbour is strong, it will alwar come to the 
surface when that neighbour is thought to be weak (as in 1919).1 
In Afghanistan's frustrated attempts to unify the Pushtuns on both 
sides of the boundary lay the foundations for Pushtunistan. According 
to Robert Wirsing, there is no universally accepted definition of the 
Pushtunistan claim, but in its boldest formulation, it envisaged a 
totally independent Pushtun state.16 It may be necessary to throw 
some light on the Pushtunistan question up to the late 1970s to 
understand Afghanistan's role and its relevance for the Baluch. 
14Selig Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," Foreign Policy, no. 32, Fall 1978 p. 
145. 
15 Afghan-Pakistan Relations, No.7 (1041/58)DO 35 8930 Public Records Office 
(London) 24 January 1958. 
16Robert Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pathans, Minority Rights Group Report no. 48 
(London: Minority Rights Group, 1987), p. 15. 
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Afghanistan is a melting pot of different cultures. The Pushtuns form 
the largest group, numbering 6.5 million, followed by the Tajiks (3.5 
million); Aimaqs (800,000); Farsiwan (600,000); Baluch and Brahuis 
(300,000); Turkmen (125,0000) and Nuristanis (100,000). Apart from 
these groups, Gujars, Arabs, Jews, Punjabi Sikhs, Hindus and Parsis 
are also found in small numbers.17 One of the factors shaping Afghan 
policy was the need to tip the demographic balance in favour of the 
Pushtuns, who constitute 40 percent of Afghanistan's population but 
fall short of a majority in the country. Another factor was that in 
economic and strategic terms "Greater Afghanistan" was a means of 
providing an outlet to the sea which would end the land-locked status 
of the country. It also gave Afghanistan an advantage over Pakistan. 
Though the demand for Pushtunistan waxed and waned over several 
years, in response to both internal and external pressures, most 
Afghan governments extended their fullest support to the 
Pushtunistan movement.18 Sardar Daud Khan, Prime Minister of 
Afghanistan during 1953-63 and then President of Afghanistan in 
1973, until his assassination in the pro-Soviet communist coup of 
April 1978, was one of the chief proponents of the Pushtunistan 
movement. Apart from raising it in international forums, he felt that 
the people of Pushtunistan should be given the right to decide 
whether they wanted to join Afghanistan or Pakistan or become 
independent.19 A clandestine radio station describing itself as "Radio 
17see Inayatullah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," Aussen 
Politik, Vol. 31, no. 3, 27October1980, p. 284. 
18Babrak Kamal was a notable exception. He is believed to have stated that "the 
national issue of the Pushtun and Baluchi nationalities in Pakistan is entirely their 
own. If the Pushtuns, Baluchis or Sindhis are not satisfied with their regime, it is up 
to them to take any action. " Quoted in Kabul New Times (Kabul), 20 February 1980. 
19 Chi tr a K. Tiwari, Security in South Asia, Internal and . External Dimensions 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), p. 91. After 1975, however, Daoud Khan 
was not as keen on the issue as before. He visited Pakistan in 1975 and agreed to settle 
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Pushtunistan" came on the air on 19 July 1973 and two days later, a 
public rally was held in Kabul in support of the Afghan claim to the 
Pushtun areas in Pakistan. 20 
The Pushtunistan question and its bearing on the Baluch. 
While the unwavering support for Pashtunistan in Afghanistan can 
hardly be disputed, what was never made clear was the position of the 
Baluch in this arrangement. Afghanistan has time and again 
expressed a desire to unify the Pushtun tribes on both sides of the 
border and even claimed rights in NWFP up to the Indus river and to 
the south in Baluchistan up to the Makran coast including the port of 
Karachi. According to another source, Pushtunistan was meant to 
cover territory that extended from Chitral in the north, bordering 
China, to the Arabian sea in the south, covering NWFP, Baluchistan, 
the free tribal territories like Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan 
and parts of the districts of Mianwali and Multan in Pakistan 
Punjab.21 
Although Afghanistan has traditionally encouraged Baluch ambitions 
for some form of liberation from Islamabad, it has never favoured an 
independent Baluch state. It offered arms and ammunition to the 
Baluch during the insurgency in 1973-77, and provided sanctuary to 
many leaders and organisations like the Baluch People's Liberation 
Front (BPLF) and Baluch Student Organisation (BSO). By the 1980s 
there were three major political organisations fighting for the Baluch 
the problem peacefully because he wanted to reduce his government's dependence on 
local communists and the Soviet Union. 
20zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and Central Asian Politics 
(1973-78)," Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 31, no. 4, 1978, p. 16. 
21Patriot (New Delltl), 14 September 1973. 
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cause in Baluchistan. The BPLF espoused a mix of Baluch nationalism 
and Marxist-Leninist thought which rejected the primacy of both 
Moscow and China; BSO was a student organisation at the forefront of 
the struggle in Baluchistan; the Pakistan National Party (PNP) was 
fighting for a confederation of states within Pakistan where each 
nationality would be given provincial autonomy within the Pakistan 
state. 
Camps were reportedly set up in Afghanistan to train Baluch 
guerrillas and anti-government Pushtun activists. According to one 
report, Ajmal Khattak, the former secretary of NAP, who was based in 
Kabul, managed to develop his own network of 50 base camps .in the 
border areas manned by 700 hard core militant followers.22 The 
Afghan government also provided a few arms to the Baluch, not so 
much to give them a proper strength to fight but rather to prolong the 
conflict and thereby press Pakistan to give concessions to Afghanistan 
on the Pushtunistan issue.23 During the Mohammad Daud regime, 
one of the leaders of the BPLF, Mir Hazar, stationed near Kandahar, 
claimed to have received a subvention of $32 per person from 
successive Afghan governments totalling some$ 875,000 per year in 
mid-1980.24 
However, as mentioned earlier, the Afghans never favoured an 
independent Baluch state, preferring the ultimate incorporation of 
Baluchistan into a Greater Afghanistan or an Afghan-controlled 
22zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and Central Asian Politics," 
o~. cit., p. 17. 
2 Janmahmad, Essays in Baluch National Struggle in Pakistan - Emergence, 
Dimensions, Repercussions (Quetta: Gosha-e- Adab, 1989), p. 389. 
24Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow - Soviet Temptations and Baluch 
Nationalism (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), p. 81. 
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Pushtunistan. Afghanistan's 18th century founder, Ahmad Shah 
Durrani, ruled over the Baluch state of Kalat as a tributary for 
fourteen years. Kabul has since then always wanted to include 
Baluchistan in its expansionist claims to areas east of the Durand line. 
This attitude had a major drawback in that it took the compliance of 
the Baluch for granted. The Baluch response to being part of a Greater 
Afghanistan or an Afghan-controlled Pushtunistan lias never been 
positive. They have always espoused the cause of an independent 
Baluchistan or a confederation conferring more rights to them within 
Pakistan. What has, however, complicated matters is that the stated 
positions of the Baluch leaders and organisations have varied, at 
different times, reflecting little conformity of thought or approach. 
The three main parties espousing the cause of Baluch were divided in 
their ultimate demands. For example, the manifesto of the Liberation 
Front stressed that it was not fighting for the Baluch alone but the 
liberation of all nationalities in Pakistan and did not think that the 
struggle for "Greater Baluchistan" was feasible in the face of Iran's 
growing military power.25 Bizenjo's Pakistan National Party (PNP), 
on the other hand, stood steadfastly for autonomy within Pakistan. 
Not only have parties differed in their approach but prominent 
leaders have also frequently altered their statements. Ataullah 
Mengal, one of the main leaders of the Baluch movement who 
headed the first elected government of Baluchistan in 1972, changed 
his stand with the passage of time. In 1978 he was prepared to accept 
Bizenjo's idea of a loose federation with constitutional guarantees for 
the different nationalities, but in 1983 he declared that Baluch would 
2Sselig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 78. 
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no longer pursue their quest for provincial autonomy within Pakistan 
but would now fight for complete independence from the Pakistani 
state.26 Surprisingly, his definition of an independent state did not 
include the Baluch of Afghanistan and Iran.27 
According to Donald. L. Horowitz, 
a group that might otherwise be disposed to separatism will not be so disposed 
if its secession is likely to lead, not to independence, but to incorporation in a 
neighbouring state, membership in which is viewed as even less desirable than 
membership in the existing state. 28 
This is more true of ethnic groups such as the Baluch, whose 
members are spread across different countries. 
The Baluch have over the years remained reluctant to share power 
with the Pushtuns. To the Baluch, any Pushtunistan which claims the 
Baluch area would be the worst threat to the Baluch national 
aspirations. According to the 1981 census (the figures for the latest 
census are not available), 57 percent of the population of the Pakistani 
province of Baluchistan are Baluch and 25 percent are Pushtuns.29 By 
all reports, the Baluch have been steadily marginalised in their home 
province by the overwhelming presence of Pushtuns, whose numbers 
have grown rapidly since the Afghan crisis. This, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, has disturbed the demographic balance of Baluch versus 
Pushtuns in Baluchistan. It has also led to frequent clashes between 
the two ethnic groups over issues such as the allocation of resources, 
26see Lawrence Lifschultz, "Independent Baluchistan - Ataullah Mengal's 
Declaration of Independence," Economic and Political Weekly, Annual number, 18, 19, 
20 May 1983, p. 735. 
27Ibid., p. 751. 
28oonald.L. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 230. 
29Cited in Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on 
Diplomacy, 1971-94 (London: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 1997), p. 91. 
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jobs, ownership of coal mines, and business enterprises. Under these 
circumstances, there was little certainty of the Baluch agreeing to any 
arrangement, such as that envisaged under Greater Baluchistan, and 
playing a subservient role to the Pushtuns. The Baluch have resented 
being referred to as "Southern Baluchistan" or being part of Pushtun 
irredentism, and have blamed Pakistan for squandering many 
opportunities to resolve the Durand line issue . 
Pakistan's response to Afghanistan and the Pushtunistan question 
As stated earlier in the chapter, the Pushtunistan issue has bedevilled 
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the withdrawal of 
the British from the Indian subcontinent in 1947. There has been a 
complete severance of relations between the two countries in 1955 and 
1961; disruption of trade between and transit through both countries; 
and major outbreaks of armed violence involving tribal and/ or 
regular forces, especially between 1950-51 and 1969-61. 
Pakistan has recognised the Durand line as the international 
boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan and believes that any 
claim made by Afghanistan on Pushtuns or Baluch living on the 
Pakistan side of the Durand line is tantamount to interference in the 
internal aff~irs of the country. Pakistan feared that Afghan claims 
were thinly veiled irredentist attempts to annex Pakistani territory 
and obtain access to the sea. It believed that Afghanistan, itself is a 
plural society, was using the Pushtunistan issue to create a pan-
Pushtun national consciousness to unify its various heterogeneous 
groups. Pakistan's insecurities were also fuelled by the fact that Kabul 
made no mention of including any Pushtu-speaking areas of 
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Afghanistan in a future Pushtunistan. Added to this, the fact that 
Pushtun leaders in Pakistan such as Abdul Ghaffar Khan had opposed 
the very creation of Pakistan was not lost on the Pakistani leadership. 
Some normalcy was established between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
under the Tehran agreement of 29 May 1963 under which diplomatic 
relations were restored and trade was resumed between the two 
countries. In 1978, a joint committee was set up to facilitate closer ties 
between the two countries. 30 It was also reported, though not officially 
confirmed, that Sardar Daud and General Zia ul Haq concluded a 
diplomatic deal ruling out the continued use of Afghan territory by 
Baluch dissidents opposed to the Pakistan government.31 Tensions, 
however, resurfaced when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 
1979. Pakistan's non-recognition of the Soviet-installed regime in 
Afghanistan made Kabul continue its support to the Pushtun and 
Baluch insurgents by providing them with arms and ammunition in 
order to neutralise the presence of the US and Pakistani backed 
Afghan resistance groups, the Mujahideen, based in NWFP and 
Baluchistan.32 By 1981, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
picture changed completely. Afghanistan was now itself in the throes 
of ethnic violence and was hardly in a position to support any 
insurgency outside its borders.33 
30Dawn (Karachi), 9 March 1978. 
31Selig Harrison, " Nightmare in Baluchistan," op. cit., p. 147. 
32chitra Tiwari, op. cit., p. 94. 
33For an updated account of the ethnic conflict in Afghanistan see Amin Saik.al, 
"Afghanistan's Ethnic Conflict," Survival, Vol. 40, no. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 114-26. 
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Soviet policy towards the Baluch 
For the Soviets, Baluchistan provided the shortest route to gain access 
to the Indian Ocean, which would enhance its ability to regulate trade 
flows vital to the US, Western Europe, Japan and Australia. As some 
scholars have argued, it would have also permitted the Soviet Union 
to control the supply of Gulf oil which constitutes 60 percent of the 
world reserves. The Makran coast, with the port facilities at Chabahar, 
Gwadar, Pasni and Karachi, could have provided. firm bases for a 
Soviet fleet. A naval base on the Makran coast with a corridor to the 
erstwhile Soviet Union through Pakistani or Iranian Baluchistan 
would undoubtedly have been a tremendous asset for the Soviet 
Union, especially since sea traffic carried 80 percent of strategic raw 
material to West Europe. Moreover, a Russian presence in 
Baluchistan with base facilities on the Makran coast would have 
allowed the harnessing of natural resources which are abundant in 
Baluchistan. 
Yet despite these strategic advantages, the Soviets showed little 
interest in aiding the separatist struggle in Baluchistan.34 These 
advantages were in fact more imagined than real. Very little help was 
forthcoming from the Soviet Union in terms of arms and equipment 
during the 1973-77 Baluch insurgency. In the latter half of 1974, the 
t 
Soviet Union, which had uptil then openly supported the Afghan 
rulers in their demand for Pushtunistan, became more cautious and 
circumspect.35 This had a modifying effect on Afghanistan. The 
34see Henry. S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, NC: Duke 
Press Policy Studies, 1983), pp. 254-5. 
35 According to one source, the change in the Soviet's attitude was due to two factors; 
first, it came at a time when Moscow was seeking a detente with the West and an 
activist approach on the Pushtunistan question would have jeopardised its progress; 
and second, Sardar Daud who had been brought to power by a group of pro-Russian 
leftist army officers, had after establishing himself in power, eased some members 
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Kremlin prevailed upon Afghanistan to not support the Baluch 
secessionist movement beyond a point as it did not suit their· long-
term policy objectives. They dissuaded Afghanistan from actively 
training and offering sanctuary to the Baluch insurgents. 
Although the Baluch looked to the Soviet Union for help and 
assistance, the USSR never extended full support for an Independent 
or Greater Baluchistan. 36 In the event, help came in a restricted and 
indirect way. For example, a new monthly magazine, Soub(victory in 
Baluchi) began publication on 20 September 1978 from Kabul; it 
sought to mobilise the Baluch of Iran and Pakistan. The Baluch 
nomads were granted lands in the Afghan part of Baluchistan to 
galvanise their counterparts in Iran and Pakistan.37 However, while 
defining the Baluch as a separate nationality and upholding their 
right of secession, the Soviets steadfastly resisted any efforts for the 
actual realisation of their objectives: an Independent or Greater 
Baluchistan. 
The Kremlin's equivocal stance was not without reason. According to 
one scholar, the Russians never wanted to compromise their relations 
with Iran or Pakistan for the sake of ideology.38 The option of being 
able to win over the Pakistani federal governments was therefore 
from the revolutionary Council. In such a situation the Soviets were less inclined to 
support him or the Pushtunistan issue, which was the cornerstone of Sardar Daud's 
policy. See Zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and Central Asian 
Politics," op. cit., p. 19. 
36'fhe first map of Greater Baluchistan was prepared by Mir Abdul Aziz Khan Kurd, 
the first General Secretary and founder of the Baluch nationalist movement, Anjam-E-
Ithad-E-Baluchistan. It claimed areas of Western Baluchistan in Iran, the 
Baluchistan states of Kalat and Lasbella as well as British Baluchistan, Derajat,and 
Sindh. Later the idea was espoused by the Baluch People's Liberation Front. See 
Inayatullah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," Aussen Politik, Vol. 
31, no. 3, 27October1980, p. 300. 
371bid., pp. 300-301. 
38Janmahmad, op. cit., p. 389. 
242 
always kept open. The Soviets were sympathetic to the minorities in 
Pakistan but were using them to gain leverage with respect to the 
Pakistani federal state which they saw as an ally of the West. The 
Soviets provided intellectual support and helped in the distribution 
of literature that could be used by the Baluch Students Organisation 
(BSO) and the Baluch People's Liberation Front (BPLF). They also 
created an infrastructure which could not identify them as being 
ranged against Pakistan but wquld at the same time signal that they 
were friends of the Baluch.39 
According to J anmahmad, though the Soviet Union theoretically 
favoured the right of minority groups fighting against their 
governments, those who did not follow the communist ideology 
seldom received any material support.40 Moreover, the Soviets 
realised that Baluch aspirations for a separate state could have similar 
consequences for Afghanistan and its Baluch population. Afghanistan 
would never allow its area to secede and form part of a united Baluch 
state at the cost of its Pashtunistan ideal. Finally, the Soviets were 
aware of the fact that the tribal nature of the Baluch society would not 
lend itself easily to the propagation of the communist ideology. 
The role of other powers in the Baluch crisis. 
Iran 
Iran has always considered Baluchistan to be of immense importance 
to its security and well-being, as any uprising in Eastern Baluchistan 
39Interview with Dr Robert Wirsing, University of South Carolina, Columbia on 3 
June1996. 
40Janmahmad, op. cit., p. 388. 
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could pose a grave danger to Iran's own Baluch minority. In 1977, 
according to one estimate, out of a total population of 34,000,000, the 
Baluch numbered 600,000.41 The Iranian Baluch were far less 
organised and looked towards their Pakistani counterparts for 
support. A number of reasons have been advanced for their passive 
demeanour. 
According to a Baluch expatriate, 
Iran has a unitary system in which all are Persians. No ethnic or religious 
differences are recognised and the government has time and again resorted, 
forcibly, to impose another culture on the Baluch and settle them in a way that 
they can never be a collective force against Tehran.42 
This has generally contributed to the weakness of the Baluch 
movement in Iran. Iranian Baluchistan is divided into five distinct 
areas, which are not linked very well to one another, making it 
difficult for any Baluch leader to unite them into one political entity. 
The central authorities in Iran used force where necessary and at other 
times simply co-opted the Baluch Sardars to keep the Baluch areas 
under control. Under Mohammad Reza Shah, the Baluchi language 
was banned and Persian made compulsory in schools. Strict 
censorship laws were passed on the publication, distribution and even 
possession of Baluch literature; and wearing the traditional Baluch 
attire was proscribed in public places. A combined province of Sistan 
and Baluchistan was created to dilute the presence of the Baluch by 
lumping them in with the more Persianised group of Sistanis and by 
41 See Patricia J. Higgins, "Minority-State Relations in Contemporary Iran," in Ali 
Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds.), The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: 
Affhanistan, Iran, and Pakistan (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 178. 
4 Interview with an Iranian Baluch requesting anonymity in Washinton D. Con 27 
May 1996. 
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encouraging Persian settlers to move to the province and buy Baluch 
lands and businesses.43 
This could not, however, prevent the Baluch uprisings of 1957-59 and 
1969-1973. It was during the last decade of the Shah's regime (1969-79) 
that a policy of appeasement towards the Baluch was introduced by 
laying more emphasis on economic inducements to weaken the 
Baluch movement. Its foundations has already been laid in 1963 
under what was hailed as the "White Revolution" which entailed 
distribution of land to poor peasants, and introduction of female 
emancipation, literacy, health and other social welfare programs. In 
1973, the Baluchistan Development Corporation was created, and 
provisions were made for expenditures up to $100 million in the 
Baluch areas during the ensuing five years.44 Education also received 
a further boost under the influence of Jamshid Amouzegar, who 
served as prime minister (August 1977 to August 1978) and head of 
the governing Rastakhiz (Renascence) Party. 
However, since a lot of Baluch were returning from jobs in the 
Persian Gulf and were becoming more conscious of their political 
rights, mere expansion of educational facilities did not win the Baluch 
support for Tehran. This was because, as with the Pakistani Baluch 
(although to a lesser extent) education was not accompanied by 
substantial political reform or economic development. According to 
one source, although the idea of a Greater Baluchistan, carved out of 
the Baluch areas of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, remained 
43Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., pp. 95-96. 
44For details see ibid., p. 99. 
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generally attractive the Baluch movement continued to remain weak 
on the ground.45 
Baluch nationalism, it may be argued, has never been a potent force in 
Iran, despite nationalist figures like Dad Shah and Jumma Khan. The 
latter made his debut in 1957 and rallied nationalist support in both 
the Pakistani and Iranian parts of Baluchistan by launching the 
Baluch Liberation Front. The Front received some support from Iraq, 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Syria and Egypt, the last two 
allowing him to open offices. The Syrians even gave Jumma Khan 
quasi-diplomatic status during 1965 and 1966 as the representative of a 
provisional Baluchistan government-in-exile, but this did not 
survive for too long. 
These developments did little, however, to allay the fears of the late 
Shah, who felt that the Iranian Baluch could still be inspired by their 
Pakistani counterparts.46 The Iranian and Pakistani federal authorities 
shared the common goal of containing the Baluch uprising in 
Pakistan. As early as 1973, the Shah of Iran had publicly declared that 
what was happening in Pakistan 
is vitally important to us and should another event befall that country, we 
would not be able to tolerate other changes or difficulties in Pakistan - we will 
not close our eyes to any secessionist movement - God forbid in your country.47 
In fact, the dismissal of the NAP-JUI government, the first elected 
provincial government in Baluchistan's history, by Zulfikar Ali 
451nterview with an Iranian Baluch requesting anonymity in Washington D. C on 27 
May 1996. 
46Urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nationbuilding in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1989), p. 230. 
47Newsweek, 14 November 1977, p. 70. 
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Bhutto in February 1973 was allegedly at the insistence of the Shah of 
Iran. The Shah, uneasy about the provincial government headed by 
the Baluch, would have been glad to see it go. The Shah's 
preparations for averting a possible crisis in Baluchistan included a 
joint two-week field training exercise held by the Iranian Special 
Forces Units and US Army Green Berets near CharBahar in March 
1978.48 This was followed by other steps including economic aid and 
provision of more arms and ammunition to Pakistan. A squadron of 
Iranian helicopters stationed in Quetta was used in Jhalawan and the 
Marri hills during 1975-76 when the civil war was going on in 
Pakistan. In fact, these AH-IJ Huey-Cobra helicopters, some manned 
by Iranian pilots, joined the Pakistani air force raids and provided the 
key to victory in a crucial battle at Chamalang which killed some 
17,000 guerrillas of the Marri tribe.49 
Arab support 
Arab support for the Baluch, on the other hand, was more muted. 
Most Arab states believed that the Baluch were ethnically of Arab 
origin and thus generally supported their cause. According to one 
source (Riyad Najib Al Rayyes), a commentator in the Saudi-backed 
Paris weekly Al Mostakbal (The Future), the establishment of a Baluch 
nation would not only secure political systems in the Gulf, but would 
enhance and strengthen the Arab presence in the Gulf area by 
protecting it from the continuous flow of immigration from India, 
Korea and other places.so 
48Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 96. 
49Selig Harrison, Nightmare in Baluchistan, op. cit., p. 139. 
SOcited in Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 121. 
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He also declared that 
the establishment of an Arab nation, with its Arab heritage and history, is 
more important than saving an already divided Islamic country ruled by 
military leaders and suffering from fiolitical instability, which makes it 
vulnerable to every threat from outside. 1 
However, like many other countries which supported the Baluch 
movement, the Arab states were also unwilling to take a decisive 
stand on the Baluch issue for fear of disturbing their relations with 
Pakistan, 'which was considered a friendly state. 
Iraq 
Iraq, on the other hand, had more compelling reasons to support the 
Baluch cause. The Shah was backing the Kurdish rebels who were 
opposed to the Baghdad government and Iraq saw this as a good 
opportunity to get back at Iran by siding with the Baluch who were 
natural allies of Iraq in their conflict with Iran. Baghdad became the 
headquarters for intensified radio broadcasting and insurgent 
activities in Iranian Baluchistan. However, lack of political 
consciousness and education, and a policy of co-opting the Sardars to 
serve as agents of the Iranian government, dealt a severe blow to the 
aspirations of the Baluch. The truce between Iran and Iraq in 1975 
lessened the need for Iraq to foment the Baluch insurgency in Iran. By 
mid-1978, Iranian Baluch were therefore rendered leaderless, 
disorganised and politically quiet. 
Slselig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, op. cit., p. 121. 
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The role of the US 
The role of the US in relation to the Baluch was more that of an 
adversary than a friend, as it was aligned with the Pakistani state and 
was providing Pakistan with arms to counter the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan. From· the Baluch perspective, the US-Pakistan special 
relationship was seen as the federal government's greatest weapon 
against them. This stemmed from their belief that the central 
authorities worked largely in the interests of the Punjabis, Pushtuns 
and Mohajirs. To the Baluch most of the policies of the federal 
government, whether the formation of the one-unit in 1955 or the 
military action against them in 1973, were supported and backed by 
the United States. 52 
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US stepped up 
its supply of arms to Pakistan to help the Afghan Mujahideen who 
were fighting against the communist regime in Afghanistan. In 1982, 
the US gave Pakistan $3,200 million in aid, half of which was 
earmarked for overhauling the Pakistan armed forces. Later in 1986 
another $4,600 million was given to the country.53 There was, 
however, a greater fear of the Soviet Union crossing into Baluchistan 
and occuping the Gulf oilfields or the fishing harbours of Gwadur and 
Pasni. To check such an intrusion, it is believed that General Zia ul 
Haq, the then president of Pakistan, offered the US permission to 
open a naval base at Gwadur to monitor submarine and other naval 
movements in the Makran. 54 The role of the US in containing the 
52Mahtab Ali Shah, op. cit., p. 116. 
53See Mahtab Ali Shah, op. cit., p. 19. On US assistance to Pakistan from 1952 to 
1981, see Devidas B. Lohalekar, US Arms to Pakistan - A Study in Alliance Relations 
(New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1991), p. 101. 
54for details see Lawrence Llfschultz, op. cit, p. 741. 
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Baluch insurgency was not direct but it helped indirectly to strengthen 
the Pakistan state in its fight against the Baluch. 
India's role 
India's role in the Baluch crisis has been quite small, though the 
Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), 
reportedly maintained some contact with the Baluch. movement. But 
according to one source, after the Bangladesh crisis, India refrained 
from meddling in the Baluch or Pushtun issue.55 In Ataullah 
Mengal's view, India would not bear any grudge if Baluchistan 
became independent but would not play an important part in the 
process.56 It is widely held in India that a weak and fragmented 
.. Pakistan is not in the long-term interest of India. It would only invite 
external attention in the region which India remains committed to 
keep at bay. This view is, of course, at great variance with that of 
Islamabad, which believes that India would go to any lengths to have 
leverage over Pakistan. 
Viability of a greater and independent Baluchistan 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the Baluch movement 
had important international dimensions. This has been so mainly 
because the Baluch are spread across three countries. With its strategic 
location Baluchistan has always been vulnerable, but the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought far-reaching changes in the 
region and put Baluchistan in the limelight again. It brought out the 
55 Interview with Selig Harrison, 24 May 1996. 
56Lawrence Llfschultz, op. cit., p. 751. 
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conflict between the two superpowers, with the Baluch caught in 
between their own long-term strategic interests in the region. At the 
same time, the level of interest of the concerned countries in the 
Baluch movement has been substantially determined by both their 
· domestic vulnerabilities as well as by their regional concerns. While 
domestic factors - such as lack of trust between the Baluch and 
successive Pakistani federal goverments, low levels of socio-economic 
development, mimimal political participation, and small numbers of 
the Baluch .:.. made the viability of an independent Baluchistan 
suspect, international support for the Baluch movement remained 
generally low-key. 
Broadly there were three factors which prevented large-scale support 
for the emergence of a Greater Baluchistan or an Independent 
Baluchistan. First, as explained earlier, Iran and Afghanistan were 
reluctant to extend support to the movement for fear of disturbing 
their own relations with Pakistan. At the same time, neither was 
willing to exacerbate its own internal insurgencies. The reluctance of 
the Soviet Union, to whom the Baluch leaders looked for help, to 
take any initiative, sealed the fate of the Baluch in the years to come. 
Thus, when the Afghanistan crisis ended, dreams of international 
support waned and the Baluch were left out in the cold. The Baluch 
would never have been able to secure independence on their own but 
might have done so under the aegis of an external ally willing to 
provide them with moral and material support. 
Second, the Baluch diaspora was not united to press for a Greater 
Baluchistan. The Baluch in Pakistan were politically the most active, 
but in both Iran and Afghanistan, they were disorganised and 
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incapable of extending any support to the cause of Greater 
Baluchistan. Finally, the Pushtunistan question did not endear itself 
to the Baluch. Afghanistan wanted a Pushtunistan but the fate of the 
Baluch in the new state was at best ambiguous. The closing of the 
Pushtunistan option, reluctance of the Soviet Union to support the 
Baluch struggle, and the might of the Pakistani state combined with 
US and Iranian support made an Independent or Greater Baluchistan 
a non-viable proposition. 
Punjab 
Like the Baluch, the Punjab crisis also had its external dimesions. This 
section seeks to examine the role of external powers in sustaining and 
strengthening the I<halistan movement. It also analyses how events 
in India had a direct impact on the the political behaviour of the Sikh 
community in other parts of the world and in tum, their contribution 
to the Sikh cause. 
Khalistan issue: Sikh diaspora 
Ethnic groups outside the country are easily affected by events in their 
homeland and ethnic nationalism can be mobilised in support of 
developments in regions that lie outside the home country. Living in 
distant lands and facing the pressure of maintaining thei~ cultural 
identity, expatriate communities tend to be conservative and 
sometimes fanatical about preserving their beliefs. Many Sikhs in the 
diaspora are particularly proud of their distinguishing physical 
features including the 5 K's mentioned in Chapter 3. The Sikhs have 
by and large been very successful in forming their own local networks 
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and are a fairly prosperous community.57 Events in Punjab might 
thus have been expected tohave a strong effect on such a conscious, 
proud and successful people with strong diasporic relations in both 
the industrialised and the underdeveloped countries.SS 
·The effects of the Punjab crisis were felt by the Sikhs in different parts 
of the world, especially in places whe~e they are concentrated in large 
numbers such as the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, West 
Germany and Ecuador. In the aftermath of Operation Blue Star in 
1984, shocked and outraged Sikh communities organised mass 
demonstrations in the UK and North America. 
A steady stream of writing in the form of magazines and newspapers 
such as the World Sikh News (USA), Desh Pardesh and Awaz-e-
Quam (UK), and the Sikh Spectrum (Canada), kept the issue of 
Khalistan alive. Extremist organisations such as the National Council 
of Khalistan (with Dr Jagjit Singh Chauhan as president), and Babbar 
Khalsa International and Dal Khalsa led by Sukhdev Singh Babbar 
and Gajinder Singh respectively, flourished in different parts of the 
world, particularly in the US, Canada, Italy, Denmark, Holland, and 
the United Kingdom.59 
57p1aces of worship hold a- special significance for the people of subcontinental origin, 
being the focus of religious, political and social activities. In the case of the Sikhs, 
the Gurudwaras played a vital role in mobilising public opinion. 
58There is a substantial literature on Sikhs in Punjab and on the diaspora. See 
Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, 2 vols (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1966); Gerald Barrier and Verne Dusenbery (eds), The Sikh Diaspora (Delhi: 
Chanakya Publishers, 1989); and Joseph O'Connell and Milton Israel (eds), Sikh 
History and Religion in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto, 
Centre for South Asian Studies, 1988). 
59Times Of India (New Delhi), 15 March 1992. For organisations in the UK see 
Shinder Thandi, 'The Punjabi Diaspora in the UK and the Punjab Crisis," in Pashaura 
Singh and N. Gerald Barrier (eds), The Transmission of Sikh Heritage in the 
Diaspora (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1996), p. 235. 
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It may be observed that Indians constitute 31 percent of the British 
ethnic minority population and according to one source, there are 
about 300,000 Sikhs living in the urban areas of Britain.60 The 
historical relationship between Britain and the Sikhs, and the sheer 
size of the Sikh population in the United Kingdom, combined to give 
Sikhs a very distinctive voice outside their homeland. Tension 
erupted between the Sikhs and Hindus residing overseas in 1984, 
undermining the sense of unity that existed within the Indian 
community.61 Many underwent the amrit pahull ceremony (baptism) 
for the first time, to show their commitment to the Sikh panth. 
Reports from relatives and friends in India on the torture of innocent 
Sikhs during the November 1984 riots magnified the pain of the 
expatriate Sikhs.62 Growing evidence of state repression, human 
rights violations by the security forces,63 and constant prevarication 
on the part of the Indian government over action against those 
responsible for the Sikh massacres in Delhi and other cities, made the 
Sikhs believe that they would be better off in a sovereign state 
independent of India. 
60Roger Ballard, "Differentiation and Disjunction among the Sikhs," in Roger 
Ballard (ed.), Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain (London: 
Christopher Hurst & Co, 1994), p. 9. 
61 For example, allegations of the Indian High Commission distributing video films to 
Indians in Britain to present the official viewpoint of the Indian government, and of 
using its connections to collect information on all those Sikhs who were sympathetic to 
the Khalistan cause, created many differences between the Sikh and the Hindu 
population in Bristol. See Rohit Barot, "The Punjab Crisis and Bristol Indians," 
International Journal of Punjab Studies, Vol. 2, no. 2, 1995, p. 206. 
62observations made from interviews conducted during the course of my field work in 
London, where Sikhs had gathered for a meal (langar) at a Sikh temple in South 
Hall, London. 
63 See Amnesty International, India: Human Rights Violations in Punjab: Use and 
Abuse of Law (London, 1991); and Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, Human Rights Watch 
(Washington D.C, 1991). 
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The Sikh organisations outside were actively involved in collecting 
funds and organising training camps for the militants. In 1981 as 
many as 25 percent of Sikhs were living outside Punjab, and they were 
sending huge remittances to Punjab. Sikh militants were reported to 
have received training in schools in US and Canada, the latter serving 
as a safe haven for Sikhs escaping arrests and legal actions in India.64 
Extremist organisations were functioning abroad, with the support of 
some Sikh leaders who wanted a sepearte homeland for the Sikhs -
Khalistan - in India. Prominent among them was Ganga Singh 
Dhillon, a US national who headed the Nankana Sahib Foundation, 
and declared the Sikhs to be a separate nation. 
Demand for Khalistan 
Dr J agjit Singh Chauhan, a former medical practitioner and finance 
minister of Punjab, put forth the demand for Khalistan for the first 
time in London in an interview in September 1971. Subsequently, a 
press note was issued in Jullandhur on 16 June 1980 with the 
proclamation of the Government of Khalistan before the Akal. Takht 
at Amritsar, and a similar press release was issued in London naming 
Dr Jagjit Singh as the president of the Republic of Khalistan. 
A handwritten declaration appealed to other countries to recognise 
the Khalistan government and accord permission for opening its 
embassies in their countries. Khalistan was to be carved out of the 
state of Punjab and Sikh-dominated areas of Himachal Pradesh, 
Haryana and Rajasthan. It was envisaged as ,a democratic sovereign 
republic; a secular state in which the rights of minorities would be 
64sharda Jain, op. cit., p. 238. 
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respected; which would be free from exploitation of man by man; and 
a state in which the people of Punjab would be offered opportunities 
for progress and prosperity through freedom of trade, and freedom of 
religious beliefs and worship.65 A document entitled "Proclamation of 
Khalistan Council" was also released, according to which Khalistan 
was to have its own currency, flag, passport, and stamps. 66 
The declaration charged New Delhi with denial of political power to 
the Sikhs, the suppression of Sikh cultural traditions, and failure to 
secure management of Sikh shrines in Pakistan. It stated that the 
central government was dominated by anti-Sikh Hindus and the Sikh 
community had liberated itself from the purview of the Indian 
constitution and law.67 It appealed to all countries to recognise the 
Khalistan government and accord permission for opening its 
embassies in their countries.68 At a convention held in California on 
3 May 1981, Dr Singh claimed that the demand for Khalistan had the 
approval of the SGPC and Akal Takht, and appealed to Sikhs all over 
the world to extend their whole-hearted support to him so that the 
mass movement could force the Government of India to accede to 
their demands. 
It is clear from the foregoing that various Sikh organisations were 
involved during the period under study in actively propogating the 
cause of Khalistan. However, except for some instances where the US 
and the United Kingdom allowed Dr Jagjit Singh Chauhan to enter 
65Khalistan Times , 3 March 1985. 
66see Annexure D, Sikh "Agitation in Khalistan" (Note prepared by the Home 
Ministry) in Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh, Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Blue 
Star and After (New Delhi: Vision books Pvt Ltd, 1984), p. 145. 
67Ibid., p. 143. . 
68fuid., p. 143. 
I 
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their countries and gain publicity on the Khalistan issue,69 there has 
been no · direct evidence of these countries aiding the Khalistan 
movement. The signing of the special extradition treaty and an 
agreement on confiscation of extremists' assets in 1992 between India 
and the United Kingdom, and its ratification by the British 
parliament, allayed any remaining doubts on that score.70 On balance, 
while the organisations were able to to focus international attention 
on the Khalistan movement and to favourably influence public 
opinion in some of these countries, they could not mobilise any 
political support for the Sikh movement. 
The role of Pakistan in the Khakistan crisis 
The role of Pakistan in the Khalistan crisis was, however, another 
matter. A history of invasions (India and Pakistan have gone to war 
three times since 1947) has made both India and Pakistan vulnerable 
and prone to believing that a foreign hand is behind their domestic 
troubles. Fear and paranoia exist on both sides. It is generally believed 
that since Delhi helped in the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan was 
determined to get even. Former Indian prime minister, Inder Kumar 
Gujral, believed that Pakistan was involved in terrorism in Punjab. 
69There were rumours that Dr Chauhan went on British radio and apparently 
publicly announced a reward for anyone who would kill Mrs Gandhi, the then prime 
minister of India. 
70For details of the treaty see Pashaura Singh and Gerald N. Barrier (eds), op. cit., 
pp. 237-38, p. 246. 
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Back in the mid-1980s he said that 
It is safe to assume that General Zia's regime has been deriving perverse 
satisfaction from our difficulties. Some of his advisors do not mind even stoking 
the fire that may, at some future date, offer them an opportunity to avenge the 
birth of Bangladesh. 71 
According to a Pakistani scholar, distrust of P~tan has been used by 
the Indian government and by sections of the Indian press to make 
the _Indian public believe that the deteriorating situation in the Punjab 
is a result of Pakistani manipulation.72 However, despite numerous 
allegations and counter-allegations, the veracity of these charges is 
difficult to prove. 
The Indian government has time and again pointed to the 
involvement of "a foreign hand," a veiled reference to Pakistan in 
abetting the movement. India claimed that Pakistan provided Sikh 
secessionists with sanctuary, arms, money, training and moral 
support, and encouraged their demand for a separate homeland. It 
believed that Pakistan was taking a close interest in the affairs of the 
Punjab by playing up the grievances of the Sikhs and characterising 
the government of India as a government of the Hindus 
discriminating against the Sikhs. Pakistan had allegedly also exploited 
the visits of Sikh pilgrims to holy places in Pakistan by giving them 
special attention. A note prepared by the home ministry went as far as 
to describe Dr Jagjit Chauhan and Ganga Singh Dhillon as pawns in 
711.K. Gujral, "Unravelling the Punjabi Knot," Mainstream, 26 January 1985. 
72see Rasul B. Rais, "Internationalization of the Punjab Crisis: A Pakistani 
Perspective," in K.M. de Silva and RJ. May (eds), op. cit., p. 43. For a Pakistani 
perspective on the Punjab crisis see Ghani Jafar, The Sikh Volcano (Islamabad: 
Vanguard Books, 1987). 
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the hands of the Pakistan High Commission, used to denigrate 
India.73 
The accusations against Pakistan began to increase in 1986-87 when 
the Government of India presented its case, based largely on 
circumstantial evidence, including broadcasts of the Pakistani media, 
interrogation reports, reports of trans-border encounters, and phone 
calls.74 
Militancy in Punjab 
In order to study militant linkages in Punjab, it is important to note 
that Punjab has always had a history of movements which used 
violence as a method of mobilising people whether in the form of the 
the Namdhari movement, Ghadar Lehar or Babbar Akalis which with 
their anti imperialist thrust laid the foundations for the subsequent 
struggles waged by the Sikhs for the realisation of their causes.75 Even 
the demand for the Punjabi suba, which culminated in the formation 
of the present state in 1966, had its origin in the politico military genre 
of the Sikh religion from the time of Guru Gobind Singh and the 
desire for Sikhs to regain the territory ruled by Maharaja Ranjit Singh 
during the 19th century. Thus the call for an independent state of 
Khalistan as a home for the Sikhs, was not entirely unexpected. 
73 Annexure D, "Sikh Agitation in Khalistan" (Note prepared by the Home Ministry) 
in Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh, op. cit., pp. 150-51. 
74see Richard P. Cronin, "Crisis in Indian Punjab: Evolution, Issues, Competing 
Positions and Prospects", Report No.84-152 F, Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress, August 1984, p. CRS-27. 
75oetails of the above have been provided in the preceding chapter. 
259 
Terrorism is a widespread phenomenon affecting most parts of the 
present day world. It can be defined as the" method or the theory 
behind the method whereby an organised group or party seeks to 
achieve the avowed aim chiefly through systematic use of violence.76 
Others define it as a process of terror involving the following 
elements: "the act or threat of violence", the emotional reaction, and 
the social effects".77 Paul Wilkinson defines it as coercive 
intimidation, which is, in practice a systematic use of murder and 
destruction and the threat of murder and destruction in order to 
terrorise individuals, groups, communities or governments into 
conceding to the terrorists' political demands.78 
Unlike other forms of violence, terrorism is an organised and 
planned activity with a definite programme and objective. It 
recognises no ethical boundaries to the use of violence and since its 
goals are often protracted and difficult, expropriations in the form of 
bank robberies, kidnappings, hijackings are a common means of 
susta~ing the struggle. Many factors inspire and motivate terrorisi:n. 
Gurr's model of relative deprivation posits that when a group of 
people feels discriminated against other members of the larger 
populace, they start to demand justice or a redressal of their 
grievances and in the process may go further and want a separate 
homeland for themselves. Another view is that terrorism is the 
chosen method of the privileged class and not the downtrodden, 
though the latter may join the terrorist campaign under pressure or 
76 J. B. S Hardman, "Terrorism," in E.R. Seligman (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences 14 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 575. 
77T.P.Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in H. Eckstein (ed.), 
Internal War (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 73. 
78P.Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan Press, 1986), pp. 
23-24. 
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fear of the terrorists. It can also be said to originate in societies where 
there is lack of opportunity for political participation and absence of 
the methods of redressal of grievances among groups. Any of these 
factors may trigger terrorism in societies.79 
In Punjab, it was believed, that the militant organisations worked in 
co-ordination with one another and had strong links with Pakistan. 
Some of the important ones were the Khalistan Commando Force 
(KCF); Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF); Bhindrawale Tiger Force of 
Khalistan (BTFK), Babbars; and Khalistan Liberation Organisation 
(KLO). The KCF was constituted by the first Panthic Committee in 
February 1986. Led first by Manbir Singh Cheheru and Sukha Sipahi, 
it later split up and came under the leadership of Wassan Singh 
Zaffarwal who was notorious for his involvement in large-scale 
smuggling of arms from Pakistan.BO To widen the scope of its 
activities, the KCF worked with other groups such as the BTFK, 
formed by Gurbacchan Singh Manochahal in 1987, and the Babbar 
Khalsa led by Sukhdev Singh Babbar Dasuwal, which was known to 
have sent a number of its members (such as Wadhwa Singh and 
Tarseem Singh) across the border for training in handling of arms and 
explosives.Bl 
The government did not produce any explicit evidence, but there 
were leaks of the interrogation records of some militants who had 
79for details on the above see Ted Robert Gurr, "Some Characteristics of Political 
Terrorism in the 1960s," in Michael Stohl (ed), The Politics of Terrorism (NY: Marced 
Dekker, 1988), pp. 31-35; Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative 
Politics,Vol.13, no. 4, July 1981, pp. 379-99; Sharda Jain, Politics of Terrorism in India-
-The case of Punjab (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), pp. 93-99. 
80for details on the KCF and profiles of KCF guerrilla's, including an interview with 
Zaffarwal, see Joyce. M. Pettigrew, op. cit, pp. 82-100; 143-86. 
Blved Marwah, Uncivil Wars, The Pathology of Terrorism in India (New Delhi: 
INDUS, 1995), pp. 213-24. 
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been apprehended. The Indian government buttressed its argument 
by later evidence which showed that between 1986 and 1989 the 
quantity of apprehended weaponry increased: AK rifles from 73 to 295; 
other guns and rifles from 155 to 300; handguns from 584 to 635; and 
rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) from 3 to 17.82 Equipment used by 
the militants included sophisticated General Purpose Machine Guns 
(GPMGs) and explosives, with some advanced accessories such as 
night vision equipment, Dragunov sniper rifles, and transceiver sets. 
Babbar Khalsa International leaders like Talwinder Singh Parmar and 
Gurdip Singh Sibia of Babbar Khalsa UK, who surrendered in 1992, 
admitted to links with Pakistan. They had been living in Pakistan for 
the past 18 months, but Pakistan denied any responsibility and argued 
that confessional statements hardly constituted proof.83 
Though not much information is available on the logistics and arms 
provided to the insurgents, recovery of Chinese-made AKMs 
(popularly listed as AK-47 assault rifles) and RPGs pointed to 
Pakistan's involvement. It was believed that these could not have 
come to India without the active support and facilitation of an outside 
force. Armed intrusions across the Pakistani border, and interrogation 
of terrorists who were apprehended by Indian security forces, also 
revealed the existence of many camps training Sikh militants in such 
places as Sialkot, Gujranwala, Lahore, Kasur, Sargodha, Abbotaabad, 
Murree and Faisalabad. One such source, Amrik Singh of Gurdaspur 
district, who was the working president of the Akal Federation, a 
militant outfit based in Pakistan, confessed that following Operation 
Blue Star he had crossed the border, along with Wassan Singh 
82Manoj Joshi, op. cit., p. 2. 
83 Frontline, 28 May -10 June 1988, p. 14. 
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Zafarwal, and at the behest of a Pakistani official sent 100 boys into 
Pakistan in 1984. Some 375 youth were being motivated and trained in 
Faisalabad to fight for Khalistan. 
In April 1985, meetings were held in Lahore between militant leaders 
like Amrik Singh, Gurjit Singh and Attinderpal Singh of the AISSF, 
and Ajaib Singh (Damdami Taksal), with Pakistan officials to discuss 
the issue. Betwee.n February and July 1986, Pakistani intelligence 
headed by Malik sent more than 100 trained terrorists, grouped in 
twelve teams, across the Punjab border. Pressure was allegedly being 
put on Gurjit Singh to declare the formation of Khalistan, or the flow 
of weapons to Punjab would be cut off. 
The White Paper prepared by the government of India stated as early 
as 1984 that the militants were able to obtain sophisticated arms 
through sources outside the country and by developing clandestine 
links with sources within the country. The government believed that 
there were large illegal flows of arms into India from across the border 
and that the terrorists were receiving different types of active support 
from certain foreign forces, but could not divulge more information 
for the sake of public interest.84 
The response of the expatriate Sikhs to this was interesting. The Blue 
Paper brought out by the World Sikh Organisation alleged that some 
of the arms found in the precincts of the Golden Temple were gift-
wrapped and planted in the Golden Temple. They claimed that the 
arms shown in the video clips had been prepared by government 
84White Paper on the Punjab Agitation (New Delhi: Government of India, 10 July 
1984) p. 57. 
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agents as part of a misinformation campaign, and pointed out that the 
brand new identification labels were still intact; if the Chinese and/ or 
Pakistanis had supplied these arms they would have at least removed 
the labels.85 
In 1990, the Governor of Punjab state in India, Virendra Verma, 
testified to the involvement of Pakistan in training and encouraging 
subversive activities in India. He said that according to Indian 
intelligence agencies there was a man in the Pakistani province of 
Sind who taught Gurbani (songs in praise of the Gurus) to 300 
Muslims who wore turbans and spoke fluent Punjabi. They were 
meant to infiltrate the state and spread terror.86 
Details of flights taken by non-Indian Sikhs residing in the US, 
Canada and the United Kingdom were given as evidence that 
Pakistan was allowing them to use its territory for hostile acts against 
India. Another source, Mohan Inder Singh Sachdev, affiliated to the 
International Youth Federation in Canada and arrested in January 
1987, gave in his confessional statement details of the flow of money 
from Canada to Pakistan and the arrangements in Canada to purchase 
weapons for shipment to Punjab~87 
Although it may be argued that there· is little documentary evidence 
to prove Pakistan's complicity in abetting the Sikh movement, many 
Indians remain convinced of Pakistan's connivance in Punjab. Some 
even believed that Pakistan was working to destabilise both Kashmir 
85Blue Paper on the Massacre in the Sikh Homeland - In Response to Mrs Gandhi's 
White Paper Dated 10 July 1984, NewYork:World Sikh Organisation, 25 July 1984). 
86frontline, 8-12 December 1990. 
87For details see ibid., p. 15. 
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and Punjab through what is popularly referred to as the K2 (Kashmir-
Khalistan) plan.88 Another point of view, somewhat far-fetched, saw 
the Punjab crisis as an international conspiracy hatched by America, 
Britain and Canada.89 According to one of its proponents, "All the 
above mentioned countries were involved, especially the US, as it 
wanted to control Kashmir, and Punjab is a stepping stone to 
Kashmir. "90 
Another important external link to the Punjab crisis is provided by 
the strong nexus between the militants and large-scale smuggling 
operations. Militancy is inextricably linked with drug trafficking, 
which has been rampant the world over and used for a myriad of 
purposes: by military establishments to sustain their regimes, by the 
financial underworld to help generate black money, and by insurgents 
as a means of generating income to buy arms for their cause. 
In South Asia particularly, the growing nexus of "narco-terrorism" 
has emerged as an area of great concern. The flow of hard drugs from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan has undoubtedly had a bearing on the 
Punjab crisis. From the early 1980s, with the liberalisation of import 
policies by India, the nature of smuggling changed from transistor sets 
and watches to· hard drugs. According to one theory, "Khalistan 
served as a respectable facade for massive international drug running 
though there are a handful of fanatics fighting for the Khalistani 
cause."91 
BBBased on wide-ranging interviews held with a cross-section of political influentials 
in Punjab during the course of my field work in July-November 1996. 
89Th.is is the line taken by the Communists in India. 
90Jnterview with Mr Joginder Dayal, Secretary, Communist Party of India (Punjab) on 
6November1996. 
91 Frontline, May-June, 1988, p. 19. 
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However, one cannot look at the Khalistan issue as a by-product of 
smuggling operations. The issue of drug trafficking is important in 
that it establishes external links for covert financial assistance to the 
warring groups and allows outside powers to provide covert 
assistance. It is a view held widely in informed circles in India that 
Pakistan has used its support for militancy in Punjab as a form of 
surrogate warfare: one for which it can never be held directly 
responsible but which could nonetheless weaken the stability of India. 
Khalistan - a viable proposition? 
Having studied the the external dimensions of the Khalistan crisis, 
one might ask whether Khalistan was ever a viable proposition. 
According to Stephen Cohen, Khalistan was not so much an 
independent movement as an expression of injustice meted out to the 
Sikhs. An independent Khalistan, the Sikhs soon realised, was not 
strategically viable; they were better off in a larger thriving India, buf 
wanted some gratification or ~pology for the attack on the Golden 
Temple and the killings and humiliation of Sikhs.92 Arun Singh, a 
former minister in Rajeev Gandhi's cabinet, doubted whether there 
was any real evidence of a mass movement for secession from India. 
"Insurgency is economic and not political and if there was a problem, 
India would be brought to its knees because Punjab is the granary of 
India."93 
A closer scrutiny of the facts lends weight to these sentiments. The 
demand for Khalistan was fraught with difficulties from the very 
92Interview with Prof. Stephen Cohen, University of Urbana Champaign, Illinois, 
June1996. 
93Jnterview with Arun Singh, University of Urbana Champaign, Illinois, June 1996. 
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outset. First, the existence of an independent Khalistan was 
unacceptable to India, which would resist it wholeheartedly. A 
secessionist movement in India would have made its frontiers 
vulnerable to outside powers and, more significantly, would have 
challenged the integrity of the country. India was already struggling to 
contain ethnic insurgencies in different parts of the country. The 
creation of an independent state of Khalistan could have led to other 
ethnic communities demanding autonomy, producing a series of 
rebellions which could have endangered the unity of the Indian state, 
an eventuality the federal government was not prepared to accept. 
Second, it is generally recognised that even in the event of its 
formation, Khalistan would have been economically and strategically 
non-viable. Its borders would have been too long as compared to its 
small size and area. Although Dr Jagjit Singh Chauhan believed that 
agriculture would be the mainstay of the economy of Khalistan and 
that it was through agro-industries, small-scale industries, foreign 
exchange remittances from emigrants, and skilled manpower that 
Khalistan would survive, not many shared his view.94 His belief that 
in the event of Khalistan forming a confederation with Kashmir, 
Khalistan would become another centre of international tourism.95 
was also not borne out by the realities. Given its land-locked nature, 
Khalistan would have have been totally dependent on other powers 
and this could well have proved a handicap for trading purposes. 
While politically and ideologically Khalistan was to be based on the 
ideology of Guru Nanak, this rather simplistic assumption 
94Maqsood Ahmed Masod and Peter Stockdale, The Khalistan Riddle (Islamabad: 
Modem Book Depot, 1988), pp. 141-42. 
95fuid., pp. 143; p. 146. 
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overlooked the numerical strength of the Hindus who are found in 
great numbers in Punjab. After 1966, Sikhs constituted 54 percent of 
total population of Punjab and the the Hindus made up 45 percent. 
The last census of 1991 showed an increase in the Sikh population to 
65 percent. But even under these circumstances, the Hindus constitute 
a sizeable minority.96 Moreover, if the Khalistan state were to include 
areas of Rajasthan and Himachal _Pradesh in which the Hindus 
dominate, Sikh numbers would have been reduced further in 
Khalistan. 
Punjab has a culture and language that transcends religious 
boundaries. Although British communal policies of separate 
communal electorates accentuated communal divisions, which 
existed even after independence, and have been used time and again 
by elites and politicians to adversely affect the formation of a secular 
polity in Punjab, the composite linguistic cultural ethos of Punjab has 
had its own deep-rooted dynamism.97 According to one source, the 
conception of Khalistan was erroneous since it was based on a false 
reading of Sikh history and a lack of understanding of the symbiosis 
that existed between the two communities.98 
The relationship between the two communities, Hindu and Sikh, 
may have been strained but practices such as inter-marriage, the 
,_ 
custom of the eldest son of some families becoming a baptised Sikh, 
and reverence for some Sikh gurus by Hindus, are all small instances 
of the deep bonding between the two communities. 
96See Census of India 1991, Series 1, Paper 1 of 1995 (New DeJhi: Registrar General 
and Census Commission, 1995), pp. xvi-xvii. 
97For an expansion of this idea, see Pramod Kumar, "Violence in Punjab," Seminar, 
434, October 1995, pp. 55-58. 
98Manoj Joshi, Combating Terrorism in Punjab, op. cit., p. 18. 
268 
Alhough the Khalistan cause was taken up by expatriates like Dr 
Chauhan and Ganga Singh Dhillon, it never found a meaningful 
expression among the Sikh people at large. The remained a vision 
nurtured with a passion by Sikhs who lived overseas.99 Most political 
leaders abstained from making definite statements on Khalistan.100 
Even Bhindranwale did not openly demand Khalistan. He is 
supposed to have said in one of his speeches that he did not demand 
Khalistan, but if the government gave it he would not reject it.101 
Bhindrawale felt that the formation of Khalistan would save the 
community from exploitation by the central government and 
preserve the purity of the Sikh community. 
With the rise of militancy, the rhetoric shifted dramatically. Most 
militant groups demanded Khalistan; but the subsequent overthrow 
of these groups and the people's rejection of violence and disorder 
marked th.e end of the Khalistan movement. The non-viability of 
Khalistan as a stable political, geographical and economic entity 
exposed the hollowness of the claims of the self-styled proponents of 
Khalistan. 
Conclusion 
Both the Baluch and Khalistan movements are unique in nature and 
composition, but there is nonetheless a common thread running 
through them. Both movements turned secessionist at one point and 
sought to carve out independent territories for themselves. Both were 
99Robin Jeffrey, Whats Happening to India, op. cit., p. 211. 
lOOfor interviews with leaders and prominent personalities see Satinder Singh 
Khalistan: An Academic Analysis (New Delhi: Amar Prakashan, 1982), pp. 142-82. 
101 Interview with Gurtej Singh, an ex-IAS officer and a close aide of Bhindranwale, 
in Chandigarh, October 1996. 
: 
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extremely vulnerable border territories and neither India nor Pakistan would have 
been willing to open up their frontiers by acceding to the demand for 
independence. 
A crucial factor in the decline of both movements was the lack of concrete 
external support. There were several powers involved in the Baluch crisis, but 
none were willing to extend their wholehearted support for the realisation of an 
Independent or Greater Baluchistan. External support for the Baluch remained 
largely confined to verbal sympathy and moral support. In the case of Khalistan, 
large-scale material and military assistance was allegedly provided by Pakistan. 
This, however, failed to make an appreciable impact on the movement for an 
independent state ofKhalistan. 
Independence was never a viable proposition for either of the movements. There 
was no international support, political, diplomatic or moral, for carving out 
independent states. Major powers, including the US, the former Soviet Union and 
China, which had important concerns in South Asia, remained wary of any 
separatist tendencies in the region, which would have affected their long-term 
security interests. The absence of committed outside support, the swift and 
forceful response of the two federal states, and the nature of the insurgencies 
sealed the fates of the two movements. 
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CONCLUSION 
It was a common view in the 1950s and 1960s among social theorists, 
looking at the post-colonial states of Asia and Africa, that with the 
development of the industrial society, the political significance of 
ethnic or cultural cleavages would diminish and disappear over time. 
However, the experience of most newly independent multi-ethnic 
states has not borne out this expectation. Indeed the problem of 
integrating ethnically disparate groups has been one of the most 
onerous tasks of nation-building. 
This thesis has focussed on elucidating current views of the role of 
ethnicity in Third World countries. As discussed in Chapter 1, there 
are many theories which explain the rise of ethnic conflict. Some of 
these include: the modernisation school which posits that ethnic 
conflicts would fade away with the passage of time; the theory of 
relative deprivation which stresses the psychological underpinnings 
of violent action caused by the sense of relative deprivation among 
people against the political system; the internal colonialism model 
which maintains that conflict is produced when a group is convinced 
that it has been turned into an Lnternal colony by the dominant ethnic 
group, and the instrumentalist theory which views ethnicity as a 
social and political construction of the elites to derive political and 
economic advantages for the groups and themselves. This thesis has 
subscribed to the view that no one theory can be applied exclusively to 
explain the rise of separatism. It has used various theories to highlight 
certain aspects of conflicts in South Asia, particularly those involving 
the Baluch in Pakistan and the Sikhs in India. 
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While attempting to examine the process of nation-building in South 
Asia, this thesis pursued two objectives. First, it argued that it was 
impossible to understand fully the dynamics of ethnic conflict 
without analysing the nature of a movement, the state's response, 
and the role of external factors. Moreover, the interactfon between 
these variables is dynamic; and at each stage of the progression of the 
movement these variables were interacting with each other. They 
have been used to explain the failure of the Baluch and the Khalistan 
movement. As mentioned earlier, this model cannot explain all the 
complexities of a holistic situation but serves as a paradigm. Second, 
this thesis examined the state in South Asia, with particular reference 
to Pakistan and India, and the effects of the policies adopted by the 
states in the post -colonial era. 
The prospects for secession by an ethnic group depend on the above 
mentioned factors. The policies of the state have a direct bearing on 
the ethnic struggle. The state plays a critical role in exacerbating, as 
well as defusing, ethnic challenges and provides the initial impetus 
for political mobilisation. Misguided policies can aggravate ethnic 
problems and turn potentially violent situations into deadly 
confrontations. On the other hand, relatively benign and 
accommodating policies can keep countries intact even in the most 
difficult circumstances. According to Michael Brown, demographic 
factors and ethnic geography, fears and goals of ethnic groups, and 
economic factors and trends are not immutable, but are dynamic 
factors that are influenced to a significant degree by governmental 
initiatives and policies.1 
1 Michael E. Brown, "The Impact of Government Policies on Ethnic Relations," in 
Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (eds), Government Policies and Ethnic Relations 
in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 512. 
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If the strategies of the state help to germinate separatist feelings 
among ethnic groups, the nature of the movement decides its future. 
The nature of the movement is an indication of its relative strength 
in the prevailing political environment. It encompasses 
organisational structure, leadership patterns, and the role of elites; 
these determine the duration of the movement and its capacity to 
wage a protracted struggle. But even if the movement is cohesive, 
with a strong leadership base and infrastructure, it is unlikely to 
achieve secession on its own. 
A crucial factor is external support, either from an ext~I'Tl.Cil power or 
from a diaspora; these provide both moral and material help to the 
insurgents. External intervention takes place because the contending 
parties in a civil strife develop external linkages and seek external 
help from them to strengthen their position in the domestic strife, or 
because external actors take the opportunity to restructure the 
international and regional situation to their advantage. However, 
external intervention has its limitations. In international law ethnic 
minorities lack the right of self-determination. External support is 
thus difficult to obtain. Most multi-ethnic states refrain from giving 
their whole-hearted support to separatist movements for fear of 
risking a similar situation in their own territory. Further, no state is 
willing to commit itself to a movement that appears weak. 
However, external support is effective only if the movement is strong 
in all other respects. The creation of Bangladesh, which remains the 
only successful secessionist movement in the subcontinent, 
demonstrates this. The people in East Pakistan were disillusioned 
with the policies of the federal government in Pakistan; their 
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separatist movement had a strong organisational base and a mass-
based appeal; and intervention by India ultimately helped in the 
creation of the new state. If the movement had not been strong 
enough, external support would not have precipitated such an event; 
on the other hand, without external support secession would 
undoubtedly have been difficult. Thus the presence of all three factors 
is vital to the success of any movement. For example, the birth of the 
LTTE can be explained by discriminatory strategies of past 
governments in Sri Lanka; its tenacity and the long duration of its 
struggle can be attributed to the well organised nature of the LTTE 
itself, but the realisation of an Eelam, or a separate. homeland, needs 
the assistance of an external power, which appears under the present 
circumstances to be unlikely. 
The three factors of the nature of the movement, external support and 
response of the government - apply wholly to the secessionist 
activities involving the Baluch and the Sikhs. The mobilising factors 
and the nature of the movements were very different in the two cases, 
but two factors were common to both: the strategies of the states, 
which maintained a combination of coercion and conciliation; and 
the presence of external intervention. 
The main reasons for the decline of the Baluch insurgency can be 
attributed to the weak nature of the movement; the efficacy of the 
strategies pursued by the central leadership, particularly Zia-ul-Haq; 
and, more importantly, the lack of any meaningful outside support. In 
terms of the nature of the movement, the potential for Baluch protest 
had been weakened by the territorial dispersion of the Baluch across 
three countries and several provinces of Pakistan. With low literacy 
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rates, late development of the Baluchi script, and the absence of an 
educated middle class, the Baluch movement could not develop a 
mass character. Moreover, differences among the Baluch leadership 
on the means and ends of their struggle, fragmented character of the 
Baluch tribes, and competing rivalries between the Baluch and 
Pushtuns in the province also militated against political assertion of 
the Baluch community. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, these weaknesses were exploited by the 
central leadership, under General Zia ul Haq, by co-option of tribal 
leaders, and strategic allocation of funds for developmental programs. 
With the strategies geared more towards assimilation and 
conciliation, rather than confrontation, there was little incentive for 
the tribes to fight for an independent Baluchistan. 
Lack of support from outside powers made the emergence of an 
independent or greater Baluchistan even more p_roblematic. Although 
there were several powers involved in the Baluch crisis, none was 
willing to extend its wholehearted support for the secession of 
Baluchistan from Pakistan. Their assistance was largely confined to 
verbal sympathy and moral empathy. Major powers, including the 
United States, the Soviet Union and China (which had important 
concerns in South Asia) remained wary of any trend towards 
"Balkanisation" in the region, which would have affected their long-
term security interests. 
But while uneven distribution of resources leading to the 
underdeveloped nature of Baluchistan and exploitative tendencies of 
the central government were significant factors propelling the 
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separatist demands of the Baluch, these hardly explain the demand for 
I<halistan by the Sikhs in Indian Punjab. Going by all socio-economic 
indicators, Punjab is clearly one of the most prosperous states of India, 
with relatively high literacy rates and one of the highest per capita 
incomes in the country. The coming of the green revolution increased 
food pfoduction, making Punjab the granary of India. Yet some Sikhs 
turned separatist. 
The Punjab crisis was essentially a part of the Sikhs' quest for a 
separate religious identity vis-a-vis the Hindus and for more political 
autonomy. . Political dithering and non-resolution of water and 
boundary disputes issues, compounded by the centralising policies of 
the Congress government, made the Sikhs clamour for a separate 
homeland. The selection of the religious symbol by the central and 
state elites underscored the religious identity of the Sikhs vis-a-vis the 
Hindus, with its extreme manifestation being the demand for 
I<halistan. This contributed to communal unrest and the upsurge of 
ethnic sentiments. In time all other parties tapped into the reservoir 
of ethnic mobilisation which resulted in more than a decade of 
violence. 
The I<halistan movement proved to be enduring because, by the early 
1980s, it had all the three factors working in its favour. First, the 
centralising policies of the state had already sown the seeds of 
discontent among the Sikhs. Second, the movement was strong from 
the start; it drew its initial capacity for action from a developed 
organisational infrastructure which comprised inter alia several 
militant outfits such as the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), 
' . 
Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), and Khalistan Liberation 
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Organisation (KLO). Moreover, the support for the cause of Khalistan 
by the Sikh people, outraged by the attack on the Golden Temple in 
June 1984 and the massacres of the Sikhs that followed the 
assassination of Mrs Gandhi later that year, made militants 
formidable players. Third, external support from the Sikh diaspora in 
the US and UK, as well as from Pakistan, which was allegedly 
providing Sikh secessionists with sanctuary, arms, money, and 
training, helped to sustain the movement. 
At the same time it must be emphasised that the lack of unequivocal, 
external support for an independent Khalistan was a major setback to 
the movement's plans. The reasons for the failure of the movement, 
also lay with the methods used by the state to crush the militant 
movement. It was deploying, by the late 1980s and early 199"0s, the 
army, the federal police, and the paramilitary forces, who worked 
through a series of well-planned operations to overcome the 
militants. By this time the movement itself had come under 
considerable pressure. The various organisations were losing support 
from the people; their membership had begun to attract lumpen 
elements who were joining the movements for the lure of money 
rather than the long cherished cause of a separate homeland for the 
Sikhs. Incarceration and the killing of prominent militant leaders 
weakened the organisations and made them susceptible to 
suppression by federal agencies. The entire movement had begun to 
lose direction by 1991. Added to this, Pakistani support, under 
increasing pressure from the West, declined considerably making it 
harder for the movement to stay alive. Even if external support was 
available, it could do little in the face of the virtual annihilation of the 
leadership and the complete control exercised by the federal 
277 
government. Ultimately none of the three factors worked in the 
favour of the movement. 
The modem state as seen in the Baluch and Sikh case studies, acts as 
the dominant agent of change and control in Third World countries. 
Ultimately it remains the only societal organisation capable of dealing 
with separatism efficiently. Ethnic conflict is but a political 
contradiction between the mono-ethnic character of the state power 
structure and the polyethnic social system. 
Post-colonial development is characterised not so mu<:h l:>y nation-
building, as is commonly assumed, but by state building. The latter is 
undertaken as a means to stabilise, extend and strengthen the 
institutions of the central state as a precondition for national 
integration and modernisation. The consolidation of state power is 
justified not only to ward off possible external threats but to defend 
the dominant ethnic group's monopoly on state power.2 
In South Asia, nation-building has not been easy - either in 
democracies or in authoritarian states. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
countries in South Asia have used different strategies to forge a 
cohesive nationalism ranging from accommodative policies, through 
coercive measures, to outright suppression. Civilian democratic 
regimes, having decentralised federal structures are more prone to 
2Who constitutes the dominant ethnic group depends on several ethnic variables: in 
China it is the Han; in India, it is the upper caste Hindus; in the United States the 
Whites. There are several ways of securing this privileged position:through 
democracy, where the sheer numbers allow a particular group to maintain its 
dominance over others or through ethnic doctrines such as bhumiputra (sons of the 
soil) in Malaysia, Brunei and Fiji, which ensure the political supremacy of an 
indigenous ethnic group which does not necessarily have numerical dominance. See 
Dawa Norbu Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism (London: 
Routledge, 1992), p.190. 
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using negotiation and bargaining for accommodation. Of course, 
democracies are not flawless when it comes to addressing ethnic 
problems, but authoritarian or military structures tend to suppress 
tensions through threat or use of coercion. But a caveat is in order. 
The continuity in the response of the Pakistani state to ethnic groups 
under both democratic and authoritarian regimes, and the Sri Lankan 
response to Tamil aspirations in a functioning democratic system, 
point to the danger of generalisations. 
The modern state pursues all means to hold on to the units pursuing 
autonomy or self-governance. The experience of India and Pakistan 
has been similar in this regard. When demands became aggressive 
and degenerated into secessionist conflicts which challenged the 
integrity of the state, both states moved away from appeasement to 
force and repression. 
Although the first generation of post-1947 leadership in India seemed 
more inclined than its Pakistani counterparts to recognise and 
accommodate ethnic, linguistic and religious differences, neither 
group questioned the construction of a state along ethnic lines. Both 
sets of leaders wanted to create unified nation-states but adopted 
significantly different strategies and methods for fostering a sense of 
nationhood among ethnically and linguistically diverse groups. 
India's accommodative policies have been a function of its relatively 
democratic, decentralised framework. It has, in some measure, 
responded to the growing challenges of nation-building by its secular 
nationalism, social modernisation, economic development, and 
devolution of power. Its historical overlay encompasses a great 
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variety of lesser traditions and sheer diversity has made for an 
essentially tolerant milieu, facilitating coexistence between the centre 
and regions. Second, power has not been limited to a particular group 
or class. No group has ever enjoyed a monopoly on authority, and 
new groups have been continuously drawn into the power ambit. 
The Indian state has sought to prevent ethnic dissidence by timely and 
often anticipatory legislation. This includes granting special rights and 
privileges to the depressed sections of the community; redrawing 
administrative borders according to cultural linguistic principles; and 
bargaining with recalcitrant groups and at times being able to co-opt 
secessionist groups into the political mainstream. However, the 
continuing strife in Kashmir, and even the case of Punjab shows that 
the Indian model has not been a complete success. 
Where liberal constitutionalism and power-sharing arrangements 
have failed to produce the desired results, force and coercion have 
been employed to curb violent activism and bring the mili~ants to the 
negotiating table. These have intensified ethnic alienation, as in the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. A drift towards centralisation has also 
amplified ethnic unrest. A strong indication of this fact was that 
President's Rule was invoked as many as 66 times between 1968 and 
early 1989 to subjugate the state governments to the centre.3 
In the case of Pakistan, the framework of ethnic conflict management 
has remained fragile due to the centralised character of its federal 
structure. Its formation in 1947 did not automatically translate into 
3 Arend Lijphart, The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Reinterpretation RGI CS Paper 
No 18 (New Delhi: Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1994), p. 19. 
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popular support for the new leadership among the country's diverse 
ethnic groups. With no national parties or uniform culture, to forge 
unity amongst the provinces, Islam became the only viable means of 
maintaining the unity of the country. Highly centralising policies 
carried out by the state elites, primarily the armed forces and the 
civilian bureaucracy, widened cleavages between the provinces and 
the centre. The long spells of military rule under Ayub Khan, Yahya 
Khan and General Zia_ ul Haq did little to increase the political and 
economic participation of disadvantaged groups such as the Sindhis 
and the Baluch. Unwilling to reorient its socio-economic policy, the 
state became even more dependent on its universalist Islamic rhetoric 
after 1971. But given the fundamental biases of Pakistan's 
developmental agenda, and the state's ambivalent attitude towards 
Islam, the Islamic stance made little headway and ethnic tensions 
continued to escalate. 
Generally speaking, the use of coercive power by the state to suppress 
cultural plurality and ethnic resurgence more often than not has 
pushed the aggrieved groups towards violence, and in some cases to a 
bid for secession. An important finding of this thesis is that if genuine 
autonomy is granted at an early stage, and this autonomy is respected 
by the state, there is a good chance of stemming separatist tendencies. 
It is only when non-dominant groups fail to get justice and see no 
prospect for maintaining and improving their status within the 
framework of existing constitutional parameters that they challenge 
the state's legitimacy. In India, Kashmir is one such example where 
the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah in 1984 on the grounds that he had 
lost majority support in the assembly commenced the process of 
alienation in Kashmir. Had the Indian government refrained from 
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adopting centralising policies in the first place, the situation may not 
have snowballed into such a crisis. 
It should be reiterated here that although India has used coercive 
powers and state repression to quell recalcitrant groups in various 
turbtilent regions, its longer history of democracy has enabled its 
regional political economies and electoral processes to maintain 
greater resilience against central interference. Pakistan's regional 
social and economic formations by contrast have been amenable to 
political manipulation by a military-bureaucratic dominated centre. 
There is a need for equitable distribution of economic benefits, 
workable mechanisms for elite settlements, and power-sharing 
through federalism and decentralisation, in order to confront the 
growing challenges of politicised ethnicity in most multi-ethnic 
societies. Coercion and force are often favoured as policy options 
because central authorities believe that such actions will produce 
quick and permanent solutions. This, of course, is seldom true. Force 
and coercion have proved to be inadequate palliatives for complex 
ethnic issues. In cases where they succeed, the solutions may be short-
lived and tensions may recur. Devolution of state authority, and the 
enforcement of democratic values are the best long-term alternatives 
to securing ethnic justice and peace in the subcontinent. 
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